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Abstract
Change management (CM) and organizational development are mature industries with
decades of research and development. Yet, failure rates stated for organizational change
initiatives remain high at 70%. This failure rate suggests that 30% of change initiatives
were successful, but no reports of these successes were found in the literature. The
overarching question considered the experiences of change leaders of successful CM
initiatives. The conceptual framework for this research consisted of change models
defined by Burke, Kotter, Schein, and others. The primary purpose of this study was to
identify the strategies used by successful change leaders. 10 phone interviews with senior
employee change leaders in education, pharmaceuticals, and industrial manufacturing
companies across the United States provided the data for this empirical
phenomenological study. Data were collected using open, conversational interviews. A
modified van Kaam method was used to analyze the data. The most important themes
identified were collaborative leadership and open communication. The results indicated
how these strategies were used without relying on the literature to guide them. Leaders
relied on intuition and independently, aligned to aspects suggested by the framework
authors, but differed in their applications. Using the results of this study may improve the
implementation of change projects and success rates, thus reducing organizational costs
and improving organizational performance. This may have a positive social change effect
on the surrounding community, as project successes may lead to reduced employee job
losses and reduced concomitant job losses and the associated economic decline.
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Dedication
I dedicate this work to all those leaders and managers who have, like me,
struggled with the concepts of change management. At times, that work was a struggle
with a level of feeling unsure because so much of the work of change leadership is
spontaneous activity, reactive to situational dynamics. Change leaders respond to
problems and must maintain a level of authority while I believe that the following work is
important to those senior leaders who must lead change and are limited to working with
external resources to do this. Successful change is possible and is more probable when
the people responsible understand what successful change leaders do differently. The
probability of failure in change is close to negligible if the change initiative were well
thought out, structured, planned, and executed. This research is a start toward improving
the ability to do that. I hope that those change leaders who want success see the value in
what this research presents.
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study
Change management (CM) is an increasingly important leadership discipline in
organizations (Dobbs, Ramaswamy, Stephenson, & Viguerie, 2014; Kotter, 2014).
Despite extensive research and development in CM, reported failure rates have ranged
between 20-92%. The particular rate reported vary based on who reported the failures and
the change activity’s context (Beer & Nohria, 2010; Jorgensen, Owen, & Neus, 2008;
Keller & Aiken, 2008; Kotter, 1996/2010, 2008, 2014; Messinger & Havely, 2013).
These rates are significant and have held constant over many decades (Isern & Pung,
2007; Jorgensen et al., 2008; Keller & Aiken, 2008). CM industry beliefs are that change
initiatives fail at a rate of 70% (Conner, 2012; Jorgensen et al., 2008; Keller & Aiken,
2008; Kotter, 2014). The magnitude of these failure rates calls into question why an
organization’s leaders would attempt to undertake transformational CM.
CM scholars suggested that because change is inevitable, it must be undertaken
and managed, regardless of its potential for failure. If an organization is to remain
competitive and viable (Bradford & Burke, 2005a; Burke, 2014), they must keep up with
changes that affect their operations and continued existence. Some researchers have
suggested that the change failure rates are deceptive (Hughes, 2011; Frahm, 2013; Little,
2013). Others (Barends, Janssen, ten Have & ten Have, 2013; Hayes, 2014; Hughes,
2011) argued that researchers have not provided credible evidence to show the seeming
inevitability of change failure. These researchers recognized that the change process is
more complex than CM theories suggest. Indeed, organizational leaders not only saw this
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need for CM, they saw it as a growing and accelerating requirement (Dobbs et al., 2014).
Nevertheless, experiences of organizational change leaders were not reported or included
in the literature, except as case point examples to support scholarly and professional
resource reporting.
This chapter begins with a broad overview of CM to frame the problems that,
according to researchers, result in CM failure, whether functional or social. The problem
statement will identify the breadth and depth of this issue in organizations. An outline of
the conceptual foundation for and nature of the study, the research questions, the
significance of this work, and a summary of the study follows.
Background
This section includes a review of selected works related to organizational change,
the organizational change failure rate, and its significance. It includes the rationale for
considering past research as fragmented, disjointed, and haphazard, resulting in a paucity
of credible fundamental research in CM. The described works encompass a multifaceted
perspective for organizational CM and show that the study of CM is not a simple,
straightforward endeavor.
Burke’s Review of Change Management Research
Burke (2014) studied and wrote extensively about CM and was among those who
recognized that successful large-scale, organizational change was rare. Burke used the
term transformational change to describe this type of change, with a recommendation to
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change strategy, structure, and culture before changing the organization. Burke posited
that change initiatives have three components:
1. A framework representing the context of the change.
2. A process, sequential activities and events that when exercised in order over
time, result in reaching a changed state.
3. Culture, the behavioral component where the change is to modify the behavior
of organizational members.
This three-part approach was unique in Burke’s work. Most scholars included one or
another of these three elements, only developing one as their primary focus. They might
have implied the other two elements in their presentation but did not address them to any
extent.
Burke (2014) stated that CM knowledge was limited because what was known
was not effective in changing organizations. He further suggested that organizational
change theory barely existed, recommending that change facilitators were better off using
other scientific and social theory approaches as the basis for their work. Burke’s
suggestions included theories such as nonlinear complex systems theory and more
fundamental psychological theories such as the James-Lange theory of emotions,
Maslow’s (1954) hierarchy of needs, Herzberg’s (1966) two-factor motivation-hygiene
theory, and so on. According to Burke, these theories would contribute better to leading
change initiatives than the existing theories for CM, which were limited in their strategies
for shaping participant behavior.
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Burke (2014) offered several examples of organizational development (OD)
authors who found that research did not address change completely. Friedlander and
Brown (1974), for example, framed their research for targeted interventions to focus on
people and technology leading to outcomes. Their people interventions focused on
processes such as communication, decision-making, and problem-solving while their
technology interventions focused more on structures such as task methods, job design,
and organizational design. At the time of Friedlander and Brown’s writing, there was
evidence that OD interventions had some impact, albeit an unclear one, with no overall
guiding theory. Alderfer (1977) concluded that the quality of research was improving but
did not include a framework for the what-and-how of change.
In subsequent studies, Fauchaux, Amado, and Laurent (1982) reported a paucity
of credible fundamental research contradicting Alderfer (1977) as well as Friedlander and
Brown (1974). Fauchaux et al. recognized that changed processes resulted in changed
outcomes, giving rise to the complexity of change. They called for stronger links between
the social and technical approaches to change, which Burke (2014) saw as not
substantiating Friedlander and Brown’s findings. Burke reviewed several other authors,
including Beer and Walton (1987), Argyris, Putnam, and Smith (1985), Carnall (1982),
Legge (1984), Morgan (1983), Weick and Quinn (1999), Oreg, Vakola, and Armenkis
(2011), and Ford and Ford (2012). As will be discussed in detail in Chapter 2, Burke
found a lack of clarity and fundamental research that supported findings. The few studies
found by Ford and Ford (2012) that met their research criteria noted a lack of relationship
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between change approaches, leader behavior, and leader change activity. Significant
findings of both Oreg et al. (2011) and Ford and Ford were the absence of longitudinal
study. Burke observed that normal science had moved on to other methods, such as chaos
theory, nonlinear systems theory, and related concepts such as fractals. He suggested that
this had precipitated changes in research methods.
Svyantek and Brown (2000) and Svyantek and DeShon (1993) suggested that
organizational research needed to move in the same direction as those other sciences.
Svyantek and Brown referred to this as a complex systems approach, meaning that
organizational behavior was unexplained by analysis alone. Complex systems behavior
required understanding (a) the variables in systems behavior, (b) the interconnections
between these variables, (c) the patterns of interconnection, and (d) that the strengths
associated with each are timescale relevant. Burke (2014) noted two concepts that
Svyantek and Brown brought to bear, from the works of Liebovitch (1998) and Richter
(1986), the phase space and the attractor. The phase space relies on multiple
measurements over time. The attractor had two characteristics; (a) sensitivity to initial
conditions and (b) stability. Initial conditions derived from organization history and
stability is analogous to sensitivity to organization culture.
Burke (2014) noted the work of Porras and Robertson (1992) and Porras and
Silvers (1991), who developed concepts of planned versus unplanned change, and firstorder versus second-order change. Planned change was deliberate, consciously executed
change, and unplanned change was the ad hoc response to unanticipated environmental
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change. He described first-order change as incremental change, such as continuous
improvement programs, and second-order change as revolutionary or transformational
change, the kind of change that affects fundamental restructuring and was paradigmatic
change. Friedlander and Brown (1974) provided a framework for understanding
organizational change. Porras (1987) provided a model anchored in open-systems theory.
Burke's concern was that the bulk of the literature failed to address the complexities
noted by Porras and Robertson or Porras and Silvers, nor did it include fundamental
research, even in its latest iterations, as mentioned by the earlier authors.
Professional Practitioners on Change Management
As will be discussed in the literature review, many authors have written
extensively about CM (Ackerman Anderson & Anderson, 2010; Anderson & Ackerman
Anderson, 2001; Jorgensen et al., 2008; Keller & Aiken, 2008; Kotter, 1996/2010, 2014).
These authors were examples of CM professional practitioners, scholars, and researchers.
The work of academics and the work of practitioners serving organizations overlapped.
Kotter, for example, developed his theory as a consultant with over 100 companies while
working as a professor at Harvard. Peters and Waterman (1982/2012), like many
practitioners, are frequently cited by scholars, among them Burke (2014), Bradford and
Burke, (2005a), and Schein (2010). Peters and Waterman worked for a consulting
company that delivered CM services to organizations. They were consultants employed at
McKinsey & Company (McKinsey), a management consulting firm with a CM practice.
CM seemed most commonly executed by larger private commercial organizations and
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government agencies. When these types of organizations plan and execute change, they
solicit support from professional consulting firms like McKinsey. This approach was
apparent in both scholarly and professional publications. Professional practitioners offer
valuable contributions to the definition and execution of CM.
Chapter 2 of this dissertation offers Burke’s (2014) rationale for including
professional and trade literature in the research, but for now, it is important to note that
professional and trade literature add significant value to the body of knowledge in CM by
telling stories of CM client engagements. In that way, it helps scholars broaden the
practical knowledge associated with applying CM theory.
Organizational Development
OD is considered a separate technology from CM. Bradford and Burke (2005a)
presented an edited text containing the work of several authors in the OD field who, in
turn, addressed the humanistic aspects of managing change. Bradford and Burke
suggested that OD was a subset of organizational change that, while still practiced in
organizations, was waning because of its absorption into other disciplines. For example,
human resource practitioners, strategic planners, or information technology offices might
lead CM. These professions recognized the importance of culture change and
incorporated practices for that process from OD into their respective approaches.
As CM diffused into other branches of organizations, CM professionals evolved
into more of a middle-management specialist rather than the senior leadership generalists.
Bradford and Burke (2005b) suggested that as OD declined and CM grew, its
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requirement in organizations changed as other disciplines responded to environmental
change. OD authors presented organizational change as a cultural and human resource
development phenomenon, rather than as a business structure or process redevelopment
problem. Many authors cited by Bradford and Burke observed and reported on the
relative success of organizational change over time, noting the high failure rate, and
proposing nonprocedural approaches for reducing failure probability. They observed the
evolution of OD into organizational change and questioned whether the two disciplines
might eventually merge.
The Disputed Failure Rate of Organizational Change
CM service providers often claimed the failure rate for change initiatives was
70%. Chapter 2 will better define this perceived failure rate. A common source for the
70% statistic came from consulting firms, and, in earlier times, scholars and researchers.
Those consulting firms are not impartial. They typically conducted their surveys among
their clients, a small and potentially nonrepresentative portion of changing organizations.
Their interest might have been for marketing purposes rather than objective analysis;
thus, they are suspect for accuracy and objectivity. At a minimum, their reports might
have been worded carefully to present a skewed picture, serving some purpose other than
objective reporting. Additionally, their concept of failure might represent inconsistent
logic. The consultants had a clear failure definition, but that definition might have been
too restrictive. Consultants see failure as (a) not completing a project on time, (b) not
completing the work within the planned budget, and (c) not delivering all the outcomes
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originally planned (Jorgensen et al., 2008; Keller & Aiken, 2008). Change initiatives
typically take two or three years to complete (Ackerman Anderson & Anderson, 2010;
Burke, 2014) and during that period the change process can be dynamic and fluid,
affected by other contextual or environmental characteristics. While invoking change, the
environment might also be changing, other segments of the organization may change, and
even the objectives of the change initiative itself might change. The original goals of the
plan might change because of other occurrences during the execution process.
Burke (2014) recognized the high failure rates for CM, noting that in the field of
mergers and acquisitions this rate was about 75% and in culture change initiatives it was
as high as 90%. He anchored his approach to addressing change in cultural and
behavioral change theory, recognizing that those constructs must be dealt with before
structural and procedural change can occur. Kotter (1996/2010, 2008, 2014), Anderson
and Ackerman Anderson (2001), and Duck (2001) rooted their theories in structural and
procedural change first. Lewin (1997/2010) and Schein (2010) worked exclusively in
social dynamics and rooted their theories in cultural and behavioral change. Others
presented processes and practices for organizational change and recognized or expressed
concern about the high failure rates. These authors are notable CM authorities based on
their status as primary references in the organizational change literature. They have
suggested that, by following their respective methods, organizational change practitioners
can successfully effect change. Among these authors, Kotter (2014) recognized the 70%
failure rate outright. However, all focused organizational change approaches to ensure
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successful CM initiatives, implying the significance or presence of a probability of CM
failure. They all suggested that following their respective processes would mitigate such
an outcome.
Hughes (2011) was among a different class of researchers who questioned the
legitimacy of the claimed failure rates. This group of authors saw, for a variety of
reasons, that the quoted failure rates were unrealistic. The purported failure rates
suggested that CM is complicated, dynamic, and not easily reduced to statistics. As will
be discussed further in Chapter 2, Hughes suggested that while a popular 70% narrative
existed, empirical evidence supporting that narrative did not. He noted that the change
process was more complex than existing theory allowed and cannot be summed up so
simply by authors whose theories hinged on high failure rates.
Dobbs et al. (2014) represented a category of researchers who recognized that
regardless of success or failure, change was an inevitable constant and will continue as
such into the foreseeable future. Addressing the noted failure rates might be credible, but
that exercise is moot. Dobbs et al. identified an ongoing need for CM, regardless of the
change failure narrative. As Dobbs et al. suggested, economic power shifting to emerging
markets, the aging population, and advancing technology was driving more change at
increasing rates. Organizations must learn to manage change. If the perceived failure rate
was true, they need to learn how to overcome the difficulties and manage change
successfully. Change was occurring whether they managed it or not. At best, CM was a
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way of directing the organization to best respond to its environment while remaining
focused on organizational objectives.
Organizational Change and Social Change
Some scholars saw organizational change as a vehicle for fostering social change.
For example, Pana (2013) viewed organizational change to grow social effectiveness.
Muja, Appelbaum, Walker, Ramadan, and Sodeyi (2014a, 2014b) addressed how
sustainability and the concept of corporate social responsibility emerged as a strategic
response to reducing resource dependency, securing existence as an ongoing concern
while demonstrating corporate citizenship.
These authors showed that CM is a broad subject area with a variety of
perspectives and overlaps. Scholars and practitioners saw change differently. Given the
variety of viewpoints, it was conceivable to understand how the existing models have not
addressed all that is important in CM. Shortcomings in the research included little
fundamental research validating conceptual frameworks. There was also little significant
contribution from practitioners responsible for leading successful change initiatives—that
is, from employee change leaders, accountable for achieving the results intended in
planned, transformational CM initiatives. This lack of input was a significant
shortcoming in the body of knowledge surrounding CM. A study was needed to explore
employee change leader experiences to compare them to what scholars and consultants
reported as causing success or failure before fundamental research is possible.
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Problem Statement
Despite extensive CM research, change initiative success rates have not improved
in organizations (Ackerman Anderson and Anderson, 2010; Burke, 2014; Schein, 2010).
The bulk of the literature, derived from case studies presenting case-point analyses, were
not generalizable to the field of CM (Burke, 2014). In the interim, organizational leaders
are involved in ever accelerating and increasing CM activity. These increasing leadership
dynamics are expected to continue to accelerate in the foreseeable future (Burke, 2014;
Kotter, 2014).
The general problem of lacking improvement in success rates was exacerbated by
the fact that little fundamental research and knowledge existed about how employee
leaders of CM viewed or perceived the credibility, dependability, and usability of the
prescribed approaches to CM intervention. Leaders responsible for achieving results in
CM initiatives cannot rely on the presented solutions as conclusive (Burke, 2014), and
are prone to approach every change as a new initiative, every time they begin. Employee
change leaders, those people charged with delivering the results of planned change in
their employer organizations, cannot ensure that by following recommended approaches
for executing change they can achieve success. They do not know if they are safe in the
knowledge that their change efforts will equal the outcomes of other successful change
leaders. Lacking this knowledge could culminate in significant personal and
organizational risk, as the organization’s social system deals with the consequences and
frequency of failure.
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The specific problem was that change leaders do not appear to have reliable
knowledge of what other successful employee change leaders do to achieve success or
avoid failure. Consequently, those other change leader efforts were not duplicative.
Change leaders begin every project as a new endeavor without the benefit of prior
experience except in those instances when they are starting a new project, had led other
projects before the new one began, and the new initiative included similar social and
operational dynamics of the earlier projects. Most change managers never have more than
that of one or two transformational change initiative experiences in their careers. Their
ability to have developed a skillset was limited.
Scholars and consultants who are professional change leaders have recognized
that change is increasing in speed, frequency, and significance. These professionals
provided background with recommended procedures for executing change (Kotter, 2014;
Jorgensen et al., 2008). However, those authors included little fundamental research
substantiating their recommendations for managing change (Burke, 2014). The literature
contained few generalizable findings supported by fundamental research. Scholars,
researchers, and consultants presented most of the literature. These people were external
resources to the organizations that engaged them. As a result, commonly cited statistics
for failure and success rates of CM efforts vary widely with little empirical evidence
presenting corroborate solutions. I found no indication of CM strategies and tactics used
by working change practitioners. That is, no working strategies and tactics the
organizational leaders assigned to lead and effect change used, specifically, how they
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defined and ensured success, how they identified the actions needed to succeed, and how
they continued to manage them through day-to-day activity to completion of the change
event. This study was intended to help close that gap by focusing on employee
organizational change leaders to determine the lessons they learned while managing
transformational change successfully.
Purpose of the Study
Because of their detachment, researchers might have misunderstood the culture
and politics of the organizations they studied, and their findings might differ from the
perspectives of organization employees, including employee change leaders. The purpose
of this empirical phenomenological study (Merriam & Tisdell, 2016; Moustakas, 1994)
was to explore the lived experiences of employee change leaders to understand how they
effected that change to achieve planned results. The paradigm of these leaders is the dayto-day inner workings of the organization from the position of an employee. It is different
from that of the external resources, such as consultants or scholars. Employees, including
senior executives, share ongoing day-to-day responsibility and social group membership.
They have a culture they belong to and behaviors they exercise that keeps them relevant
as members of the group. They know how to stay within social boundaries while
interacting with other members of the group and directing their work efforts. I gathered
data and information, containing descriptions of these lived experiences from employee
change leaders. This data collection was analyzed to go beyond their understanding and
descriptions, to deduce the shared essence of their experiences, turning them into the
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common experiences that expose the leadership strategies and tactics that led to
successful CM.
Research Questions
The overaching reseach questions is: How do employee change leaders,
responsible for delivering results in CM initiatives, live their experiences of CM success,
specifically, to be held accountable for achieving the results of planned change, to
experience the culture of change, and accomplish the results forecasted in planning the
change process?
Subquestions derived from this research focus include:
1. What behaviors and other practices do internal change leaders seem to
exercise, what do they do differently from what external change practitioners
suggest, that results in CM success?
2. What meaning do employee change leaders attribute to the high failure rates
in CM and how do these leaders show through their lived experiences to avoid
them?
3. How, given the extraordinarily high potential for failure, do these leaders
continue to exercise CM practices successfully in their organizations?
Conceptual Framework
This study’s underlying conceptual framework used Burke’s (2014) model for
change, as well as the frameworks and processes suggested by Ackerman Anderson and
Anderson (2010), Anderson and Ackerman Anderson (2001), Kotter (1996/2010, 2014)
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and Peters and Waterman (1982/2012). Burke suggested that CM can be explained using
either life-cycle, teleological, dialectical, or evolutionary discourses. He stressed that CM
theory itself was, for all intents and purposes, nonexistent. He noted that the known
change principles tended to be procedural approaches that fit within Lewin’s (1997/2010)
model for behavioral change but were incomplete. According to Burke, these principles
addressed transitions from some current as-is state to a future to-be state, following and
embellishing Lewin’s three-phase process of unfreezing, changing, then refreezing.
However, Burke also noted that the principles tended to oversimplify actual change and
failed to recognize the ambiguity and dynamic complexity of effecting behavioral or
cultural change. He suggested that change is rooted in psychological and behavioral
theories such as Maslow’s hierarchy of needs or Chin and Benne’s strategies for social
change (Burke, 2014, p. 194). The areas covered by the most widely accepted CM
theories addressed only lightly if at all, the aspects presented by behavioral scholars such
as these. Because of this failure to address behavioral and psychological dynamics, Burke
believed that the change theories submitted by others were incomplete.
Kotter’s (1996/2010) model was a source of Burke’s (2014) criticism. Kotter
presented a logical, sequential approach for organizational change, stressing change as
more of a procedural activity, transitioning from an as-is to a to-be state. Kotter addressed
humanistic and behavioral aspects of change but not as critical or primary objectives of
his approach. He did not emphasize behavioral aspects, except by demonstration in case
examples throughout his writing.
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Nystrom, Hoog, Garvare, Weinehall, and Ivarsson (2013) noted that most of the
widely accepted theories of change were similar and seemed incomplete or
oversimplified. The authors of such theories recognized sociological elements but treated
them as secondary to mechanically structuring change as a sequential process. Kotter’s
(1996/2010) theory is relevant because of its status as the second most cited theory in CM
and one of the more commonly known in organizations (the most cited was E. H.
Schein’s (2010) model addressing organizational psychology). Appelbaum, Habashy,
Malo, and Shafiq (2012) noted that Kotter’s (1996/2010) book was cited more than 4,000
times in Google Scholar, and many academic texts include his model. Appelbaum et al.
(2012) called Kotter’s book a key reference in CM but noted that the work lacked
empirical evidence, which is consistent with most works in CM. Appelbaum et al.
reviewed the literature for the efficacy of Kotter’s (1996/2010) eight-step process for CM
and found that while the literature supported the steps in Kotter’s model, there were
limitations in how the process was applied. These included an overly rigid approach to
CM and recognizing that some measures were unnecessary in certain contexts. The
model also did not address important aspects noted by others and added difficulty in
dealing with the complexity of change.
Beyond showing that they exist, Kotter (1996/2010) did not emphasize the
importance of humanistic and sociological concepts. He demonstrated without describing
the behavioral characteristics exhibited by actors in his cases as they responded to
change. Other authors have treated these aspects similarly (Dobbs et al., 2014; Duck,
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2001; Kotter, 2014; Peters & Waterman, 1982/2012). Such characteristics, which may be
idiosyncratic or reflective of good leadership practices assumed by these authors, may be
most crucial in determining success or failure of any organizational change effort. Kotter
(1996/2010) suggested an eight-stage process for managing change. While he did not
relate those stages to Lewin’s (1997/2010) model, it is possible to align these two
theories in a comparative model. The same goes for Burke’s (2014) approach, as well as
that of Ackerman Anderson and Anderson (2010). Lewin wrote about the sociology of
change at the individual behavioral level. By aligning Lewin’s phases with Kotter’s eight
stages, the parallels between their concepts become evident while adding the sociological
insight of Lewin.
In another example, Duck (2001) presented a procedure in five phases, similar to
Kotter’s (1996/2010) eight stages. These phases can be aligned to show the parallels
between Kotter’s and Duck’s approaches. Duck’s process recognized human issues
surrounding change, presenting what others saw as resistance, as normal behavior in the
evolving change event. Aligning Duck’s phases with Kotter’s stages shows insight into
the human issues that Duck saw in Kotter’s activity.
Thus, it is feasible to align the aspects of CM presented by others with the
procedural logic suggested by Burke (2014) or Kotter (1996/2010) and see a more
comprehensive description of an effective CM process. Testing the usefulness of such an
approach, while possible as a secondary objective of this research, was beyond the scope
of this study. However, such a consolidation could enhance future research.
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Nature of the Study
Because of their detachment, external researchers and consultants may have
misunderstood the culture and politics of the organizations with which they consulted.
Their findings might differ from the perspectives of organization employees, particularly
those of employee change leaders. The purpose of this empirical phenomenological study
is to explore the lived experiences of these employee change leaders—those charged with
bringing about change—to understand the essence of how internal change leaders, as
employees of changing organizations, successfully lead change. It is to explain how this
differed from what researchers and scholars described as the mechanics of successful
change. The perspective was the day-to-day inner workings of the organization from the
viewpoint of an employee, which differs from that of the external resource. I gathered
data and information that showed how these leaders led change initiatives to fruition, by
bracketing and reducing their lived stories to the essence of their practices as successful
change leaders. This data collection was structured to go beyond understanding the
behaviors, leadership, findings, actions, and results of employee change leaders. Instead,
I sought fundamental understanding of what these practices were in their purest sense and
how they created success.
The nature of this study was qualitative using an empirical phenomenological
approach (Merriam & Tisdell, 2016; Moustakas, 1994; Patton, 2015). This method
explored CM practices, gathering the lived experiences of employee change leaders as
they confronted the underlying phenomena that caused the success or failure of planned
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change initiatives in organizations. These experiences were bracketed and deduced from
the stories of lived experiences told by CM leaders within changing organizations, the
people charged with executing change plans and achieving the results expected in the
change initiative.
Organizations were selected based on their inclusion in targeted industries for this
study because of a perception that they experience higher or more frequent change rates
than most other industries. The actual essences of change initiative success and failure
were expected to be credible and dependable. The approach to this study was to interview
organizational senior change leaders to learn how they considered these phenomena, how
they described them occurring within their organization, and through comparative
analysis to reduce their explanations to their purest form, the essence of their underlying
character without the filter of participant interpretation. The study participant group
consisted of 10 people, which was what was needed to achieve data saturation. Data
saturation occurred when additional interviews did not change the key findings and when
any additional data was redundant compared to earlier collected information (Merriam &
Tisdell, 2016). These analysis results expressed the essence of transformational change
that actual employee change leaders considered being the causes of success or failure,
how they explained the high failure rates reported for this sort of activity, and why they
continued to exercise CM, given the high failure rates reported in the CM industry.
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Operational Definitions
Change framework: Some change leaders recognized that change occurs within a
framework (Isern & Pung, 2006; Jorgensen, Bruehl, & Franke, 2014; Keller & Aiken,
2008; Peters & Waterman, 1982/2012). Organizations have a structure which are
abstractly defined frameworks that surround their operations. These frameworks define
the scope of organizational elements and the organization as a whole. Many change
leaders considered change occurring within such frameworks. For example, McKinsey
did not consider change processes possible and suggested that all change happens within
a framework (Rasiel, 1999). I discuss the framework in greater detail in Chapter 2.
CM success (or failure): Jorgensen et al. (2008) defined CM success, as did
several others, as (a) completing a project on time, (b) completing the work within the
planned budget, and (c) delivering all of the outcomes planned at the beginning of the
initiative. Others have significantly contradicted this definition. For example, Hughes
(2011) indicated that change is more complex than this simple definition allowed. Dobbs
et al. (2014) also said that managing change is more macroeconomic than existing theory
allowed, noting that change is a constant, an inevitability, and learning to manage it is a
requirement, regardless of how simplistically stated control definitions were. Thus, CM
success (or failure) is undefined and may become a secondary outcome of this research.
CM: Burke (2014) defined CM as the integration of aspects of management
consulting, such as business strategy, modifying information systems, or organizational
design and structure services, with organization change methods, based on applied
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behavioral science and organizational psychology. Ackerman Anderson and Anderson
(2010) preferred the term change leadership, noting that management focuses more on
standardization, maximizing consistency and eliminating variation while leadership
focuses more on transcending the management paradigm, applying creative solutions to
transformational change. Exercising leadership goes beyond management.
Change manager: The organization employee assigned leadership responsibility
for directing a transformational change initiative. If the entire organization was changing,
that leader might be the CEO or another member of the senior staff assigned that
responsibility. In larger organizations, it might be a senior director, vice president,
division or department leader, or specialist who reported to the C-level, empowered with
the authority of the Chief Executive to complete the change initiative.
Change process: Many authors viewed CM as a process (Duck, 2001; Kotter,
1996/2010, 2014; Schein, 2010). Part of managing change entails defining a sequential
process, designed to execute a logical chain of steps that when completed, should result
in an orderly change. These are typically done using project management techniques that
organize tasks, activities, and events to occur in sequentially with goals, milestones,
tasks, dependencies, and so on, using the tools of the project management discipline.
Cultural change: Many authors suggested that change was a function of
individual behavior and organizational psychology (Bradford & Burke, 2005a; Burke,
2014; Schein, 2010). Their premise was that every organization has a unique culture that
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must change to effect transformations. Without culture change, transformational change
was not possible.
External and internal resources: Full-time employees of organizations and
members of the culture, the social group that makes up the organization. External
resources are consultants, scholars, and researchers brought in by organizations under
contract, to work in support of the organization, but who are not employees and not
members of the culture or social group of the organization.
Organization change: Daft (2010) defined organization change as the strategic
innovation exercised by organizations to stay aligned with their changing environment.
Organization: Jones (2010) defined an organization as an intangible tool used to
coordinate action toward achieving a goal. Daft (2010) defined the organization as a goaldirected social entity, a deliberately structured, coordinated activity system linked to an
external environment. Daft said that the organization is an assemblage of people and their
relationships with each other. These relationships exist to perform essential functions to
attain goals.
Transformational change: Burke (2014) defined organization change as planned
or unplanned evolutionary or revolutionary change. Most change is unplanned,
evolutionary change that occurs spontaneously in the organization. Occasionally, the
organization undertakes planned, revolutionary change that results in most or all of a
simultaneously modified or new vision, mission, strategies, leadership, products and
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services, structure, business processes, and culture. This type of change, a rare occurrence
in organizations, is transformational change.
Assumptions
The public postsecondary education (education), pharmaceutical, and
manufacturing industries appeared positioned for higher instances of transformational
change. The way they approached and managed this change is similar. Growth and
decline were both presumed to be indicators of high rates of change, given that growth
and decline both tend to cause or bring about reorganization, which in turn leads to
changed vision, mission, strategy, leadership, and culture. The fastest growth industries
reported by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (2015) were in the sectors of health care and
social assistance, professional and business services, information, financial activities,
state and local government, and mining. Pharmaceuticals are a subset of healthcare,
education is a function of state and local government, and manufacturing has been
declining as the U. S. transitions from an industrial based to a knowledge-based
economy. I sought participants in these sectors. CM is a general management and
leadership philosophy versus a technical, structural, or functional discipline of operations.
The techniques used to manage change cross boundaries from one industry to another.
Transformational change occurs in all industries and organizational structures but is more
prevalent in high growth and rapidly declining environments. When a transformational
change requirement occurs, organization survival requires leadership to address the
demand it creates.
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Scope and Delimitations
The scope of this study was transformational change initiatives conducted in
small to large business organizations in the education, pharmaceutical, and manufacturing
sectors as defined by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. These organizations were
sought throughout the United States (U.S.) and found primarily through referrals. This
focus facilitated discovery of change initiatives more readily than others and provided
ample potential participants with recent change experiences that were more easily
accessible and representative. There was a large population of recently experienced
change leaders found in these sectors, and the study took advantage of that. Education has
undergone significant change over the past 15 to 20 years and has exercised
transformational change in keeping with that trend. The pharmaceutical industry, a subset
of Healthcare, is a major industry in the Northeastern U.S. that has also been undergoing
significant change. Manufacturing has also undergone significant change recently as the
U.S. economy evolves from an industrial to more of a knowledge-based economy. As for
CM, the research contained a more generic concept, more related to leadership, general
management, and organization development in a broader sense than to some unique
aspect of any one industry. CM concepts were applicable across industries and
organizations of all types. The management of change in education organizations was
conducted in the same manner as in any other organization. The literature showed that
CM leadership is not unique to any one industry. For example, Kotter (1996/2010) said
he conducted his research while working at over 100 companies. He did not indicate any
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particular industry where his findings were more prevalent. Likewise, while Burke (2014)
offered extensive examples, he did not place them in any industry. Burke’s work cited
others extensively, for example, Porras and Silvers (1991) and Weisbord (1976), Nadler
and Tushman (1977), and Tichy (1983). None of these suggested any one industry stood
out over another as when experiencing transformational change. The same concepts seem
to apply across industries, regardless of where they existed.
Delimitations
The delimitations for this study included, first, a limitation to transformational
change. I sought participants whose change initiatives were to modify or change the
mission, strategy, leadership, culture, and design of an organization, simultaneously.
Participant representatives were senior executives, general managers, and directors
responsible for leading transformational change initiatives. The research conduct was
primarily through one-on-one telephone interviews with these change leaders. This
approach facilitated comfortable communication between the researcher and participants
and fostered candor in the discussions. Participants were inclined to speak more openly
and fluidly in the telephone interview setting and established a relationship with the
investigator. That was easiest for them in one-on-one telephone interviews. This
approach also enabled the researcher to reach a higher level participant as part of the
interview process, thereby improving the depth of data in what the participants expressed.
Video conferencing was considered for this. However, most participants were unable to
participate in that manner.
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Limitations
Conducting the study in a natural setting made it difficult to replicate in other
contexts. While organizations are similar in a macro sense, the nuances of structure,
culture, and process in one organization can differ substantially from others. Findings in
one organization may be unique and not duplicable. The placement of change leaders in
many organizations may be at wrong levels or in wrong departments to empower them
with directing change. Their focus during CM may be too specialized in one discipline or
another. When effecting change, research has shown that change leaders should be the
most senior officials of the organization or a direct report, empowered as if they were the
organization leader. As Burke (2014) and Bradford and Burke (2005a) pointed out, most
evolutionary change occurred gradually, in isolated actions in one department or another,
or in various smaller, more specialized projects that do not necessarily impact the entire
organization. Many organizations have relegated CM to a middle management function
in one department or another that is more focused on functional change than on
organization or culture change. This study needed to ensure that the example change
initiatives of a participating organization were representative of transformational change
rather than of the typical functional changes that occur at lower organization levels.
Focusing on the credibility of the change initiative, its transferability, its dependability
and confirmability, should facilitate limiting the research to change.
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Significance of the Study
Change will continue into the foreseeable future, more pronounced and significant
as time goes on (Burke, 2014; Dobbs et al., 2014; Kotter, 2014). Dobbs et al. (2014)
noted how the forces of change over the past 50 years have disrupted industries and
changed societies and, given the shifts in social systems and technology, particularly in
emerging markets, will continue to do so with greater impact. Dobbs et al. suggested that
organizational change approaches will necessarily continue for the foreseeable future.
Increasingly efficient organizational change processes are needed to facilitate it. These
authors noted that, despite advances in organizational change, the reported high failure
rates have remained relatively constant over the past 55 years. They suggested that the
organizational change improvement claims might not be conclusive. Dobbs et al. noted
that for all the effort in defining organizational change, the lack of reduction in the failure
rate for this type of initiative suggested a need for more research, or, at the least, a
redefinition of change success. Perhaps failure is a step that should be anticipated and
integrated into the designs of change efforts, an argument also supported by Burnes
(2011), Hughes (2011), Nystrom et al. (2013), among others.
Significance to Practice
Contemporary theorists have not yet established the criteria needed to
demonstrate success or failure in CM initiatives empirically. It seemed that little data
presented internal change leader experiences and how they accomplished change
successfully. Professional and trade practitioners have developed established criteria for

29
managing change, but that criteria may not have accounted for group dynamics and
cultural issues while changing. Their approaches seemed more mechanistic or procedural.
They addressed culture but only at theoretical levels. They prescribed success for project
completion (Jorgensen et al., 2008; Keller & Aiken, 2008) without addressing the
leadership tactics and social influences that got them there. Consultants and scholars
tended to have an arm’s length perspective regarding organizational change. They
demonstrated processes for and claimed or implied success using CM models. They
might not have been as familiar with other organizational dynamics such as culture,
politics, and personalities, which tend to significantly influence outcomes (Anderson &
Ackerman Anderson, 2001; Burke, 2014; Burnes & By, 2012; Marshak, 2005; Pasmore,
2014). While high failure rates persisted, the consequences of failure were less significant
for scholars and consultants than for employees of changing organizations. The authors
cited in this study were primarily scholars, consultants, and other external resource
organizational change proponents. This study strove to understand the behaviors and
practices exercised by employee change leaders and present them in a way that is
generalizable and transferable to other organizations. This understanding could
significantly expand the practices of CM, could lead to reductions in the failure rates for
CM initiatives, and show positive contributions to improving success in CM activities.
Significance to Theory
While the goal of this project was gathering insight into why change failure rates
remain high, one aim was to broaden understanding of CM viability instead of accepting
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the high failure rates at face value. This research explored change initiatives led by
employee change leaders, who unlike consultants, are paid to direct change initiatives
from start to finish, are socially connected to the organization where they need to retain a
level of trust, respect, and appreciation. The study was designed to find these leaders’
success stories and the essence of their understanding of the causes of this phenomenon. I
studied how these leaders behave in their organizations, how that participation translates
to motivating success or failure, and how that precipitated social stability within the
organization. This study compared these findings with those of the scholars and
practitioners in the literature, to understand what working change leaders do differently to
achieve success. Publishing these results will document an important addition to
knowledge of CM theory and practice.
Significance to Positive Social Change
The literature showed that most reporting in CM came from scholars, scholarpractitioners, and external consultants. These are external resources to the working
organizations that exercise CM as a matter of course of their continued operations. Their
perspectives were different. There was little direct reporting from actual working change
leaders, those people responsible for effecting change in their respective employer
organizations, by implementing the recommendations of scholars, scholar-practitioners,
consultants, or others professing CM knowledge. On-the-job CM practitioner experiences
differ significantly from what researchers, scholar-practitioners, and consultants observed
cause CM success or failure. The stress applied in conducting this study was to focus on
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the knowledge of the on-the-job change leader. Scholars, scholar-practitioners, and
consultants report findings based on their involvement in CM efforts as external
resources. They are inclined to attend, observe, and report observations but may not have
been participants in the social structures or political interactions of the organizations they
observed. That participation differs from the experience of working change leaders,
responsible for executing the recommendations of the consultants and authors who wrote
about CM while maintaining credible work and social relationships with organization
members. The employee experience may have been affected by the need to negotiate
terms and tactics to obtain trust, respect, and cooperation. Indeed, change efforts or OD
interventions may have been undertaken by these practitioners without knowledge of
academic theory or the benefit of consulting with other successful CM professionals. This
anomaly was a unique difficulty sometimes expressed as the knowing-doing gap (Pfeffer
& Sutton, 1999).
This study was conducted to gain an understanding of the causes of CM success
from the unique perspective of the on-the-job employee CM practitioner, compared to
that of scholar-practitioners and consultants. Employee change leaders are a unique
subset of change practitioners. At a minimum, the change practitioner profession includes
academics, consultants, and organizational employees who lead change initiatives.
Scholars include professors, researchers, and instructors who study CM as a concept.
Consultants include both independent specialists and representatives of management
consulting firms offering CM services to organizations. These individuals, while
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influential, do not lose credibility in a failure, the way an employee does. The employee
leader is more heavily invested in the success of the change and stands to lose more than
other practitioners in the event of failure. They tend to have a narrower, more hands-on
range of experience. They are more politically and socially connected inside the
organization, and they might have their entire career defined by this one success or
failure; a failure that could permanently disrupt career advancement. Academics and
consultants, by the nature of their work, are more likely to maintain a sense of distance
and neutrality. They are less liable to be threatened by failure than is the employee leader.
Consequently, the employee outlook for, and actual dynamics of, CM success or failure
might significantly differ from that of the external consultant who gives advice and
guidance, or the academic who conducts a study of change and views each failure as an
expansion of knowledge rather than a loss of credibility. The on-the-job leader remains at
risk for immediate, irreversible career damage, lost credibility, and diminished trust and
respect. Such failure not only affects the employee change leader, but it may also affect
the welfare of the entire organization and possibly their surrounding community. Failure
can lead to layoffs, which in turn, lead to less demand for goods and services afforded by
the community. This is Calibresi’s (2016) perfect vicious circle, that in worst case
scenarios could lead to economic and social recession or depression.
Summary
This chapter included a review of selected works in CM and explored the
literature for a better understanding of the causes of transformational CM success or
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failure. Exacerbated by the fact that the literature is incomplete in reporting how CM
failure occurs, the research problem was to discover how organizational employee change
leaders affected changes successfully. This qualitative phenomenological study is
designed to distill the essence of their activity, thereby developing a more generalized
finding from their experiences. The purpose of this research was to identify the behaviors
and tactics that cause transformational change success or contributed to reducing the
failure potential. I explored how employee change leaders defined success and failure,
what strategies and tactics they applied to achieve success, how they applied them, and
the why, what, and way they did this to avoid failure.
This chapter has been an overview leading into Chapter 2, offering a synthesis of
the work already completed in CM. The review in Chapter 2 will stress the state of the
existing literature, elaborate on why this research is necessary, and demonstrate how this
work will result in the expansion of knowledge in CM.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
The study problem noted in Chapter 1 is two-fold. First, there was little
knowledge about how employee leaders of CM viewed or perceived the credibility,
dependability, and usability of the prescribed approaches to CM intervention found in the
literature. Leaders responsible for delivering results in CM initiatives cannot rely on the
presented solutions as compelling (Burke, 2014). Those leaders are prone to approach
every change as a completely new initiative every time they begin. Employee change
leaders, the personnel charged with delivering the results of planned change in their
employer organizations, cannot ensure that by following the recommended approaches
for executing change, they can succeed. They do not know if they are safe in the
knowledge that their change efforts will equal the outcomes of other successful change
leaders. Second, change leaders do not appear to have reliable knowledge of what other
successful employee change leaders do to achieve success or avoid failure. Consequently,
those other efforts cannot be duplicated. Change leaders begin projects without the
benefit of prior experience except when previous projects have included similar social
and operational dynamics.
The extensive research in CM consisted predominantly of case studies. Findings
and recommendations tended to be descriptions of isolated solutions for observed,
pointed incidents than based on learned generalizable or transferable experiences. These
findings and recommendations were mostly from interviewing and working with multiple
participants who actively led change projects through to completion. In the literature
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review that follows, although numerous scholars have described strategies and tactics that
led to change failure, in no books or articles, have authors described direct experiences of
managing change. This shortcoming is particularly true as it relates to encountering and
addressing conflicts and problems while guiding a change initiative from the perspective
of a line manager or senior executive, the people primarily accountable for success in
leading a change initiative.
This chapter contains the approach used to explore the literature for successful
CM initiatives and includes a presentation of the conceptual framework underlying this
study. Many authors recommended tactics and techniques for managing change,
summarized in the following chapter. They recognized three areas of concentration: (a)
the cultural and behavioral aspects of change, (b) the frameworks within which change
occurs, and (c) the procedural aspects of organizing and managing change projects from
start to finish.
The review began with the definitions of success and failure offered by CM
practitioners and reported from organizations undergoing planned change. The search
included a review of the models underlying major CM approaches and how successful
change leaders achieved their success or avoided failure. Finally, the literature review
addressed why knowing what leads to success has not translated into a reducing the
failure rates for CM efforts.
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Literature Search Strategy
This section includes a description of the approaches taken to review CM success
and failure. Relevant information found in peer-reviewed literature from academic
journals, trade and professional books, articles from reputable business and management
publications, and literature from management consulting firms that offered the CM
services underlying these searches. The section relied on Burke’s (2014) argument for the
inclusion of trade and professional literature in this sort of review. Burke suggested that
trade and professional publications were needed to ensure adequate coverage of the
subject due to the breadth of literature available from CM executives, consultants, and
experienced practitioners. The trade and professional publications included in this search
were reputable publications. Many of the trade and professional articles from these
publications were found in academic databases such as ABI/INFORM Complete and
Business Source Complete and were often cited in peer-reviewed literature. Burke noted
that professional publications contributed knowledge beyond that of academic journals.
He cautioned that a narrower scope of vision on the part of these authors might limit their
efficacy since they tended not to include reference citations or independent verification
and validation of their findings. However, these authors, whether academics, consultants,
executives, or other practitioners, were experienced professionals. They invested the
integrity of their professional status in seeing CM represented fairly, and their
contributions led to a broader understanding of the phenomenon.
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The academic sources searched returned peer-reviewed articles from the
ABI/INFORM Complete, Academic Source Complete, Business Source Complete,
Google Scholar, ProQuest, and Thoreau databases. Examples of the non-academic
sources searched included The McKinsey Quarterly, Bain & Company Insights,
International Business Machines (IBM) Systems Magazine, American Management
Review, Bloomberg Business Week, Inc. Magazine, Forbes, and the Houston Chronicle.
Additionally, relevant material was sought from the websites of McKinsey, Bain &
Company, IBM, Boston Consulting (BCG), and several smaller consulting companies.
This literature review process began with studying academic, trade, and
professional texts for CM. A significant number of scholars and consultants who practice
CM as advisors authored most of these books and articles. For example, John Kotter,
professor emeritus at Harvard University, also appeared to work to assist organizations
with CM. His book, Leading Change, was based on over 10 years of consulting
experience with over 100 organizations (Kotter, 1996/2010). While his text outlined his
consulting experiences, that outline seemed more of an example of what appeared to be
standard practices; not citing references, not enabling independent verification, or not
providing any corroboration for his claims. For this reason, Burke (2014) classified
Kotter’s works as trade and professional publications, even though most of it was written
during his tenure as a professor at Harvard and published by the Harvard Business
Review Press. The significance of this fact was that Kotter’s (1996/2010) Leading
Change was the second most cited academic source in the ABI/INFORM and Business
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Source Complete databases. In another example, Hammer and Champy (2002), a
professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) and a management
consultant, respectively, wrote about re-engineering corporations. Hammer and Champy
recognized change was a dynamic of business process redesign and reorganization but
focused more on re-engineering processes than on CM. As discussed elsewhere in this
dissertation, they also stated their unscientific estimate was that 50% to 70% of reengineering efforts did not achieve their intended results. Claims like these are significant
because so many other authors cite them, making them part of the management canon.
OD and CM are mature disciplines with an extensive literature. A cursory search
of Amazon.com showed almost 104,000 titles listed for CM. A search of the databases at
Walden University revealed 38,000 articles on the topic, and Google Scholar returned
about 341,000 titles. Several searches were conducted to refine the review and limit the
search to literature pertinent to understanding CM success and failure rates. Each had a
unique context derived from the study’s preliminary research. These included the
following:


Where the authors seemed to concur with or support the existence of the high
failure rates suggested in the initial studies.



Where the authors seemed to question, disagree with, or contradict the failure
rates proposed in the studies that suggest them.



That is presenting CM models and solutions.



That explicitly defined change success and failure.

39


That listed or suggested causes of success and failure in CM initiatives.



That recognized a distinction between OD and CM.



That conflated OD and CM.



That perceived change as a constant, regardless of success or failure.



That addressed the failure to effect failure rate change in CM. or



That recognized the potential for social change, and the influence CM had in
this context.

The approach to this study began with a review of professional and trade literature
for CM. I examined academic research relevant to organizational theory, including
organizational theory textbooks that included chapters or sections on CM. Next was a
search in academic library databases for research addressing one or more of each of the
perspectives previously mentioned. The search concluded with a review of nonacademic
professional and trade literature for relevant articles and publications that contributed
knowledge in CM, recognizing Burke’s (2014) observation that this research is
significant. This non-academic search followed the same perspectives, searching for
professional and trade literature for research addressing one or more of the perspectives
listed above.
Although I made every effort to limit results to peer-reviewed literature, this
subject has been studied and written about extensively by consultant CM professionals
and practitioners outside the academic world in non-academic papers, magazines, online
resources, and non-peer-reviewed journals that address change. Many academic scholars

40
also published this way (Burke, 2014). Burke stressed that the broadest research basis
should include non-peer-reviewed publications with any comprehensive literature review
in CM.
The difficulty with using nonacademic literature was that its authors tend not to
cite references or to independently verify their findings and recommendations. Therefore,
as Burke (2014) cautioned, these works, while significant, may tend toward the anecdotal
and are limited in generalizability. Concerning that scope, they can be helpful,
contributing to CM knowledge. Thus, expanding the search breadth to include these
works broadened the efficacy of this review.
Conceptual Framework
The phenomenon studied in this research was managing transformational change
in structured organizations. Planned transformational change affects the organization
system to such an extent that the system is modified in its entirety and supports an
entirely new and different mission. It involves changing strategies, systems, leadership,
and culture (Burke, 2014). The organization that emerges from transformational change
is something different from when the organization identified the change needed and
planning for that change started.
The three elements of change in organizations were (a) the behavioral and
cultural, (b) the organizational framework, and (c) the change processes. What follows
represents how the various researchers defined these elements.
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Behavioral and Cultural Change
Behavioral and cultural changes were those social and individual behaviors that
organization members exercised to complete their work, to interact with each other, with
leadership, and with the external environment. Effecting behavioral and cultural change
was manipulating social and cultural programs in a way that organizational members,
both as individuals and as groups, change their behaviors in concert with organizational
changes. Schein (2010) identified these best in his Stages of Learning/Change (p. 300).
His first stage involved disconfirmation of what is, the creation of survival anxiety, and
the creation of psychological safety to overcome learning anxiety. His second and third
stages were similar, and together, they comprised the seven steps of his approach to
cultural change. These were behavior change techniques Schein expected as part of a
change initiative. Schein was unique in that he was focused completely on cultural and
behavioral change.
Organizational Frameworks
Frameworks are the structural elements that the group operates within, including
the artifacts that support that structure. Burke (2014) referred to the framework as the
organizational model, as a representation of the organization. He considered the
framework as the what to change. Behavioral and cultural change defined how the change
leader changes the behavior of the organization by changing the behavior of the
individuals, the groups, and the micro-cultures within the organization. Ackerman
Anderson and Anderson (2010) viewed frameworks differently. They defined them as the
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“static depictions of types of change activity requiring attention, such as business case,
communications, training, and work redesign” (Ackerman Anderson & Anderson, 2010,
“Leading Transformation Requires,” para. 4). Peters and Waterman (1982/2012)
developed the McKinsey 7-S Framework while employed at McKinsey. Figure 1 depicts
that framework.

Figure 1. McKinsey 7-S framework. Adapted from “Criteria for Success,” by T. J. Peters
and R. H. Waterman, Jr., 1982/2012, p. 11, In Search of Excellence: Lessons from
America’s Best-Run Companies (Collins Business Essentials edition), Used with
permission.
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As shown in Figure 1, Peters and Waterman (1982/2012) depicted structural
elements as static artifacts of organization structure. They noted that change occurred
within the bounds of a framework such as this. Ackerman Anderson and Anderson (2010)
also recognized, in addition to the framework, the importance of a change process for
guiding the change in conjunction with a change framework to frame the scope of the
work.
Change Processes
A change process is a linear sequence of planned activities and events, executed
to move an organization from a current state to some future state (Burke, 2014). Burke
defined the change process as the how, the implementation, and adoption of change.
Burke’s approach prescribed how a change is planned, launched, implemented, and
sustained. This approach is the application of project management techniques such as
planning a series of activities and events along a timeline, with milestones toward
completion, assignments of tasks to responsible individuals and tracking progress to
ensure achievement of task completions with both interim and end-state goals.
Most approaches to change were either process models or combinations of
process models and frameworks. Kotter’s (1996/2010) eight steps were sequential,
although as Kotter indicated the steps did not need implementation in the order given, if
the organization addressed all eight steps. Duck (2001) called her approach a framework
but displayed it in a conventional timeline configuration with a sequential order. Peters
and Waterman (1982/2012) and Rasiel (1999) suggested that McKinsey did not have a
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process for CM. They worked from the 7-S model. However, the first thing they do when
engaging with a client is to prepare a process plan jointly. Every process plan is a custom
development at the beginning of every project. There were some confused definitions in
the literature for frameworks and processes, covered in more detail in the next section.
Framework, Process, Behavioral and Cultural Model Confusion
The research examples found in this study seemed based mostly on work where
external change agents had conducted programs to help bring about change at client sites.
The observations of those external resources served as the basis for their change models.
Those studies did not include contributions from working CM leaders, who were
employees of changing organizations. While overall change failure rates have not
declined, whatever internal change leaders do in those organizations that were successful,
must work. If 70% of change initiatives fail, as an industry mantra seemed to suggest,
then 30% are successful. How those 30% organizations do that, how they achieve
success, was not documented in the literature.
An example of reporting change success rates without describing what successful
CM leaders did was Jorgensen et al. (2014). Jorgensen et al., employees of IBM,
conducted surveys among IBM clients and found that change initiatives managed by
experienced change leaders were 92% successful. Compared to the generalized 70%
failure rate, the 8% failure rate found by Jorgensen et al. suggested that what was
reported by others might be incomplete or erroneous. However, Jorgensen et al. also
found that novice change leaders were only 8% successful, implying a 92% failure rate in
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this category. Across the board, these authors found that on average, only 41% of survey
participants were considered successful. What these authors suggested was that
successful change leaders exercised different strategies. However, Jorgensen et al. did not
report on or validate what these successful leaders did to ensure success. That element,
the activity of successful, experienced change leaders, seemed missing from the data
reported in the literature.
Descriptions of the working hypotheses of the major theorists in CM follow. No
single theorist framed a generalizable model for transformational change. The change
model derived from comparing the literature review authors works showed three parts to
a change plan, as discussed above the three parts were a framework, a process, and a
behavioral and cultural element. Each part required attention or the likelihood of change
initiative failure increased. For example, Duck (2001), Kotter (1996/2010), and Schein
(2010) all represented change as a process. Duck graphically displayed a process timeline
from start to finish, elaborating behavioral reactions that typically occur during that
process. She pointed out behavioral elements considered by most as resistance, is normal
behavior and part of the learning, doing, accepting mind-shift that a change participant
must go through. Kotter listed eight steps that he said must happen organizationally for a
change initiative to succeed. Each of those steps was a process in itself. When he
described causes of failure at each step, those descriptions were behaviorally oriented.
However, Kotter did not offer any explanation as to how successful companies dealt with
behavioral issues. For example, Kotter’s first step, create a sense of urgency, suggested
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involving a large segment of the staff in adopting that sense of urgency. Each of his steps
takes a similar approach for engaging personnel in that respective step, and each is
intended to effect behavioral change as part of the organizational change. Each theory
addressed a part of what would be a comprehensive model while more or less either
vaguely referring to the other parts or not addressing them at all. None of the theorists
found in this research recognized s complete transformational change model with
appropriate emphasis in all its parts, although Burke (2014) came closest, emphasizing
the importance of cultural change along with his framework.
Schein (2010) focused on cultural change and listed 10 steps to give leaders a
quick way to decipher cultural issues. He meant these steps as tools to assess their
relevance to a change program. His actions were similar to the framework suggested by
Jorgensen et al. (2014). Schein’s first step was “obtaining leadership commitment” (p.
317). Jorgensen et al.’s strongest critical factor for success was “top management
sponsorship” (p. 6). Jorgensen et al. proposed a framework for managing change, not a
process. However, what Jorgensen et al. presented as a framework was a process. This
difference is an example of the overlapping logic that seems to permeate the CM
industry. Many authors seemed to offer processes that were frameworks. Others seemed
to offer frameworks as processes, and a few offered both.
The framework defined by Burke (2014), Peters and Waterman (1982/2012),
Ackerman Anderson and Anderson (2010), and others, was the combination of structures,
processes, resources, hierarchy, and so on, found in an organization. Kotter (2014)
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defined the framework as any strategic, innovative, hierarchical, or change related
activity that consumed inputs and converted them to outputs by throughput within the
constraints of the organization. Burke (2014) defined a framework as a model that
simplifies the structures and dynamics surrounding the change that represented reality.
This depiction of the relevant organization makes sense to the people who work there and
helps organize the facts in ways that promote understanding and activity. Frameworks are
grounded in open systems theory. Thus, a framework is the scope of activity, assets, and
people that exercise the processes to result in change. For CM, those elements of these
features applied to change, recognizing whether the entire organization was involved in
the change or not. If some part of the organization does not participate in the change, that
becomes part of the external environment of the part that remains involved in the change.
The framework is what changes.
Burke (2014) went on to say that without the concurrence and cooperation of the
people who worked within the framework, change became impossible, or at least
extraordinarily difficult. Behavioral change was the activity required to change the
understanding and beliefs held by the organization members, needed to support the
change initiative. Ackerman Anderson and Anderson (2010) stressed the importance of
changing the mindset of the organization leadership before attempting to implement or
invoke change. Burke (2014) commented that to foster change the leadership must alter
the attitude of the organization. This alteration required a focus on invoking behavior
change.
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These differences demonstrated the different perspectives from each author.
Ackerman Anderson and Anderson (2010) provided a conceptual overview of
transformational change and what was required to lead it successfully, and Anderson and
Ackerman Anderson (2001) described a change process methodology. The two works,
together, provided Anderson and Ackerman Anderson’s understanding and approaches to
managing transformational change. They suggested that most change process models
were too general or only partially reflected what was needed to lead transformational
change. Burke’s (2014) position was that most change models were drawn from case
studies and were not generalizable to the problems affecting transformations. He
advocated reverting to earlier, more generalizable, theories. For example, he noted that
when Drucker (1954/2010) espoused his Theory of the Business, he addressed
transformational change, as Senge (2006) did when he proposed the thinking
organization, or as Argyris and Schön (1978) did when they suggested feedback loops.
Burke further noted that When Audia, Locke, and Smith (2000) wrote about the paradox
of success, they were addressing change. Burke presented conceptual and integrated
models, focused on leading and managing change. He noted that change is a continuous
inevitability, a linear process of phases and stages that these types of models help to
understand and enable management progress toward an eventual future state defined in a
change plan.
Duck (2001) called her model a process but showed that it grew from a starting
framework. Her process addressed organizational and individual behavior as the
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organization recognized and progressed through a series of stages. These steps led a
transition to a more focused and responsive organization, more aligned with the
environmental changes that drove the need for change. While her model presented a
process, that process functioned within the context of an implied organizational
framework and achieved change by following a process-oriented timeline.
Kotter (1996/2010) referred to his model as an eight-stage framework but
described a process. He did not present a conceptual framework in the manner that
Ackerman Anderson and Anderson (2010) or Schein (2010) described. Kotter described
contexts for findings at a higher level by giving excerpted case examples, describing each
with the actions the case participants took to deal with them. He seemed aware of
underlying frameworks for organizations, giving recommendations in familiar structural
terms, showing examples of various cases that demonstrated his eight findings and how
they were worked out in each respective case. However, these cases occurred within an
implied framework without explicitly describing it. The reader is left to imagine the
context.
Lewin (1997/2010) focused on individual and societal conflict, involving
conceptual and methodological tools for understanding behavioral change. Lewin's
theories stimulated the works of Lippitt, Watson, and Westley (1958), Maslow and
Frager (1987), McGregor (2006), Argyris (2010), and Bradford and Burke (2005a),
among many others. Lewin co-founded the NTL, a non-profit behavioral psychology
center, in 1946. The NTL survived his passing and over time, developed his theories,
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strategies, and tactics for use in OD. Lewin’s preferred method for publication was in
journal articles. Harper and Row compiled his articles into two books, published in 1948
and 1951, respectively. These books were recently reissued by the American
Psychological Association (APA), who considered Lewin's intellectual contributions
significant to contemporary social psychology. Since Lewin’s death, the NTL has refined
his works in field theory while developing them further in the area of OD. The NTL
recognized that organization culture existed as a unique construct. They specialized in
OD, human relationships and personal development particularly in the organization
setting, and in organizational change. Field theory was used as a framework for observing
the individual behavior within a group setting, how individuals related to the group, and
how the group relates to them.
Schein (2010) offered a conceptual model for culture change. He spoke of
categories that exist to facilitate shared understanding and meaning between organization
members. These categories included a common language and conceptual understanding,
recognizing group boundaries, defining the distribution of power and authority,
developing norms of trust and intimacy, defining reward and punishment, and creating an
approach for explaining the unexplainable. While all of the theorists used frameworks,
Duck (2001) and Kotter (1996/2010) did not recognize them, leaving the reader to
assume that a framework existed. They both presented processes. In reading their works,
an underlying framework is visible, but neither author recognized or described it. The
reader is left to conjecture, to develop an assumed framework from the reader’s
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experience. Others presented frameworks but not processes. However, reviewing their
presentations suggests that they relied on processes in addition to their frameworks.
Peters and Waterman (1982/2012) and Rasiel (1999) demonstrated this in their
descriptions of McKinsey’s approach to client engagement, as did Jorgensen et al.
(2008). They defined a framework, listed causes of change failure, planned actions to
take during change execution to ensure success, but did not give processes to follow.
Some authors either directly or indirectly listed causes for change initiative
success, recognizing that they also implied the causes of failure. Others listed reasons for
failure, thereby suggesting causes for success. For example, Jorgensen et al. (2008)
indicated that the factors for success included top management sponsorship, employee
involvement, honest and timely communication, and a corporate culture that motivates
and promotes change. Jorgensen et al. also included having change agents, the changes
supported by the culture, efficient training programs, adjustment of performance
measures, effective organization structure, and monetary and non-monetary incentives.
Each success factor implied a failure factor. For example, top management
sponsorship being essential to success suggested that a lack of senior management
support could cause failure. This logic held true for all of the proposed contributors to
success. The same was true for those authors who touted causes for failure. For example,
Kotter (1996/2010) indicated that those organizations that failed at CM committed one or
more of eight errors that led to the failure. These errors included allowing too much
complacency, failing to create a sufficiently powerful guiding coalition, and not
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underestimating the power of vision. They also included under-communicating the
vision, permitting obstacles to block the new vision, failing to create short-term wins,
declaring victory too soon, and neglecting to anchor changes firmly in the corporate
culture. Again, each factor implies, in this case, a success factor. In fact, Kotter’s eight
steps were detailed recommendations for how to exercise the opposites of these eight
errors. For example, Kotter said that instead of allowing too much complacency, the
organization should establish a sense of urgency and strive to spread the angst over that
urgency throughout the organization. Kotter indicated alternative steps for each of his
errors.
The Description of Theories section presented three fundamental truths regarding
CM. First, CM was a process that began in a past or current state that needed to change,
involved a linear or sequential series of activities that ultimately concluded with the
realization of change in some present or future state. Second, the conduct of this work
occurred within a framework, a structure that included both physical and abstract aspects
such as an organizational hierarchy or a set of operational processes. Third, CM was as
much or more about changing behavior and culture as about changing operational
functionality. Change comes about as a result of influencing people to act and behave
differently. When these three truths are applied equally, organizational change will ensue
and is more likely to succeed. A fundamental shift toward a new vision, a new future will
happen. However, given that context, the application of CM is in reality, a fragmented
discipline. Every theorist has a different approach; every organization has a different
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need and a different response to CM intervention. Consequently, what worked in one
place might not work in another. These facts might explain why, as a change agent gets
deeper into these three elements of change and starts invoking the tactics that cause
success or avoid failure, the change might be more likely to succeed.
Worley (2005) recognized a loss of distinction between OD and CM where OD
has become defined as CM. He noted that many misunderstood OD as synonymous with
CM. Because of how OD had evolved, it’s tools and techniques could not easily define it.
Comparing and contrasting CM and OD with each other enhances how they are
understood. Worley addressed how organization change from the OD perspective is more
concerned with development, growth, learning, and effectiveness, whereas CM is more
concerned with implementation, control, performance, and efficiency. Worley wrote,
Good change in a global economy cannot be defined only by amounts and
levels of participation, by costs (or people) reduced or profits achieved or
increases in organization size. . . . Good change is more often participatory
than dictated, more dependent on behavioral sciences than on economics.
(p. xvi)
Business leadership and OD were thus disconnected. Leaders were more focused
on performance and economics, and while they accepted that participation and social
activity was necessary, their attitudes set performance and economic criteria as their
priority.
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High Failure Rates for Change Management
Many authors recognized extraordinarily high failure rates for CM initiatives
(Burke, 2014; Foster & Kaplan, 2001; Isern & Pung, 2007; Jorgensen et al., 2014; Kotter,
2008, 1996/2010, 2014). This section relies heavily on Burke (2014), who came closest
to describing a model for change and to recognizing the requirements underlying the
failure rates. Burke reported that in the world of mergers and acquisitions, 75% of the
efforts to change organizations fail. Kotter noted that over 50% of the cases he had
observed failed as a result of failure to address the first of his eight findings, to create a
sense of urgency. Hammer and Champy (2002) noted that some 50 to 70% of reengineering efforts failed but qualified this statement by calling it an unscientific
estimate. Senge (2006) talked extensively about failure in systems thinking but did not
quantify it, suggesting that failure in this concept is a problem. Neither Anderson and
Ackerman Anderson (2001) nor Duck (2001) quantified the failures they noted beyond
stating that a majority of the change efforts they saw failed. Ackerman Anderson and
Anderson (2010) indicated that what the research literature showed is that a majority of
change efforts failed to produce their needed return-on-investment and failed to produce
their intended outcomes. Duck stated, “The majority of change efforts fail or achieve
only partial results” (Duck, 2001, Preface, para. 4). The Association of CM Professionals
(ACMP) recognized a potential for change failure but neither quantified nor attributed
significance to it.
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A commonly found theme in CM was that a majority of change initiatives fail.
There are hundreds of books on leadership and management that recommend changes in
structure, processes, systems, culture, communication, or other dynamics. For example,
Cameron and Green (2015), Hiatt and Creasey (2012), Pugh and Mayle (2009) suggested
that a majority of change initiatives fail. Isern and Pung (2007), reporting on a survey by
McKinsey, which found that only 38% of global executives surveyed indicated a change
effort they had been close to or involved in was entirely or mostly successful. Jorgensen
et al. (2014) reported that 59% of their study participants fell short of desired objectives
for on-time, within budget, meeting quality standards, and delivering business value. Of
these, 44% missed, at least, on time, budget, or quality goal, and 15% either missed all
objectives or management stopped them before completion. Hundreds of books and
thousands of articles have addressed CM and noted a high failure rate, offering that
failure rate as exemplary of one or another position on change. These publications may
be, for the most part, correct in what they claimed or stated. The problem is that they
keep citing each other, and they all seem to trace back to very few articles that were
inadequately supported with fundamental research or were not generalizable to CM.
Conner (2012) noted that the CM failure rate has held at 70%, even though CM
services have grown to become accepted as part of corporate functioning. He attributed
this, in part, as resulting from change leaders and consultants using the 70% failure rate
number as a tool to engage with organization leadership while not fixing the causes of or
reducing the failure rate. Ashkenas (2013) also addressed the need for change, noting that
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most studies showed a 60-70% failure rate. Ashkenas stated, “The content of CM is
reasonably correct” (para. 3) and suggested that managerial capacity to implement CM is
underdeveloped. Ashkenas claimed that managers had been permitted to outsource CM to
human resource specialists and consultants instead of assuming responsibility themselves.
Maurer indicated; “Changes in organizations still fail 70 percent of the time” (Maurer,
2010, p. 37; Maurer, 2011, p. 33), citing Keller and Aiken (2008), who in turn cited Isern
and Pung (2007). Keller and Aiken stated, “Conventional CM approaches have done little
to alter the fact that most change programs fail” (p. 1). They went on to critique Price and
Lawson’s suggestions that four basic conditions must be met before employees will
change, and recommended Isern and Pung as additional reading. These authors are
typical of those who write for trade and professional publications.
None of these authors, except for Burke (2014), supported their claims with
objective or empirical research, and Burke did not do that well. Burke reviewed the work
of Foster and Kaplan (2001), who in turn had searched for fundamental research in
organization change. From that analysis, Burke concluded that organization change
theory barely existed, and concluded that other theory should apply in a way that an
organizational change theory emerges. For example, Burke suggested nonlinear complex
systems theory, chaos theory, and some of the more fundamental psychological theories
such as the James-Lange theory of emotion. The James-Lange theory was an earlier
theory that suggested that witnessing an external stimulus leads to a physiological
response (James & Lange, 1967). Burke also suggested applying Maslow's (1954)
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hierarchy of needs, a philosophy that suggests that people grow through a hierarchy of
reward levels until they achieve self-actualization at the top, and Herzberg’s (1966) twofactor theory, which measured job satisfaction on one scale and dissatisfaction on
another. Burke reviewed the literature from the 30 years preceding his study and
uncovered a consensus that little fundamental research about CM existed. Most research
was technologically or structurally oriented and needed stronger social linkages. Burke
noted that the research did not include the following:


Researchers attempted to determine causation, working to identify the effects
of some change intervention such as team building, structure change, surveys,
and so on.



Most research on organization change was a snapshot and not longitudinal.



Research methodology and instrumentation were precise, but the meaning and
interpretation of the data were not. It often ignored historical and
environmental contexts.



The findings reported in the research often did not meet user needs. Results
could be highly technical and make research outcomes so complicated that
managers might not understand them. Researchers also tended to hedge the
results, introducing ambiguity and making them seem uncertain. Managers
tended to dismiss the findings when that occurred.

Burke (2014) noted that, although the outcomes of change did not always produce
the expected or measurable results hoped for, change may have occurred. Burke defined
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two kinds of change: beta and gamma. The beta change represented a recalibration along
some dimension of reality, where some dynamic might be viewed differently along some
continuum. Change may have occurred but was not major in the sense that it caused a
realignment, redefinition, or reconceptualization of some domain. Burke referred to this
as evolutionary change. The gamma change brings about that latter effect: realignment,
redefinition, or reconceptualization of some domain. The changed organization is
something different from what it was before entering into the change program. This
change was a revolutionary or transformational event. It is transformational change.
Burke (2014) discussed more recent research by Oreg et al. (2011), which
appeared to review the change of recipients’ reaction and how they felt about what was
happening to them. Oreg et al.’s research covered 60 years beginning with 1948. They
found about 700 quantitative studies out of the approximately 142,000 publications
mentioned earlier. Using the scientific method Oreg et al. were able to reduce the 700
articles to 79 that could provide a framework to show, quantitatively, causes of
organizational member reaction to change. These included (a) individual characteristics,
(b) a degree of participation in the change process, and (c) a primary focus of the change
(Burke, 2014, p. 143). Oreg et al. (2011) concluded that (a) trust of leaders, (b)
involvement in decisions that affect the recipients, and (c) selection of change leaders
with positive dispositions, are critical factors in the change process. While these findings
were interesting, they were neither conclusive nor validating. Seventy-nine out of
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142,000 is too small a sample when considering how fragmented the themes and research
bases were.
In summary, Burke (2014) pointed out that measuring organization change was
not straightforward. Following a scientific method might be possible, but the results
could be inconclusive. Determining cause and effect in change initiatives is difficult
because of the many uncontrollable variables in CM. Any attempt to measure change
must identify the beneficiary of the research. Using a scientific method is appropriate for
other researchers, but if the research users are members of the organization under study,
an action science approach, rather than following a scientific method, might be more
appropriate. For all of the effort that has gone into studying CM, there still is no real
definition of success and failure, beyond the seemingly overly simplistic, budgetary
criteria defined by consultants: Achieving change objectives on-time, within budget,
while delivering all of the results specified as goals in the original change plan.
Of note, many researchers were critical of the failure to effect a reduction in
change failure rates, for example, Conner (2012), Ashkenas (2013), were critical of
failures but did not explain them. Barends et al., (2013), who searched the literature for
articles on CM that supported a concept of evidence-based CM. Their search came as a
result of an address to the Academy of Management by Rousseau (2006), who wondered
whether evidence-based management existed, as it does in medicine, education, criminal
justice, and social work. Rousseau had been critical of the failure to effect a change in the
failure rates for CM, and Barends et al. worked to review the literature for evidence of
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efficient CM. These authors noted a prevalence of one-shot studies with low internal
validity. They searched the ABI/INFORM database and found more than 20,000 articles
on organizational CM, but could find only 563 that provided any reliable and valid,
evidence-based practices of CM. Barends et al. concluded that confidence in whether
findings that clarify how CM works were questionable, and there is no accepted
definition of organizational CM. They suggested that the quality of evidence, despite the
growing volume of literature, is inferior and getting worse.
Problems with Published Causes of Change Management Failure
Many academic, trade, and practitioner authors suggested reasons for CM failure
but offered little validation for those reasons with their presentations. Most authors
seemed quick to offer solutions without demonstrating how research and experience led
to their conclusions. While they offered descriptions of some underlying factors, they did
not present the actual behaviors and performance of the causes they suggested led to
failure. Kotter (1996/2010) did not explain as to how or why his findings caused failure,
nor did he offer any corroborating evidence that proved those particular results were valid
beyond his rumination. As previously noted, he attributed a failure to create a sense of
urgency as the foremost cause of CM failure, followed by his seven other causes. He did
not rank those causes beyond suggesting that the first cause, failure to create a sense of
urgency, was the foremost cause noted. In another example, Jorgensen et al. (2008)
surveyed over 1,500 chief executive officers (CEO) worldwide. They concluded from
that survey that the two primary causes of failure were employee resistance to change and
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insufficient senior executive leadership support; findings that were entirely different from
Kotter’s. Again, they gave no details that could substantiate their claims. Their survey
results were merely the summation of what they heard in the survey, with no validation
beyond the fact that they asked the question and the respondents answered. Duck (2001)
defined failure as a result of not recognizing and, therefore, resisting the behaviors that
demonstrated that change was occurring. In her method, the peak of the feelings of angst
and frustration among the affected group was usually reached sometime during her
determination phase. She suggested that these were normal reactions and signify
approaching a tipping point where change is becoming accepted. However, she did not
explain these behaviors in a way that was confirmable or transferable. She did not
validate how she knew this beyond her own observations.
Dea (2013) supported Ackerman Anderson’s and Anderson’s (2010) roadmap.
Dea concurred with Ackerman Anderson’s and Anderson’s assessment that CM fails for
three reasons: (a) Change consultants were inadequately prepared for personal
development and came to the effort without understanding the larger organization at a
level that they understand change; (b) Most change models were incomplete in the sense
that they did not allow for the nonlinear nature of change; (c) Capacity for dedicated
personnel with time in their normal working hours to design, plan, and coordinate
change, was widely overlooked. According to Dea, the agents leading the change
initiative needed to develop into the higher levels of action logic, describe by Rooke and
Torbert (2005). Rooke and Torbert defined seven levels of action logic, seven leadership
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styles, representing how leaders interpret their surroundings and react when challenged in
their power and safety. The higher levels exercise powers of mutual inquiry, diligence,
and allow vulnerability in how they react. The lower levels foster or avoid conflict, ruling
by applying logic and expertise. The highest levels integrate strategy and performance,
collaborate, and remain open and vulnerable. The very highest level leaders blend
material, spiritual, and societal transformations in a way that makes them stand out as
social leaders. Dea’s meaning regarding incomplete change models was to suggest that
each change agent must embody the higher levels of leadership, and the organization
must provide for nonlinear, complex transformation. Her reason was that the organization
must allow time for development and change. Capacity meant providing the additional
workforce and resources needed to effect change. Organizations must allow for these
resources if they expect to achieve their change goals. Dea’s stance was unique in the
sense that it recognized peripheral issues, not commonly expressed, that affect the change
process. These may be alternative reasons as to why change initiatives fail or may offer
alternative explanations that contradict others in defining causes of the failure rate. In
either case, neither Dea nor Ackerman Anderson’s and Anderson’s, like the others,
provided supporting objective evidence that these alternate causes are valid.
Pascale, Milleman and Gioja (2000) proposed a significantly different scenario
for managing change. These authors suggested that organizations were more like living
systems than rigid or defined structures. According to Pascale et al., a business
organization is more a complex adaptive system than a structured hierarchy, although the
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defined underlying structure is a significant part of the organizational framework. The
structured organization served as a context for the complex adaptive system. The ongoing
dynamic interactivity between the various elements of the system, working collectively in
concert, acted as a vehicle for driving both evolution and revolution in the survival and
advancement of the organization. A complex adaptive system is a system of independent
agents. These agents act in parallel, developing models for how things work in their
respective environments. The authors refined those models through shared learning and
adaption (Pascale et al., 2000, Chapter 1, “Of Colonies,” para. 7).
Pascale et al. (2000) referred to the science of complexity when describing four
principles, applicable to living systems. These included equilibrium, movement toward
the edge of chaos, Self-organization and emergence, and direction and disturbance. By
playing on these principles, the organization as a living system can thrive and evolve into
a new system under certain conditions. This evolution becomes a self-organizing process
where the elements of the system bring themselves together in a new direction. Change
occurred when the organization was allowed to destabilize to a point where it verged on
chaos but did not lose control. The most creative change ideas happened at this point,
were accepted, and then implemented faster than at any other level of operation.
The theories of Pascale et al. (2000) were similar to and possibly a precursor of
Gladwell (2002), who suggested that to understand the construct of consensus, some
seemingly harmless element of social interaction, suddenly grew into a primary focus.
The study of epidemiology or how epidemics spread is an appropriate model of how this
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growth occurs. According to Gladwell, every epidemic has a tipping point, triggered by
some combination of simultaneous happenings or the convergences of seemingly
unrelated memes. The fronting of this combination pushes a static reality to the forefront
with characteristically explosive growth. Gladwell’s example was Hush Puppies shoes,
which had been a relatively obscure product for decades until a social group in East
Greenwich Village of New York City chose them as their preferred shoes. A clothing
designer noticed this and included the shoes in a forthcoming collection for a New York
Fashion week exhibit, not as a designer item but as an accessory used to offset their
design presentation. From there, many other designers adopted the shoes in the same way
as part of their respective collections. The net effect was that the shoe’s sales went from
fewer than 30,000 pairs per year to well over 300,000 pairs in the year this design change
was adopted. Almost overnight, Hush Puppies shoes became a fad. Gladwell saw
successful changes as following this same sort of growth pattern for rolling out
requirements in organizations. He considered it possible to manage change toward
success by fostering the interest in the change across a broad base of the organization
staff. As interest grew, confidence in success for the change grew with it. Once change
acceptance passed its tipping point, general acceptance was assured, and the change
would succeed. He suggested that organizational leadership could inspire popular
acceptance of memes related to organizational objectives and inspire general acceptance
of change in the same way that modern movements grow through cultural change. The
adoption of change could manifest, as in the way epidemics spread. While these three
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paragraphs proposed a significantly different understanding of change, which dovetailed
well with explanations of change processes by other authors, once again Pascale et al. did
not present valid evidence of their findings that demonstrated credible, transferable,
dependable, confirmable findings underlying their recommendations.
Literature Review
Historical Perspective
This study was initiated to explore the activities of employee change leaders
within organizations––those charged with bringing about change––to understand the
essence of how internal change leaders successfully led change. Burke (2014) noted that
extensive research in CM began with the work of the Center for Group Dynamics at MIT
in 1947 and the follow-on work, at the National Training Labs Institute (NTL). This work
has expanded over the years, far beyond the scope of these originating organizations, into
two distinct professions: OD and CM.
During the years since CM began as an application of technique, many authors,
and theorists, studying and writing about CM, did so as OD practitioners. Burke’s (2014)
examples included Herbert Shepard and Harry Kolb of Exxon, Leland Bradford and
Robert Blake of NTL, Paul Buchanan of the U. S. Navy, and Douglas McGregor and
Richard Beckhard of MIT Sloan School of Management. These were early change
leaders were recognized as key influencers of the emergent OD profession who defined
theory focused on organizational change.
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Despite all that has gone into CM research since its recognition as a leadership
discipline, failure rates for CM initiatives remained high and relatively unchanged
(Burnes, 2011; Jorgensen et al., 2008; Isern & Pung, 2007; Kotter, 2008, 1996/2010,
2014). While many researchers claimed knowledge of the causes of CM success, or more
specifically, the organizational traps that led to failure, most appeared not to have
validated these causes or supported their findings with quantitative or other empirical
evidence. This study explored CM practices from the perspective of on-the-job employee
change leaders to determine if their perspectives might explain success or failure in the
CM process. The literature did not appear to include CM knowledge from the perspective
of working practitioners—those individuals employed by organizations and held
accountable for CM results. This study was meant to determine whether the causes of
CM success and failure experienced by working change leaders align with those reported
by theorists, or if understanding practitioners’ perspective can contribute to increasing the
success of CM, thereby reducing the reported failure rates.
The Commonly Cited 70% Failure Rate of Change Initiatives
Before reviewing the work of theorists, a commonly cited but dubious statistic
should be noted. That statistic, found in both academic and popular literature, is that 70%
of change initiatives fail. For example, Burke (2014) identified no failure statistic but
implied that the 70% figure is a given and proposed that his approach to transformational
change might reduce the possibility of the over 70% failure rate. Burke recommended an
increased focus on culture change, loosely coupled systems, employee resistance, leader
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selection and development, learning ability, and trust (p. 374). He was recommending
solutions without substantiating the statistic.
Conner (2012), like Burke (2014), used the 70% as if it were common knowledge.
Hammer and Champy (1993) called their reference to the 70% an unscientific estimate.
In a 2002 article, being sensitive to the fact that so many people indicated this number
and tracing back through their references led to Hammer and Champy’s work, these
authors wrote a disclaimer about the number, included as an appendix in the kindle
version of Re-engineering the corporation. Citing several authors (Champy, 1995;
Garvin, 1995; Hammer & Stanton, 1995; Womack, 1995), Pfeffer and Sutton (1999)
noted that “re-engineering efforts had failure rates as high as 70 percent” (Pfeffer &
Sutton, 1999, Ch. 4, How Fear and Distrust section, para. 6). In 2001 Anderson and
Ackerman Anderson noted that research shows that a majority of change efforts failed;
however, they did not quantify that observation. Later, Ackerman Anderson and
Anderson (2010) stated that 60% of change initiatives failed but gave no source for the
statistic. They reasoned that most executives, having engaged in change for most of their
careers, assume they know how to lead change initiatives when they do not. None of
these other authors substantiated their findings.
Other researchers who recognized but did not substantiate a 70% failure rate
included Beer and Nohria (2010), Blanchard (2010), Burnes and Jackson (2011), and
Senturia Flees, and Maceda (2008). This tendency to cite the 70% without substantiation
seemed a common practice. Professional and trade organizations also recognized the 70%
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failure rate. Bain & Company (Senturia et al., 2008), IBM (Jorgensen et al., 2008), and
McKinsey (Isern & Pung, 2007; Keller & Aiken, 2008; Maurer, 2010, 2011) all cited this
statistic without support. Some of these professional organizations cited surveys they
conducted but did not include descriptions beyond stating numbers of clients
participating in those studies. Many authors cited other authors as sources but did not
verify those citations. For example, Lawrence, Ruppel, and Tworoger (2014) cited
Maurer (2010), who stated that approximately 70% of organizational change efforts fail.
Maurer cited Keller and Aiken (2008), who cited both Isern and Pung (2007) and Miller
(2002). In a 2006 study that is no longer available in either academic or McKinsey
databases, Isern and Pung indicated that only 38% of the respondents in a McKinsey
survey of executives stated that change efforts they knew about were entirely or mostly
successful. Thus, Maurer’s assertion was untraceable to its research source. Miller cited
several sources, including a Business Intelligence study from 1998 and a Gartner Group
report from the year 2000. Neither study could be found in libraries or at those
organization’s websites. Thus, most citations of the 70% rate appeared lost in a web of
complex, unreliable tracings.
Executives were inclined to assume control and manage change without outside
resources, and their success or failure remained unnoticed. Duck (2001) merely noted that
most fundamental change efforts failed to accomplish what they set out to achieve but did
not quantify that statement. Appelbaum, Habashy, Malo, and Shafiq (2012) cited several
authors, suggesting that research showed failures ranged from one-third to 80% of change
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initiatives undertaken. Their observations were based solely on citations of other writers.
These generalizations also included writers who, while not quantifying change initiative
failures, offered a failure statistic for one discipline or another. For example, Burnes and
Jackson (2011) noted that culture change initiatives failed at a rate of 90%, citing Rogers,
Meehan, and Tanner (2006). Atkinson (2005) also mentioned this 90% figure for culture
change. Burke (2014) noted that change failure was found in mergers and acquisitions,
where 75% of these initiatives failed (p. 9). While authors indicated a variety of failure
rates in a variety of ways, what was important was that the 70% failure rate was
commonly used, so much so that it seems an assumed given without verification or
validation. Many authors presented this statistic without support or source identification.
Still, others did not recognize the 70% failure rate at all, suggesting that those that
do have oversimplified the issue or problem. Hayes (2014) presented a complete process
for change without any mention of failure rates or other statistics. He made no mention of
the potential for breakdown or failure at any particular point in the process. Hughes
(2011) questioned the validity of the claimed failure rates and argued that while there was
a popular narrative of a 70% change failure rate, empirical evidence supporting that
narrative did not exist. He also noted that the process of change was more complex than
existing theories suggest.
Together, these observations suggested that while many authors support a
narrative of high failure rates for CM initiatives, the existence of fundamental research
demonstrating that as fact may not exist. As such, quoting a high statistic for failure rates
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in CM seemed more a device than fact. CM appeared to be much more complex an
undertaking than the commonly stated failure rates implied.
Introduction to Change Theorists
Among the better-known CM theorists are scholar-practitioners such as
Ackerman Anderson and Anderson (2010), Burke (2014), Conner (2012), Duck (2001),
Kotter (1996/2010), Lewin (1997/2010), and Schein (2010), and many others.
Additionally, Bradford and Burke (2005a) included works of 12 OD scholars in their
edited text. Burke, Lake, and Waymire Paine (2009) brought together 52 works of CM
and OD authors in their book addressing CM. The literature is replete with works of
scholar-practitioners suggesting strategies and tactics for managing change.
Several professional organizations have practices dedicated to delivering CM
services to clients. Examples include Accenture, Bain & Company, Booz Allen
Hamilton, BCG, Deloitte, Ernst & Young, IBM, KPMG, McKinsey, Price Waterhouse
Coopers, PROSCI, and Towers Watson. Educational groups, associations, and nonprofit
organizations, in addition to the NTL and ACMP also exist. These include the Project
Management Institute (PMI), the CM Foundation, the University of Michigan Institute
for Social Research, the MIT System Dynamics Group, and the Tavistock Institute,
among others. These groups and associations all have memberships, instructors, and
consultants supporting organizational change as part of their larger management
consulting offerings or as independent consultants. Many regional and local management
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consulting and public accounting firms also offer CM services, as well as scores of
independent experts work in this field.
As noted earlier, consulting firms and individual practitioners suggested the CM
failure rates, albeit their prognostications were unreliable. For example, Isern and Pung
(2007) worked for McKinsey when surveying McKinsey clients for reports of failed
change initiatives. Jorgensen et al. (2008), who surveyed IBM clients, categorized change
failures based on where organizations they surveyed fell on a continuum between novice
and expert change leaders. These organizations were IBM clients using IBM methods.
McKinsey, IBM, and other firms like them, did not demonstrate how their work ensured
objectivity, validity, or generalizability, and did not provide enough information to allow
their work to be duplicable. Nevertheless, other researchers and organizations refer to
these kinds of reports for informational and marketing purposes as if they were valid and
reliable.
Many scholars and academics also worked as consultants, either in parallel with
academic careers or as some may have preferred, as their primary career with academics
secondary. For example, while working as a professor at Harvard University, Kotter
(1996/2010) based his writing on consulting experience with “dozens of initiatives”
(Kotter, 1996/2010, Preface, para 2) over a 15-year period, leading to the publication of
his book, Leading Change. This publication was significant because Kotter’s method has
become one of the most common models for leading change in organizations. Leading
Change is a Harvard Business Review best seller. Burke (2014) based his work on
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academic research and 40 years of experience as a consultant. He prioritized neither
academics nor consulting, instead, simply presenting his model. Schein (2010) worked
from the research perspective of mid-level theory and translated that model into a
practical application. This translation came from helping organizations solve cultural
process problems found while he was a professor at the University of Chicago.
Background of Change as an Organizational Discipline
Interest in change began with Lewin’s (1997/2010) studies in social psychology.
That work led to the establishment of the NTL, which grew as a nonprofit institute for
learning and development, including OD. This group was a focal point of the growth and
maturation of OD as an industry and integrated with most of the academic institutions
offering an OD curriculum. The main focus of the NTL was training, education, and
consulting in OD. The organization worked with many major public, business, and
government agencies as it developed Lewin’s concepts of field research, training groups
(T-groups), and sensitivity training into skills for leaders and managers of organizations.
This growth remained faithful to Lewin’s (1997/2010) principles that individual behavior
change was necessary to achieve group change, and that individual and group behavior
were interrelated and affected each other.
Many noted scholars in OD associated with the NTL over the years. Other
nonprofit and otherwise similar organizations also developed. For example, Argyris
(2010), Bennis (2009), Bradford and Burke (2005a), Burke (2014), McGregor (2006),
Schein (2010), and many others were members of or associated with the NTL. In this
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capacity, they taught and consulted with clients in addition to their academic activity.
Many other groups developed programs in OD and CM. These include top schools and
universities such as MIT, Harvard, Stanford, and Columbia Universities, the University
of Michigan, and many others. They also include premier management consulting firms
such as BCG, Deloitte, IBM, McKinsey, and others. These two disciplines; OD and CM,
are now generally accepted in most business school curricula, particularly in graduate
business education programs. The NTL is unique in that it focuses on individual
interaction with group behavior in an organizational setting.
One of Lewin’s (1997/2010) principles was that he preferred to research
behavioral psychology in healthy subjects. Lewin studied healthy individual interactions
within the social groups where they belonged. Most behavioral and social psychology
centers are medically oriented, focused on aberrant behavior that interfered with social
acceptance. The work of the NTL and their proponents were apparently more useful to
organizations than to others professing behavioral psychology because of the NTL
approach to studying this phenomenon.
Change Defined
Burke on evolutionary change. Burke (2014) stated that planned organizational
change on a large scale is unusual. Most change is evolutionary, a gradual shift that
occurs in bits and pieces as one part or another of the organization encounters change
needed to keep up with an evolving internal or external environment. Large-scale change
is revolutionary, transformational, resulting in a major overhaul or modification of an
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organization. This kind of change typically results in new missions, strategies, leadership,
and culture. It can and often does include new products and services, new ways of doing
business. CM, according to Burke, refers to planned organizational change on a large
scale. This type of change is a shift away from the past purpose of the organization,
which was to pursue a vision and maintain continuity, a systematic process designed to
achieve organizational goals drawn from a strategy, toward a purpose. Transformational
change shifts to a new purpose, driven by new strategy, with new structure and systems
for achieving new goals. Transformational change is comprehensive as compared to
evolutionary or incremental, which requires leadership or management focus as
transformational change. Burke saw management as paying more attention to the
maintenance and turnover of resources, brought together to systematically achieve the
goals or outputs defined in strategic or other operational plans. He suggested that when
not undergoing significant change, organizations manage for continuity and survival.
This management includes exercising change as necessary, to sustain operations in light
of a changing environment. The difference in transformational change, according to
Burke, is that large-scale, revolutionary change changes everything. Continuity is
intentionally interrupted and destroyed. A complete new vision, organization, and culture
arise from the remnants of the old. This change is done to ensure continuity, most likely
because the former organization could not have otherwise survived.
Schein on a change in culture. Over the years since its inception, many scholars
have been engaged by or involved with the NTL. Schein (2010) was unique because of
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his close involvement with the NTL during its start-up and early growth in the 1950s and
1960s. Decades later Schein is still focused on research and publishing about CM. Schein
(2010) stressed that change was about culture change, which drew themes from
anthropology, sociology, social psychology, and cognitive psychology. He recognized
that the explosion of new tools in communication and information technology had made
cultural phenomena more accessible. However, these advancements had also accelerated
potential danger in all organizational technology. This acceleration exposed the cultural
development of groups to an instability that changes their sense of structure and could
cause conflict. Schein noted the spread of research and consulting services in
organizational culture and leadership. He argued that leadership and culture are
intertwined. Leaders are the principal architects of culture; as the culture grows, leaders
influence the kinds of leadership possible, and if the culture becomes dysfunctional
leaders must induce what is needed to effect culture change.
As technology advanced, the leadership task evolved into networks and away
from the traditional hierarchy of organizations. Schein’s (2010) position was typical of
OD and might conflict with the other more technology-oriented scholars that suggested
that change was more a function of changing structure and processes to create
efficiencies that achieved goals. However, Schein pointed out how the cultural focus was
critical and saw the role of leadership, distinct from management, as creating and
embedding culture in a group. Those leaders who concentrate on managing mechanical or
structural approaches to change missed the cultural focus.
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Schein’s (2010) work was important for understanding the transition from the
industrial-organizational psychology of the 20th century to the rapid growth,
decentralization, and globalization of organizations of the 21st century. In this sense, he
maintained the premise that managing change is more than managing projects and task
lists: It involves managing people. Schein was instrumental in the shift away from
focusing on social psychology to the discipline of OD in organizational leadership.
Process-oriented approaches. A strong orientation toward a sequential, processoriented approach has existed throughout the history of modern CM, as demonstrated by
Ackerman Anderson and Anderson (2010), Association of CM Professionals (2014),
Burke (2014), Kotter (2014), and Schein (2010), among others. For example, Schein
defined Lewin’s stages sequentially as:


Stage 1: Unfreezing: Creating the motivation to change through
disconfirmation, the creation of survival anxiety or guilt, and the creation of
psychological safety to overcome learning anxiety.



Stage 2: Changing: Learning new concepts, new meanings for old concepts,
and new standards for judgment through imitation and identification with role
models and scanning for solutions and trial-and-error learning.



Stage 3: Refreezing: Internalizing new ideas, meanings, and standards by
integration into self-concept and identity and incorporation into ongoing
relationships (Schein, 2010).
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Kotter (1996/2010) proposed an eight-step process, based on eight faults he
consistently found in unsuccessful change initiatives. Kotter (1996/2010) indicated that
while the eight steps did not necessarily need execution in the order he listed, they needed
to address them all if the company were to ensure a successful transition. The steps
included establishing a sense of urgency, creating a guiding coalition, developing a vision
and strategy, communicating the change vision, empowering employees for broad-based
action, generating short-term wins, consolidating gains and producing more change, and
anchoring the new approaches in the culture.
Kotter’s (1996/2010) approach deemphasized the socio-psychological aspect of
change, although his case examples showed attention to behavioral responses beyond the
procedural. This concentration existed at the highest levels in his first two and last steps.
Creating a sense of urgency required changing the collective understanding of what was
important, creating a guiding coalition was not possible without building a consensus
among the members of that group, and anchoring new approaches in the culture was only
possible with attention to the psychosocial relationships and behavior within the
workgroup. However, Kotter treated changing behavior as almost incidental, tactics
embedded in his procedural presentation, without explaining how to affect these aspects
of change. At one point, Kotter suggested building a false sense of urgency if no real
urgency existed, to convince the group that change was necessary. Kotter claimed that his
work is the most read CM approach, although consulting firms such as IBM or McKinsey
(Jorgensen et al., 2014; Keller & Aiken, 2008) proposed similar methods. Where these
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companies differed was in their propensity to introduce change as working within a
framework. Otherwise, they also focused more on procedures and results than they did on
the socio-psychological responses to change.
Ackerman Anderson and Anderson (2010) developed a process for CM. Although
strikingly similar to Duck’s (2001), Kotter’s (1996/2010), or Schein’s (2010), Anderson
and Ackerman Anderson used the McKinsey 7-S framework, or something similar, when
appropriate for their planning purposes (see Figure 2). They offered a limited discussion
of behavioral change—restricted in the sense that they only stressed the importance of
organization leadership changing their mindset to succeed. However, they wrote
extensively about that issue, devoting a full chapter to that one behavioral control
dynamic.
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Figure 2. The nine-phase change process model. Adapted from Chapter 7, the nine-phase
change process model, by D. Anderson and L. Ackerman Anderson, 2001, Beyond CM:
Advanced Strategies for Today’s Transformational Leaders. Copyright 2001 by D.
Anderson and L. Ackerman Anderson. Reprinted with permission.
The similarities between Anderson and Ackerman Anderson’s (2001) and
Kotter’s (1996/2010) models were apparent. Anderson and Ackerman Anderson’s Phases
1–3 were equivalent to Kotter’s Steps 1 and 2. Further, Kotter’s Steps 1 and 2, as well as
Anderson and Ackerman’s Phases 1–3, paralleled Schein’s (2010) steps for Lewin’s
(1997/2010) Stage 1. The most significant differences are that Schein, and to some
degree, Anderson and Ackerman Anderson advocated addressing group behavior. Kotter
only implied that concept. Kotter addressed the more tangible, manageable artifacts, as
opposed to addressing behavior.
In a sequential process for managing change, Duck (2001) divided the process
into five phases: stagnation, preparation, implementation, determination, and fruition.
Duck noted that any process description was inclined to be an oversimplification, an
observation that holds equally true for the other processes previously mentioned here.
While one section, department, division, or other segmentation, might struggle with one
part of the process, others might move on to the next phase. This struggle offers scenarios
where different subdivisions might progress at different rates, and activities might not
align while executing change. However, all groups will go through all of the phases, and
the change is not complete they are all complete (Duck, 2001). Kotter (1996/2010) made
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this same point, albeit differently. He wrote that some activities might result in ordering
the steps differently or spending more time on one or more steps than others. Various
activities may be at different places during the process, but that all activities must
complete all of the steps to achieve success.
Duck (2001) was unique in that her primary focus was on behavioral issues but
within the structure of a process plan. Duck’s premise was that groups had set behavioral
patterns that are comfortable. Change is difficult due to those patterns but necessary when
their performance cannot achieve the goals of the organization, regardless of how hard
they try. That was the essence of her stagnation phase. The group reached a comfort zone
that interfered with progress and needed change. The organization was stagnant,
atrophying, and defeating itself. In planning and executing change, there are behavioral
reactions that are normal and expected. As implementation proceeds, discomfort
throughout the group increases until it reaches a point where something must happen to
relieve the stress. At this point, most managers consider the group reaction as resistance,
but Duck pointed to this as an emotional but regular part of the acceptance process. The
group reaction reaches a crisis level. At that point, the determination phase in Duck's
process, something happens, a turn, where the group begins to accept the change. The
group adopts a new paradigm and behavior, and performance normalizes at some new
level. The organization continues in a new maintenance mode until the next stagnation
occurs.
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Duck (2001) focused more on group behavior than process step completion. She
suggested that the flux that took place when asking a group to do something new and
unfamiliar was natural. The swelling of discontent, struggle, and what seemed like
resistance was a routine part of group behavior while adapting to new requirements.
Some people may fall out, but most would eventually see the wisdom of the change, or,
at least, accept the new. At that point, normal operations with improved behavior would
resume. Duck also noted, as did Ackerman Anderson and Anderson (2010), that change
was cyclical. Once a change was implemented, and normal operations reoccurred, the
organization would operate in a maintenance mode or steady state until it again stagnated.
That would be when normal operations were no longer able to achieve reasonable
performance goals or otherwise perform adequately within their environment. At that
time, the change process started over.
This orientation toward a process approach in CM may have been because
organizations tended to maintain their existence in a time-sequenced manner, conducting
themselves in a maintenance mode for operations, aimed at consistency and uniformity.
Burke (2014) noted that unless organizations were involved in change, they strove to
avoid variability in operations. A lack of deviation was preferred. This consistency ran
counter to the objectives of transformational change.
Additionally, most managers focused on managing tangible artifacts rather than
providing leadership for behavioral or social issues. They conducted day-to-day
operations so that they maintained consistency and continuity. Managers thought in terms
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of stability and targeted achievement and avoided the flux that came with revolutionary
change. Process-oriented approaches seemed to fit this context, where the goal was to
keep the status quo stable. This thought process was good business, to play to the
expectations of managers, even when the intent was to upset the process. However, there
is more to CM than the process. Many practitioners, particularly those from consulting
companies that supported CM, have proposed to effect change by working within a
framework. Some, like McKinsey, did not even suggest a predefined process; they just
offered a framework to work within. The next section reviews these frameworks and how
they fit CM.
Framework-oriented approaches. Ackerman Anderson and Anderson (2010)
stressed the importance of managing change within a framework, citing Peters and
Waterman’s (1982/2012) description of the 7-S framework as an example. Ackerman
Anderson and Anderson listed several frameworks other than Peters and Waterman’s,
including Weisbord’s (1978) six-box model, Nadler and Tushman’s (1977) congruence
model, and their own earlier three-element model. Ackerman Anderson and Anderson
(2010) used the 7-S model as their example in describing how frameworks differ from
processes, noting that all of these models were equally good examples. Anderson and
Ackerman Anderson (2010) suggested that these frameworks served as organizing
constructs that set the boundaries of where attention was focused while executing change.
Their position was that the framework depicted the static, interconnected elements of the
organization that surround the change process. These items are the critically affected
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areas requiring redesign. A change process worked within a framework that did not
include those items not touched or affected by the change. They were outside the context
of the modification.
Anderson and Ackerman Anderson (2010) noted that, while process models
provided a roadmap for action and a path to follow to complete change, they often were
too general and missed elements requiring attention. They found that process models had
a tendency to focus on either behavioral transformation or business content, but seldom
did that well on both. As a result, process models without a framework tended to
overlook critical aspects of change requirements. Conversely, change frameworks
without process models lost the dynamic of sequencing actions in a logical order that
produced orderly results. Anderson and Ackerman Anderson saw the orchestration of
transformational change as a complex undertaking that required a conceptual, pragmatic
approach, achieved by combining frameworks with process models.
Peters and Waterman (1982/2012) developed the 7-S framework while employed
at McKinsey (Anderson & Ackerman Anderson, 2001). McKinsey relied on the 7-S
framework to structure their engagements with clients while consulting on how to
execute transformational change. Rasiel (1999) showed that at McKinsey, each
engagement was separate and unique. Consequently, they considered each process plan
an individual development at the start of each engagement, prepared by the assigned
consultants in conjunction with and as part of their preparation to assist the client. Their
project plans were completely customized. As Rasiel described it, an approach to
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building group cohesion among the assigned consultants used a process plan
development process, where the advisers and clients collaboratively defined a process
plan. By training for and developing the plan together, the consultants and customers
built a mutual understanding and a level of trust they might not have otherwise gained.
This approach suggested that McKinsey lacked a defined process plan for
transformational change, such as found in Kotter’s (1996/2010) or Schein’s (2010) work.
However, as Kotter (2014) noted, McKinsey developed their interest in CM consulting
after observing the success of the BCG in providing those services. Both companies;
McKinsey and BCG, offered similar management advisory services.
Defining CM approaches within a framework rather than as a process seemed
more prevalent among consulting companies. For example, IBM referred to its IBM
Better Change Methodology as a framework, although it contained elements that were
process oriented (Abouzaglo & Kirschen, 2014). This framework identified a distinction
between transformation and change, indicating that change is what Burke (2014)
considered evolutionary, incremental change. Transformation Abouzaglo and Kirschen
defined extensive change that improves the future landscape of an organization, which
Burke called revolutionary, transformational change. Jorgensen, Bruehl, and Franke
(2014) extended the definition by assuming that CM focused on technology change.
Their discussion was limited to technology change in organizations, as might be expected
from IBM consultants given their heritage in technology consulting.
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The process presented by Duck (2001) was the approach used by BCG to manage
change. Duck (2001) called her presentation of the Change Curve a framework, not a
process; yet it featured a sequential series of phases, with steps within each phase,
organized as a process plan. Kotter (1996/2010) used the words framework and process
more or less interchangeably. Moreover, the expectation that OD practitioners would
consider their methods as frameworks seemed likely if they read or applied Lewin’s
(1997/2010) work in field theory and experimentation. Lewin’s work in social
psychology presented a framework of constructs that in his day became accepted as
dynamic properties, types of reactions and influences. Change from the OD perspective
was more of a group behavior than process type of study, which leads to the third
category of research in CM, behavioral approaches.
Behavioral approaches. As previously noted, OD began with Lewin’s
(1997/2010) work in social psychology. Lewin’s first focus was not on OD but instead
was interested in individual and group behavior interaction in a social setting. He
developed the concepts of social psychology, field theory, and training groups (or Tgroups), concepts developed into modern OD by the NTL. Lewin suggested that
individuals grounded their behavior and identities in their association with the social
group to which they belonged, and Allport (2010, para. 3) proposed that this
interdependence and influence is inescapable in the growth of the organization.
Bradford and Burke (2005a) presented CM from the perspective of the OD
scholar-practitioner and questioned the future viability of OD. Burke and Bradford (2005)
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noted that OD had once been a critical philosophy sought by senior organization
executives. OD practitioners, at one point, were considered part of the senior team,
responsible for driving the strategic directions of organizations. However, that status had
declined, and OD practitioners had been relegated to lower level positions, if kept at all,
within organizations. They were, for the most part, no longer considered strategic
contributors, except when group behavioral issues might impede performance. At the
same time, Burke and Bradford noted the ascendance of CM, a discipline promoted by
major management consulting companies like Accenture, BearingPoint, Cap Gemini
Ernst and Young, and IBM. This type of organization was inclined to focus more on
organization structure or mechanics, using project planning and management techniques,
managing artifacts and processes as opposed to behavior and culture. These practitioners
tended to use participative processes to secure buy-in and cooperation rather than to
influence behavior and culture. Burke and Bradford questioned whether OD was relevant
if OD was synonymous with change, and if managing change is the core task of leaders,
then why has OD not been seen as relevant by those leaders?
Bradford and Burke (2005b) suggested that OD had evolved to where it was
relegated to lower ranks in organizations, if it existed at all, and was devoted to
individual personal development rather than OD. The exception was the periodic need to
fix organizational problems. The skillset then elevated to where needed to foster change.
Harvey (2005) believed that OD has declined and should be allowed to fade gracefully.
Bradford and Porras (2005) suggested, “OD is everything and, as a result, OD is nothing”
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(p. 51). Their point was that whatever OD consultants were doing at the time became the
definition of OD. OD had become a meaningless label for the discipline, and what
happened in the name of OD was not necessarily organizational. Marshak (2005) pointed
to the influence of general management consultants and the growth of CM practices,
replacing organizational psychologists in the decision-making processes. This influence
occurred concurrently with the fragmentation of OD. General management consultants
focused more on re-engineering and efficiency with less consideration of humanistic
needs. Greiner and Cummings (2005) noted, “OD has virtually disappeared as the title of
departments in many organizations…. It is rarely taught as a primary field in universities,
except by a small number of longtime adherents” (p. 87). Together, those holding these
positions recognize the decline of OD concurrent with the elevation of CM as the
practices underlying the leadership of change in organizations.
Other approaches. The authors discussed to this point were primarily academics
and consultants devoted to CM. Many others who, while not presenting theories as CM,
have described processes that required CM to work. For example, Senge’s (2006)
systems thinking was to view the organization as a system, recognizing how an impact at
one point resulted in outcomes at others. Creating a mindset of systems thinking in an
organization requires a change initiative. Goldratt and Cox’s and Cox’s (2004) goaloriented management was a systems-oriented model that sought to identify organizational
bottlenecks or chokepoints. Goldratt and Cox and Cox suggested managing those
bottlenecks first. Organizations that invoke this approach would, in the process, create a
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CM requirement. Change appeared to be a constant that exists, regardless of whether
managed or not.
Most researchers in management, leadership, or organizational theory were, in
fact, advocating change when they advocated adopting their concepts. For example, when
Argyris and Schön (1978) presented their theory on single- and double-loop learning,
they recommended that, if implemented, represented a change initiative. In these and
many other examples (Bennis, 2009; Chowdhury, 2003; Drucker, 1954/2010; Goldratt
and Cox & Cox, 2004; Hammer & Champy, 2002; McGregor, 2006; Pascale et al., 2000;
Peters & Waterman, 2012; Senge, 2006), the authors were not recommending CM.
However, adopting what they presented, logically required it. Many scholars and
researchers over the years, from Lewin (1997/2010) through Burke (2014), have
introduced theories and practices in CM, either directly or indirectly. Authors, over the
years wrote about management, leadership, organization structure, systems, processes,
culture, or behavior, but following their suggestions and recommendations requires CM.
In that sense, most business theories, whether directly or not, required CM to invoke the
practices they recommended to achieve the outcomes they proposed.
Summary of theoretical approaches. All approaches to change seemed to
contain a tendency toward a process orientation. They began with the past or current state
and ended with a current or future state. Lewin’s (1997/2010) three steps, Burke’s (2014)
or Schein’s (2010) seven steps in three stages, Kotter’s (1996/2010) eight-stage process,
or Duck’s (2001) five phases of change, were all similar when viewed as processes.
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Kotter’s eight stages were similar to Burke’s seven steps. Duck presented an approach
more like Kotter's: It was procedural yet similar to Schein’s, which focused on behavior
rather than frameworks and processes. When viewed together against all of the processes,
frameworks, behavioral, and culture modification approaches, this process orientation
seemed most common.
Duck’s (2001) process was unique in the emphasis on identifying the circular
nature of change, meaning that once completed, the new level of fruition for change
eventually became stagnated, and the first phase of the next change cycle began. The
process perpetually repeated itself in this way. However, Duck's observation was not
unique in the sense that she alone recognized this cyclical nature, as Ackerman Anderson
and Anderson (2010) and Schein (2010) also recognized it. Ackerman Anderson and
Anderson noted a distinction between change frameworks and change processes after
addressing the importance of the leadership mindset. They showed that both behavioral
change and frameworks were present in achieving change before centering on a process
approach, similar to the others, such as Schein’s (2010), Burke’s (2014), Kotter’s,
(1996/2010), and so on. McKinsey only recognized a need for frameworks (Peters &
Waterman, 1982/2012). By their definition, frameworks were those structures of
interrelated concepts that surrounded the initiative, within which change occurred.
McKinsey’s 7-S model was one framework used to recognize the structures needing
attention as static or continuous elements of an organization. CM attended to these items
while working through the change process. Inside the 7-S framework, change mapped as
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a sequential process moving from a current to future state. McKinsey consultants, as
noted by Rasiel (1999), considered processes unique in every case, and did not believe
that a generalized process model was possible. According to Rasiel, they developed a
unique process each time they engaged with a new client, using this development process
as a mechanism for building relationships with team members and client representatives.
In their essence, these models for CM contained three elements: The behavioral
adjustment, the framework, and the procedural approaches. Different authors assigned
different weights or priorities to each, but at some level, they all recognized a need to
address all three elements in a change initiative. The social element addressed
organizational acceptance and behavior change; the framework defined the scope of
organizational structure within which the change occurs, and the process laid out the
stepwise approach from a start to a future end state.
How Theory Has Informed the Literature
The theorists established that CM is a process, managed within the framework of
organization structure (Anderson & Ackerman Anderson, 2001; Peters & Waterman,
1982/2012). That process is a sequence of steps, stages, or phases that occur in a logical
order (Anderson & Ackerman Anderson, 2001; Duck, 2001; Kotter, 1996/2010, 2008,
2014). Some authors described CM as the transition or transformation from a current
state to a future state (Burke, 2014; Duck, 2001; Kotter, 1996/2010, 2008, 2014; Schein,
2010). Others indicated that it was about behavior and culture change as much as about a
process (Ackerman Anderson & Anderson, 2010; Burke, 2014; Schein, 2010; Duck,
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2001). Other authors found change more about changing structures, business processes,
and other more tangible framework artifacts (Jorgensen et al., 2008; Senturia et al.,
2008). Management strategies are about the mechanics of designing organization
processes to deliver expected results. CM focuses on changing those models because of
the changed environment or context of the organization. This change is about providing
leadership and getting people to understand, accept, and act on new expectations dictated
by the change rather than continue with their old structure. Theorists defined change as a
manageable process. They recognized that leading an organization through behavioral
change within the construct of a framework is necessary for any success.
Validating Theory
Creswell (2013) wrote that while opinions about validation of findings in
qualitative research vary, the most important task was to establish that reported results are
valid, at least for the environment studied, and this validity should compare to some
standard. These standards vary, whether the study perspective is procedural, interpretive,
emancipatory, or postmodern. Some viewed qualitative validation like that of quantitative
studies while others resisted validation, suggesting that qualitative research is
incongruent with the quantitative perspective. Many used alternative, more naturalistic
terms such as credibility, authenticity, transferability, dependability, and confirmability,
words meant to serve as equivalents for internal validation, external validation,
reliability, and objectivity. Creswell cited Eisner’s constructs for structural corroboration,
consensual validation, and referential adequacy.
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Most scholars quoted by Creswell (2013) agreed that some form or nature of
validation should occur. Creswell recognized that some authors did not consider
validation necessary. They considered it noncontributory and distracting. He noted that
Whittemore, Chase, and Mandle (2001) organized validation into four primary criteria:
credibility, authenticity, criticality, and integrity. These tests depended on the skill of the
researcher to surface the fullest, most accurate sense of the narrative possible.
Whittemore et al. also noted secondary criteria including explicitness, vividness,
creativity, thoroughness, congruence, and sensitivity. Creswell considered validation an
attempt to assess the accuracy of the findings as described by researchers and
participants. He saw validation as a strength of qualitative research. It was, to him, a
process rather than a verification, and authors needed to choose the types and terms of
validation with which they were comfortable. Researchers should employ accepted
strategies to document the accuracy of their studies.
Patton (2015) wrote differently about validation. He respected the concept of
validity in his opening example and his presentation on quality and credibility and
included an example of validity as part of his overview discussion of the nature of
qualitative inquiry. Patton directed his presentation for evaluating qualitative research
more toward quality and credibility, but that evaluation included various forms of
validation. Patton identified five evaluative criteria: (a) Traditional scientific research
criteria, (b) social construction and constructivist criteria, (c) artistic and evocative
criteria, (d) critical change criteria, and (e) evaluation standards and principles. Patton
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identified several evaluation criteria for quality and credibility under each of these labels,
including internal validation (credibility), external validation (transferability), reliability
(dependability), and objectivity (confirmability) as subsets under these headings. In all,
he included 45 criteria for assessing quality and credibility, although there was some
overlap in the criteria, repeated under different headings.
Creswell (2013) and Patton (2015) represented the importance of validation.
However, theorists in CM did not seem to support evidence of their findings, whether as
validation, quality, or credibility. Some admitted they had not included this evidence, as
Kotter (1996/2010, 2008, 2014) did. Others, while less open about including evidence,
did not offer corroboration that what they presented was valid (Duck, 2001; Anderson &
Ackerman Anderson, 2001; Peters & Waterman, 1982/2012). This lack of corroboration
is not to say their theories were not credible, noting that cross-referential comparisons
demonstrate their findings are similar, and if their research were independent the
similarities themselves would suggest some level of credibility. The literature did not
suggest this. These authors did not suggest that each set of findings were unique. What
was unclear was whether their findings were merely applying each other’s theories and
then adapting their own, or if they researched their work independently and found that
their findings closely simulated others.
Schein (2010) limited his evidence to face validity—the concept that if it looked
valid, then most likely it is. No author provided sufficient descriptive information to
enable replication of their work or to demonstrate that their processes were generalizable

94
outcomes that would apply in any change situation. Indeed, it may be that none of the
theories studied in this review were generalizable at all, as demonstrated in the Little
Rock Board of Education case (Nitta, Wrobel, Howard, & Jimmerson-Eddings, 2009).
None of these authors’ examples demonstrated that if another leader or consultant
independently applied them; the outcome would be the same. Each author appeared to
execute their research independently, using his or her approach to researching change.
They then seemed to arrive at more or less the same conclusions, which is that managing
change was, or at least included, a linear process that managed within an organizational
framework and that affected change by altering culture and behavior. The leadership of
people through cultural change was equally or more important than applying the
mechanics of the change process in the artifacts of the organization. Most of that research
was qualitative, without sufficient data included to support an independent study that
validates same or similar results. Reliance was restricted to the credibility of the
researchers and was the extent of validation available in the literature.
The findings of the theorists had some credibility, given that all have arrived at
similar conclusions. This study was not proposed to question that credibility. The work of
the theorists did not appear to include knowledge from working practitioners, those
permanent employees charged with managing change. In that sense, the body of
knowledge in CM remained incomplete. These employee-practitioners were the front-line
participants responsible for results and may have had different experiences that led to
success or failure in CM. Those experiences should be explored, documented, and
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validated. The experiences of the scholar-practitioners did not demonstrate that they came
from repeated experiences with repeated results, beyond the personal claims of those
scholars. The theorists may have had these data, but they neither offered them as findings
nor published them in a form that demonstrated validity. This study should expand
knowledge by exposing contributions to success and failure in CM from the perspective
of employee-practitioners charged with facilitating change.
Conclusion of Descriptions of Theory
In this section, I covered the theories of better-known authors in OD and CM. OD
evolved in academia while CM was more rooted in management consulting practices.
Many of the OD authors cited here were somehow involved with the NTL. Other groups
were key contributors to OD and the influences that top management consulting firms
have had. Change in this study referred to transformational change. OD was focused
more on cultural and behavioral change while CM stressed procedural and structural
change within organizations. I reviewed the works of several authors, noting that most
presented procedural approaches to change. Some also addressed the frameworks within
which change occurs while others also addressed the importance of cultural and
behavioral change in conjunction with organizational change. Frameworks were more
prevalent in the CM discipline than in OD while OD addressed behavioral change more
than CM. Schein (2010) dealt exclusively with behavioral change while Peters and
Waterman (1982/2012) dealt only with frameworks. Others confused the concepts of
process, frameworks, and behavioral change. For example, IBM (Jorgensen et al., 2008;
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Jorgensen et al., 2014) called their approach a framework, then presented a processoriented approach. McKinsey (Keller & Aiken, 2008) did the same. Through all of this, it
became apparent that there are three elements of managing change; the first element was
the process, the second was the framework, and the third was provision for cultural and
behavioral change.
Burke (2014) was the only author who fairly represented this troika of approaches
with equal weight given to each. Kotter (1996/2010), who presented a process-oriented
approach, showed behavioral requirements by giving case examples at various stages
where outcomes depended on behavioral change. Another example was Ackerman
Anderson and Anderson (2010), who in addressing behavioral change, limited their
recommendation to adjusting the mindset of the organization leadership before
commencing a change initiative. McKinsey (Rasiel, 1999) stressed that a procedural
approach could not be specified outside the change initiative, suggesting that each effort
is so unique that it would be impossible to define a process before starting work with a
client. After comparing their respective approaches, I concluded, as Burke noted, three
aspects or elements of change must be equally addressed for a change initiative to
succeed.
Several other authors, such as Argyris and Schön (1978), Bennis (2009), Drucker
(1954/2010), Goldratt and Cox and Cox (2004), Senge (2006), and others, proposed
management and leadership approaches or organization and structure that represented
implied calls for change. These were management and leadership authors who developed
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a variety of theories and methods for management and leadership practices. These
theories suggested changed results from organizational expectations expected from
implementing their proposals. These authors, and others like them, envisioned that their
recommendations would stimulate change activities. Thus, CM is more pervasive than
most people realize. Knowing this background led to the development of the next section,
the conceptual framework for this research.
Importance of This Study
Although there was extensive research and development in CM, the high ratio of
failed programs to projects has not declined. This lack of decline raises questions whether
the causes of CM failure indicated unaccounted, missing aspects of the change process,
or that the research did not include some form of validation for the underlying causes of
CM failure proposed by the scholars and consultants in the industry. Moreover,
organizational leaders may not have been aware of and able to execute change plans
based on the research findings. Academic, trade, and professional publications were
written mostly by scholars and consultants who worked as change agents rather than by
workers, on-the-job practitioners, senior- or middle-managers. Employee Practitioner
accountability left little room for failure as the employee was subject to immediate and
irreversible political and professional harm if a change initiative failed. This study filled a
gap in the literature by exploring the employee change leader perspectives that offered a
better understanding of CM success and failure and improved the success potential for
future change leaders.
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Summary and Conclusions
In this chapter, I reviewed the literature regarding CM, particularly about the
failure rates and factors contributing to success or failure of a change effort. Although
many theorists have reached similar conclusions about managing change, these scholars
have offered little consensus on what caused success or failure or how to effect change
successfully. Theorists have differed on the nature of OD, of change, and of CM.
Leadership is not a simple process or activity; leading change appeared more complicated
than expected. CM was unique to the need, the context, the change, the culture, and the
organization (Burke, 2014).
The literature suggested three constructs for managing change be addressed
simultaneously: the cultural, structural, and procedural. Failing to address any of these
increased the potential for failure (Burke, 2014; Pascale et al., 2000; Peters & Waterman,
1982/2012). Kotter (1996/2010), although labeling his approach a framework, presented
an example of the procedural construct by introducing CM as an eight-step process, an
approach highly acceptable to organization leaders, as evidenced by the popularity of his
articles in the Harvard Business Review. Kotter stressed that a changing organization
must address each of these steps and allow time for them to complete if they expected to
change successfully. Many other authors also suggested process-oriented approaches—
some recognizing the structural aspect, others recognizing the cultural and behavioral
developmental aspects, and a few who credited two of the three, or all three constructs.
Peters and Waterman (1982/2012) presented McKinsey’s 7-S framework, an example of
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the structural framing needed to focus on change. Framing change helped keep
superfluous work out of the process by focusing the change activity only where it was
important. Burke (2014), Anderson and Ackerman Anderson (2001) and Ackerman
Anderson and Anderson (2010) also mentioned this framework. Anderson and Ackerman
Anderson referred to the importance of having the right leadership mindset before
starting a change initiative and emphasized the concept of resetting leadership values and
styles before beginning. After setting the leadership mindset and addressing the
framework of the change, Anderson and Ackerman Anderson then proposed a process for
managing change that has worked for them. Burke recognized the same framework as
needed to define the context of the change before addressing cultural and behavioral
issues.
Like some scholars and many independent consultants, the major consulting firms
with CM practices discounted the academic theorists to some degree, instead, inventing
their own proprietary methods for dealing with change (Foster & Kaplan, 2001;
Jorgensen et al., 2008; Peters & Waterman, 1982/2012; Rasiel, 1999). Consulting
companies such as IBM, McKinsey, Bain & Company, and others who provided CM
consulting services, were likely to be the first choice for many organizations looking for
outside help to effect change. These organizations differ from scholar-practitioners or OD
consultants by focusing more on structure and process than on behavioral or cultural
change. Many of the scholars and academics who studied CM have done so in
conjunction with these firms and others like them. For example, Kotter (1996/2010)
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completed much of his research while partnering with BCG and McKinsey. Burke (2014)
partnered with McKinsey and the NTL. Anderson and Ackerman Anderson (2001) and
Ackerman Anderson and Anderson (2010), while consultants in CM, collaborated with
Stanford University. Dean Anderson was on the faculty there at one point, while,
continuing to work as a consultant. After addressing mindset and framework, these
authors used Schein's (2010) process, developed in conjunction with the NTL. A value of
more overlap between academic researchers and professional practitioners seems
plausible.
A common finding reported by consulting firms was that employee resistance and
lack of leadership support were top causes of change failure (Foster & Kaplan, 2001;
Jorgensen et al., 2008; Peters & Waterman, 1982/2012). These findings were different
from the causes reported by change theorists such as Anderson and Ackerman Anderson
(2001), Ackerman Anderson and Anderson (2010), Burke (2014), Duck (2001), and
Kotter (1996/2010). Scholars reported different causes for CM failure. They recognized
that resistance and leadership difficulty occurred but did not present them as primary
causes of change failure. Anderson and Ackerman Anderson found that an inability to
establish the right mindset among leadership was a leading cause of failure. Among eight
reasons for failure, Kotter noted that failure to create a sense of urgency was first and
most significant; for Burke, it was a failure to conduct behavioral and cultural change
within the framework defining the organization. Finally, Duck attributed failure to not
recognizing normal behavioral symptoms of a successful change initiative as the change
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occurred, resulting in premature discontinuance of leadership, and guidance of the
turmoil that was normal throughout the change process. Duck stressed that behavior
viewed as symptomatic of failure might signify success. For example, a workforce that
crescendos to a new level of disturbance might appear to offer major resistance, when, in
reality, the group was accepting the change and struggling to adapt and accommodate.
The change may appear to be complete, but work is discontinued too soon, resulting in
apathy instead of continued forward drive, eventually leading to failure due to lack of
interest.
One major shortcoming of CM research was insufficient empirical evidence for
the findings that researchers presented beyond anecdotal examples and case studies.
Whether the CM approach was academic or professional, every model suggested primary
causes for failure, but none gave independent or empirical evidence of credible,
transferable, confirmable examples that substantiated the researchers’ conclusions.
Whether scholarly or professional researchers, none were clear about causes of failure as
understood by employee practitioners. Scholars and consultants, while engaged, were
observers; the anecdotal stories and cases seemed to neglect or minimized the viewpoints
of employee change leaders who were members of a group and part of the culture where
changes occurred. In most cases, the employee change leader was held up as an example
of how not to do it.
The theorist or external consultants were temporary resources who, at most,
joined the organization on a short-term basis. They wrote and delivered reports with
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recommendations, then departed, leaving the employee change leader to achieve the
suggested results. Theoreticians and consultants, while knowledgeable, did not feel the
constraints of social and political responsibility in the culture of the organization. They
were outsiders as far as the organization was concerned. This difference may partially
explain the persistence of the failure rates for formal organizational change efforts. The
works of Kotter (1996/2010), Anderson and Ackerman Anderson (2001, 2010), Duck
(2001), Lewin (1997/2010), and Burke (2014) need validation to substantiate their
claims. Thus, the gap noted in the literature review was a lack of contributions from
working employee change leaders within organizations. Although conducted by highly
involved and extensively experienced academics and practitioners, their empirical studies
focused on isolated elements of one theory or another or one problem or another for
demonstration purposes, rather than showing generalized findings. The opinions of
organizational members, subject to the whims of politics and the social responsibilities of
membership, might have been closer to the action of effecting change and may show that
something different led to success or failure.
The work of scholars and consultants dominated the research. Organization
employees as change leaders may have had different perspectives on CM success, not
considered by the scholars and consultants, that might have been more correct. Those
views could include negotiating action with and getting support from other staff, dealing
with ad hoc flux and crisis during the change initiative, maintaining leadership, and
organization political interaction from within the context of the change programs. This
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segment of the profession was an important population that apparently had little voice in
the existing research. The knowledge held by employee change leaders should represent
unique data for defining success or failure.
This study is designed to collect that knowledge and compare to the presentations
of the scholars and consultants in the literature review. These scholars and consultants
were external resources, invited to make recommendations, who may also have stayed on
to participate in the change execution, but who were not part of the organization staff or
culture and might not have had the same experience as a permanent employee would.
Analysis of data from employee change leaders may confirm what scholars and
practitioners suggest caused success or failure or offer alternatives. Those alternatives
would come from people held accountable for leading change, ensuring results, and
achieving success within their respective organizations.
A realistic phenomenological approach, as noted in Chapter 1, is intended to
generate a broader narrative of these success factors than other research designs. Chapter
3 details this design for use in studying this problem.
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Chapter 3: Research Method
The research paradigm of CM has been predominantly drawn from the
perspective of external personnel. Mainly scholars and consultants have reviewed CM
activities in organizations and recommend courses of action that might reduce the
possibility of failure. As they consult with CM personnel, researchers have observed how
leaders address change, reported these observations and noted how leaders approach
managing change procedurally within a framework. Some scholars have examined
behavioral and cultural issues in conjunction with their research. Others have addressed
the framework that CM happens within, noting that while the operation of change is fluid
and flexible. CM occurs within a framework or context that limits the worldview and
scope of the change.
This external and detached resource perspective have led to an incomplete body
of research lacking, for example, a researcher’s familiarity with the culture and politics of
the organization. Studies conducted by external researchers, at a minimum, have
excluded the contributions of actual employee change leaders. The contributions of
employee change leaders to the success of CM were not reported in ways that supported
credibility, transferability, dependability, or confirmability. Thus, the purpose of this
study, to explore the lived experiences of those employee change leaders––those charged
with bringing about change–– to understand how they do that and successfully achieve
results. The goal is to understand what it is they do, what behaviors they exercise, to
effect change.
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The phenomenon of interest in this study is the essence of how internal change
leaders, employees of changing organizations, successfully achieve change. The study is
designed to seek data and information absent from the CM literature, as demonstrated in
Chapter 2. Data collection activities were designed to discover the practices and
behaviors of these specialized employees and define how they succeed or fail when
leading and managing transformational change initiatives.
This chapter begins with a discussion of a phenomenological research design for
gathering the reflections of transformational change success and failure as understood by
change leaders employed by organizations, and the rationale for choosing this research
method rather than a different approach. The next section contains a definition of the
unique role of the phenomenological researcher. That section leads to a detailed
description of the method used to gather data and conduct the research, including a
description of the target population, the participant group, and the participant selection
method. A description of the instrumentation and a pilot study design follows, as well as
procedures for recruiting participants, data collection, and follow-up procedures. The
method section will conclude with a process for analyzing and interpreting the data. The
chapter contains the requirements needed to establish the criteria for assessing the
trustworthiness of the findings regarding credibility, transferability, dependability, and
confirmability, and concludes with a summary of the chapter’s contents.
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Research Methodology and Rationale
This empirical phenomenological research design was intended to serve as a
framework for gathering the reflections of change leaders employed by organizations—
those leaders held accountable for day-to-day leadership to drive change through the
organization until they achieve the intended results of invoking change. The following
section restates the research questions from Chapter 1.
Research Questions
How do employee change leaders, responsible for delivering results in CM
initiatives, live their experiences of CM success, specifically, to be held accountable for
achieving the results of planned change, to experience the culture of change, and
accomplish the results forecasted in planning the change process?
1. What behaviors and other practices do internal change leaders seem to
exercise, what do they do differently from what external change practitioners
suggest, that results in CM success?
2. What meaning do employee change leaders attribute to the high failure rates
in CM and how do these leaders show through their lived experiences to avoid
them?
3. How, given the extraordinarily high potential for failure, do these leaders
continue to exercise CM practices successfully in their organizations?
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Central Phenomenon of the Study
The central phenomenon of this study is CM success as understood by successful
organization CM leaders. This unique subset of CM practitioners, typically employees of
a transforming organization, is assigned to lead change initiatives to fruition. The CM
industry has reported extraordinarily high failure rates for change (see, e.g., Jorgensen et
al., 2008; Keller & Aiken, 2008; Kotter, 2014). These rates range between 20% and 92%,
depending upon who reported them and in what context the failure occurred. The
approaches that organizations continue to undertake for CM are almost exclusively the
product of scholars and consultants who studied organizations and recommended actions
they predict will lead to change success (Jorgensen et al., 2008; Keller & Aiken, 2008).
While these consultants may have engaged extensively in change initiatives, their
involvement is advisory. They are less likely to encounter the consequences of failure
that organization employees might experience. If the failure was attributed to consultants,
the consequences are probably less impactful than for organization employees. The
employee change leader, as noted in the preceding chapter, has a different relationship
with the organization than the consultant, may act differently, and may view the causes of
success and failure differently from what scholars and consultants write about in the
literature.
Research Tradition
The research tradition of this study is empirical phenomenology (Moustakas,
1994). Empirical Phenomenology is unique in how it goes beyond the beliefs and biases
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of researchers and participants to investigate, summarize, and understand the essence of
experiencing phenomena. It was empirical because it was intended to compare the
research results to the theoretical presentations about change management and to the
universal processes of organization workings. The objective in phenomenology is to
understand the underlying essences of the phenomenon and to rise above or go beyond
the preferences and beliefs brought out in the data (Vagle, 2014). By the researcher’s
bracketing of his or her experiences and beliefs —that is, suspending all judgment about
the causes of success or failure and focusing on the analysis of the lived experiences of
research participants—the essence of the phenomenon represented in the data, without
any personification or evaluative opinion, becomes discernible.
Moustakas (1994), in turn, based his interpretation on the work of Descartes
(1977/1909), who separated the concepts of mind and body and created the distinction
between objects that are not material, that are abstractions of thought but that are also
objects of consciousness and reliable representations of lived experiences. These objects
are real truths representing phenomena although they are ideas found in the mind rather
than in nature. Kant (1966) suggested three sources of knowledge; the sensory, the
imaginative, and the apperceptive. Moustakas (1994) related these sources to phenomena,
showing the connection between the physical, its perception in the mind, and the
conscious evaluation of it as an aspect worth study. Moustakas cited how van Kaam
(1966) operationalized the method: “to obtain comprehensive descriptions that provide a
basis for a reflective structural analysis that portrays the essences of the experience” (p.
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12). The researcher determines the underlying structures of experience by interpreting the
original descriptions.
Moustakas (1994) stated that this type of research is intended to capture the
underlying nature of phenomena regardless of who experienced it, how they experienced
it, or who was interpreting the observations. Smith (2013) defined phenomenology as
the study of structures of consciousness as experienced from the first-person point
of view. The central structure of an experience is its intentionality; it's being
directed toward something, as it is an experience of or about some object. An
experience is directed toward an object by virtue of its content or meaning (which
represents the object) together with appropriate enabling conditions. (para. 1)
Moustakas (1994) based his philosophy in part on Hegel, an eighteenth-century
philosopher, who was first to offer a precise description of phenomenology, calling it
knowledge as it appears in consciousness. Hegel, according to Moustakas, presented
phenomenology as the science of describing perception, feeling, and knowledge of
immediate awareness and experience. Moustakas developed transcendental
phenomenology from empirical phenomenology, beginning with a description of the
empirical approach, recognizing the influence of Giorgi, Knowles, and Smith (1979).
Moustakas noted Descartes’s (1977/1909) distinction that experiences of the mind do not
always extend to material objects (phenomena). He saw the application of Husserl’s
concept of epoché, the process of avoiding presupposition in analyzing data, as blending
what was present and what was possible, the transformation of empirical experience into
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insights through a process of ideation. The concept in the mind mingles with the
phenomena in a way that creates meaning and extends knowledge.
Although not a heuristic inquiry per se, some of the tactics of heuristic inquiry
added value to this study. Patton (2015) wrote that heuristics refers to connectedness and
relationship, depicting essential meanings and portrayal of intrigue and personal
significance, and developing a creative synthesis that includes the researcher’s intuition
and understanding while distilling the structures of experience. As a necessity in a
heuristic inquiry (Patton, 2015), to obtain the best results, the researcher must suspend his
or her beliefs and be open to new concepts that change any preconceptions when the data
do not align with them. As in heuristic inquiry, the data collection should be under a
paradigm of maximum structural variation of perspectives. Where this approach differs
from empirical phenomenology is that the topic of research does not change; the topic is
CM success (or failure).
Rationale for a Phenomenological Study
As noted in the literature review, there has been little fundamental research to
support past findings on managing change. Further, researchers have largely ignored the
knowledge and contributions of actual change leaders, those employees of organizations
charged with achieving the outcomes of CM initiatives. Phenomenology was selected as
the underlying methodology for this study with its focus on the conscious experience of
everyday life and social activity, with the intent of reducing those experiences to their
essences, their core meanings, mutually understood through commonly experienced
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phenomena within the population (Merriam & Tisdell, 2016). Phenomenology focuses on
the basic structure of experience, putting aside the prior beliefs of researchers and
participants (Patton, 2015). This approach isolates the essence of a phenomenon as it
exists in life, attempting to do so without the influence of interpretation inherent in the
explanation of researchers or participants. While phenomenology may use bracketing,
coding, and other forms of data analysis, the objective is not the analysis as much as it is
to distill the essence of the phenomenon to its purest underlying form without subjective
interpretation by the people who experienced it (Merriam & Tisdell, 2016).
Among other forms of qualitative research, I considered were a basic interpretive
study, a qualitative case study, a grounded theory study, or a narrative inquiry. All four
were less optimal than phenomenology because of their analytical nature. While the basic
interpretive study might offer similar structure and flexibility, an analytical approach
seeks to categorize, simplify, and reduce understanding to a generic or interpretive
explanation (Merriam & Tisdell, 2016). The method focuses on how people interpret
their experience, construct their world, and attribute meaning. Phenomenology, on the
other hand, reduces the findings to their pure underlying essence, the characteristics that
make the phenomenon what it is regardless of its interpretation. The narrative inquiry is
similar to phenomenology but stops with the collection and interpretation of stories.
Stories told by participants are the data and include those interpretations in their analysis.
According to Merriam and Tisdell (2016), those stories are more about how a participant
makes sense of an experience, how they communicate with others, and how they
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understand the world around them than they are about the phenomenon that is the basis of
the study. The narrative inquiry does not distill the essence of a phenomenon, leaving the
story as told by the participant rather than reducing it to the pure essence of the
phenomenon.
Grounded theory, which focuses on building a theory from the analysis of the
research data (Merriam & Tisdell, 2016), was another potential method for this study.
Most of the approaches mentioned in this proposal, such as Kotter’s (1996/2010) eightstep method, Burke’s (2014) three components, and Schein’s (2010) seven-step approach
were essentially grounded theories. More theory was not needed, just evidence of existing
theory. This study did not focus on defining more theory or methods about how to
manage change but why failure rates remain so high despite all the work already
completed in CM.
Before settling on phenomenology as the best approach, I considered conducting
multiple case studies to build a consensus of understanding from a broader perspective
than one pointed solution. The case study method was not selected because of its focus on
the analysis of bounded systems (Merriam &Tisdell, 2016). Merriam and Tisdell
indicated that the defining characteristic of a case study was this focus on a bounded
system. The phenomenon of CM success is not a bounded system so much as it is a
universal maxim. CM success is a phenomenon that occurs regardless of its context or
who led that success. A single case would only give a pointed example. Multiple case
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studies would only give multiple pointed examples. This study needed to demonstrate a
broader consensus of the underlying philosophy of CM success.
After considering these other methods, and what the objectives of the study
included, it was apparent that phenomenology was the most appropriate approach to
understanding CM success. Data collection for this study was fieldwork in the form of
open-ended conversations about CM strategies and tactics. Employee change leader
participants shared their lived experiences, stated in their words, and thereby contribute to
understanding the essence of CM success. While those stories depicted valid causes of
change success, they articulated opinions of those leaders without filtering or any form of
codification. Phenomenological reduction provided for understanding the essence of CM
success or failure. The method entails bracketing and coding those stories in a way that
distills the underlying essence of the actual causes of success or failure. The method also
enabled data collection from a broad range of participants and provided for consolidation
of the various stories into summary statements that articulate the pure essence of the
phenomenon. The method filtered out the personalities of the participants through this
coding and bracketing process. These tactics masked the interpretations offered by the
participant inputs and drew out the underlying absolute essences of CM success, the pure
character of the phenomenon without influence by how a participant told the story of
their experience. This approach provided insight into the experiences of employee change
leaders in organizations. Restating their experiences in the essential architecture of
phenomenological reduction protects them from any sense of traceability.
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Role of the Researcher
As an experienced observer and member of the targeted population for data
collection, I needed to avoid researcher bias carefully. Merriam and Tisdell (2016) noted
that the researcher “usually explores his or her experiences, in part to examine
dimensions of that experience and to become aware of personal prejudices, viewpoints,
and assumptions” (p. 27). Patton (2015) noted that the method also allows the researcher
to assume a role of heuristic inquiry. These descriptions suggested that bracketing is a
process of reducing the description of a lived experience relevant to a phenomenon, to its
purest representation, without bias, of the essence of that experience, regardless of who
experienced it or under what circumstances or in what context that experience occurred.
To limit researcher bias, I considered my potential biases. I have worked as a
change leader in many organizations as an internal resource, an employee change leader,
and an external resource; a consultant working for companies that provide CM services to
clients. This background included experience as a program or project manager from start
to finish in 18 significant change initiatives and as a consultant and subject matter expert
on many more. This level of experience is not meant to suggest complete knowledge. A
participant’s experiences might have been significantly different yet worked equally as
well as mine in achieving results in change initiatives. Leadership is cultural, behavioral,
and situational. What worked at one place or with one group might not work at another.
What worked on one occasion might not work at another time, even though the place or
group is the same. I realize that my experience, while successful, represented only one
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approach to managing change. As the researcher, I needed to ensure that the biases that
existed in my background do not show, to guard against giving opinions, advice, or
recommendations while interviewing participants. Still, I need to establish rapport and
credibility as a peer, to build a level of comfort and trust to where the subject felt
comfortable talking about their experiences openly, candidly, and honestly. Enough
background needed to be presented to facilitate this understanding.
I conducted field research in organizations where I might be known but not
through any personal relationships or past engagements. My qualifications for conducting
this research are available in public information and might be sought by the participants if
they chose to examine it. I would not provide my qualifications beyond the minimum
necessary to establish rapport and to build a researcher-participant relationship.
The relationship-building activity needed for this study was possible by
recognizing that everyone has an opinion, shaded by his or her background and
experience. This recognition suggested that fundamental aspects of CM success exist,
regardless of the approach, the leadership, the structure and culture, the expected
outcomes, and the context of the change. To foster healthy interactions with participants,
I took care to avoid appearing aloof, subservient, or somehow outside a peer relationship.
Because most change leaders are likely to have only one or two change initiative
management experiences, I shared my background only in broad terms.
Another issue that arose was how participation in the research or my presence
might influence the story told by the participant. For this, I remained intentionally
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conversationally vague and noncommittal while conversing enthusiastically with the
participant, encouraging them to expand their stories. Thus, my presence did not
influence the participants.
Research Design
Giorgi (1997) suggested that empirical phenomenology employ (a) description (b)
within an attitude of phenomenological reduction, and (c) seek the most consistent
meanings for the context. Giorgi listed five basic steps in a phenomenological study.
These include
1. collecting verbal data, a process of interviewing participants for their “natural
description” of the phenomenon;
2. reading the data for understanding at a macro level;
3. breaking the data into parts (in Giorgi’s terms, “meaning units”);
4. organizing and expressing the data from a disciplinary perspective
(bracketing); and
5. synthesizing or summarizing the data for communication or publication to the
scientific community (Giorgi, 1997, “The Concrete Steps,” para. 1).
These steps were followed using a constant comparative method (Merriam &
Tisdell, 2016), which suggested interviewing each participant and then beginning the
analysis immediately. Merriam and Tisdell (2016) recommended that the analysis begins
with the interview, taking notes of observations, and including them among the data for
the analysis process. Each subsequent interview was conducted and analyzed in the same
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way and compared to the earlier interviews for consistencies that might represent
commonalities depicting essences of the phenomenon. When these comparisons find no
new meaning units, saturation had been achieved, and further interviews were
unnecessary for establishing research findings.
Using Giorgi’s (1997) method, I began by interviewing senior executives and
change leaders who have recently been through and completed transformational
organizational change initiatives, to gather their descriptions of lived experiences of
change leadership that culminated in their success. I read through the data from start to
finish to get a sense of its scope and context, breaking the data apart into meaning units,
then removing all meaning units not consistent with the discipline of CM. I then
examined the remaining meaning units and re-described them more explicitly,
transforming the descriptions from everyday life stories into the technical
characterizations used within the scientific discipline of CM. I then synthesized these
characterizations into a set of themes that describes the essential fabric of the lived
experience of success or failure from the perspective of the discipline of CM.
Participant Selection Logic
The target population for this study was executives, change leaders, and managers
in education, pharmaceuticals, and industrial manufacturing companies across the U.S.
who have been through a recent transformational change initiative and succeeded.
Potential sites included education institutions with schools and programs that supported
organizations in these industries. Jorgensen et al. (2014) documented an example process
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IBM uses with all of the company’s clients. Jorgensen et al. demonstrated how CM in
organizations was essentially the same for planning, execution, and getting results,
although the strategies, tactics, and structures of the changing organizations might vary
widely. The basis of the differences were the products and services organizations offered
or the markets they served, not how they approached systematizing their selling,
marketing, and operations to create efficiency and control in their inputs and outputs. By
that definition, any organization that manages major change initiatives was an appropriate
target for this study. However, as suggested in the literature review, these industries,
education, pharmaceuticals, and industrial manufacturing, seemed to do this CM more
frequently and thus may have more experience at it. They are better targets for finding the
type of change leaders in their employ that might serve as participants in this study.
Sampling
Sampling occurred through a purposeful strategy. Patton (2015) described
purposeful sampling as derived from an emphasis on the in-depth understanding of the
population and identifying a representative participant group that is “selected
purposefully to permit inquiry into and understanding of a phenomenon in depth”
(Patton, 2015, p. 52). Because of my prior knowledge of change leadership in hightechnology businesses I focused on a few industries that are known for frequent ongoing
significant change. These included education, pharmaceutical production and
distribution, and industrial manufacturing. I focused on firms that had recently undergone
transformational change. Participants were leaders in those organizations charged with
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managing the changes to fruition. With those limitations, participants were randomly
selected based on their willingness to participate. I contacted chief executives, other chief
officers, general managers, and directors for participation or referrals. Additionally, I
spoke with consulting firms that supported them. In many cases, the participants may
have been the senior executives themselves. Depending on the size and complexity of the
organization, the senior executive may have been the change leader. In larger, more
complex organizations, that responsibility might have been delegated to some other
senior leader or a specialist within the organization. Whomever the change leader was,
whether the senior executive or delegate, that person was invited to participate on behalf
of their organization. I administered the selection process, recognizing that senior
executives are also members of the population and potentially peers. Transformational
change initiatives typically start at the chief officer level in business organizations, and at
an equivalent leadership level in other types of organizations (for example, a chancellor
or president in a university). Regardless of whomever the responsible individual was in a
participating organization, for leading the change initiative, that person was responsible
for achieving results for the change initiative and should have had a controlling say in
CM results.
These change leaders needed to be an employee of a small to large-sized
organization (100 to 1,000+ employees) and a leader of a recent transformational change.
Such companies must have been big enough to have internally grown a culture, structure,
and bureaucracy before initiating a change project, such that they needed to apply
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formalized management strategies and tactics to the change process. The unit of analysis
was the organization that had relatively recently undergone a transformational or major
change and is far enough from its completion to evaluate success or failure. The
participant was the employee who led the change initiative, the executive who directed it.
Participants were self-selecting. I contacted senior executives in organizations
fitting the participant profile to share the participation criteria. If they were qualified and
wished to participate, they could identify themselves as a change leader assigned to lead
the initiative on which they based their eligibility assessment. Otherwise they could refer
me to that person in the organization. A reasonable expectation was that senior executives
would identify themselves as the change leader and organization representative, a
specialist, charged with carrying out their change initiative execution. An equally realistic
expectation is that the top executive delegated the activity to a senior manager or some
other specialist, someone charged with day-to-day leadership of a change program,
empowered to act on behalf of the most senior executive as if they were that person. If
the change leader identified to participate was not empowered to act on behalf of the
most senior executives as if that delegate was the senior executive, then that change
leader was not qualified to participate.
Participant Group Size
The participant solicitation used standard tactics similar to those used in
consulting services marketing and sales activities for identifying and contacting potential
prospects. Contacted organizations included branches of major organizations and smaller
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independent companies. Thousands of these groups exist throughout the U.S. that fit the
participant profile outlined above.
A search of public records for education, pharmaceutical, and manufacturing
firms gathered information to identify organizations that fit the participant profile.
Representatives from those organizations that met these criteria were contacted and
invited to participate. These contacts continued until no new data in the form of meaning
units were identified. Although Polkinghorne’s (1989) suggestion of five to 25
participants set expected boundaries for participants in this study, Giorgi’s (1997)
approach suggested that the number of subjects could exceed that. Creswell (2013), while
not suggesting a participant group size for phenomenology, noted other researchers
having used group sizes ranging from one to 325 participants. O’Reilly and Parker (2012)
pointed out that group size is more dependent upon the quality of the data obtained than a
function of some number of participants. They indicated that “… an adequate sample size
is one that sufficiently answers the research question” (O’Reilly and Parker, 2012, p.
192). More importantly, O’Reilly and Parker stressed the importance of group adequacy
over group size. O’Reilly and Parker further emphasized the concept of saturation, noting
that data collection should continue until there are no new meaning units, or additions to
existing data, found. The participant group size for this study was within the range
suggested by Polkinghorne—10 participants. Enough leaders participated to establish a
consensus for the meaning units derived from their interviews. These meaning units
represented the essence of the participant’s understanding of success or failure in CM.
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Ten participants were the quantity where data saturation was achieved, thus fulfilling
O’Reilly and Parker’s concept of saturation. Merriam and Tisdell (2016) defined data
saturation as that point where it was apparent that additional interviews neither generated
new findings or changed those already found. Patton (2015) noted that there had been
phenomenological studies with only one participant and such a small participant group
was not significant by itself. Transformational change in small to large organizations
involved a significant proportion of the organization to execute the change, but the
change leadership was frequently only one person. Burke (2014) noted that change
requires a protracted process of behavioral and cultural modification and can take months
to years to complete. Burke saw CM as a complicated endeavor, occurring over an
extended period, more about culture change that organization change. Burke suggested
that change is more than likely to exercise lists of strategies and tactics to achieve
successful outcomes. The research continued until the meaning units were a complete set
of strategies, or meaning units, as defined by O’Reilly and Parker, and Merriam and
Tisdell. That is additional interviews would not generate additional data.
Patton (2015) noted that an aspect of the data collection process might be anxiety
over participation in the research. Participants will be made aware that their involvement
is voluntary, anonymous, and that they can decline further participation at any time
during the process. This awareness will be mentioned several times throughout the
participation process, beginning with the initial contact introductory script (Appendix B).
I will discuss expected contributions of the participant, the guarantees provided to the
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participant regarding privacy and confidentiality, and what the participant can expect in
return for taking part in the study. The comfort and ease of the participant are paramount.
Once identified as group members, the interview process began. Collecting
interview data started the reduction process. Giorgi (1997) recommended that this process
continue until additional data seems redundant, and the reduction process no longer
expands understanding of the fundamental underlying structures of CM success. Merriam
and Tisdell (2016) noted that the constant comparative method allows for identifying this
lack of further expansion of understanding as quickly as completing the analysis of the
latest interview.
Instrumentation
According to Patton (2015), the researcher is the instrument in qualitative
research. Patton based this claim on the assumption that data collection, analysis, and
interpretation is conducted by the researcher through fieldwork as an observerparticipant. Patton noted that the researcher is, by default, also a participant and the
reporting is experiential. However, the researcher must also exercise tactics that support
conformity and objectivity in the data. The researcher must retain a sense of impartiality,
accomplishing this through the informal interview process where open-ended questioning
occurs. The researcher intentionally avoids interjecting opinions and recommendations,
or otherwise implying a stance regarding change management while guiding the
conversations between the researcher and participants. Patton referred to this as the
“informal, conversational interview” or “unstructured interview” (p. 342) in which the
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conversation is guided by study criteria, rather than using more structured approaches
such as found in more standardized interviews. Giorgi (1997) also recommended
conducting phenomenological research in a way that encourages participants to describe
their experiences as they lived them.
Giorgi (1997) noted that in informal, conversational interviews there are no
predetermined sets of questions, as they are expected to flow spontaneously from the
context of the discussion. This approach is difficult to do without some framework that at
least keeps each interview focused in the same area. The questions in Appendix D were
developed to serve as this sort of framework. Their use was not meant as done in question
and answer sessions, so much as prompters to guide the underlying conversational
direction for the investigator to lead the discussion. Data gathered this way are likely to
be different from one participant to the next. Interview questions may change over time,
and contacts with some or all participants might involve more than one interview session.
Interviews would be flexible, spontaneous, and responsive to individual and situational
differences. Questions can be personalized, making use of the immediate situation to
increase the immediacy and concreteness of the responses. To accomplish this, the list of
questions in Appendix D was used to frame the interview direction. These questions were
designed to frame a direction and boundaries for the interview conversation, thereby
keeping the focus on the phenomenon of CM success.
The data collection process involved identifying companies that were likely to
have high rates of change in their operations and inviting their most senior change leaders
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to participate in this study. As previously noted, that person might be the CEO or an
equivalent, or some other senior officer delegated to lead change initiatives, delivering
the results that drove the need for change. What follows describes the process of
contacting and engaging participants in the study, including the artifacts used to support
this activity. The reader should note that this process was spread over several contacts
from the initial introduction, to follow-up interviews, to study result reviews. Spreading
these touches over multiple contacts allowed time for thought between conversations.
The process included:
1. Initial contact occurred using referrals from my professional network. My
contacts identified senior executives in organizations presumed to have high
rates of change. I contacted each executive by telephone and invited them to
participate. These contacts were asked to commit to an introductory
conversation. Initial emails were sent after that initial conversation to confirm
their participation. That email included a copy of a welcome letter (Appendix
A), including a consent to participate, statement of scope and process, and
other information pertinent to the participant.
2. The introductory conversation was scheduled during the initial contact from a
referral. A telephone script for managing this conversation appears in
Appendix B. This script served as a guide to the initial conversation between
the potential participant and me. It was not read verbatim. The script guided a
short, mutual introduction, a brief description of the research, a request to
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schedule a later time for a second, longer, interview conversation, and to
briefly qualify the potential participant and their organization.
3. Those contacts that agreed to participate moved to the interview process.
During the first contact the participant was asked to schedule time for an
interview, and to complete a questionnaire (Appendix C) as part of that
registration process. The questionnaire asked for basic administrative
information to help frame the interview conversation. This questionnaire
included preliminary demographic and descriptive data, needed for follow-up
after the interview. For participants who registered during the initial contact
phone call, the option to register verbally during that call was available. All
of the participants who made it past this screening process did this. I collected
the survey data and recorded it on their behalf, then sent them the welcome
letter (Appendix A) and Consent Form via email.
4. Upon completion of the registration process and survey, participants received
a Consent Form that included additional information about the conduct of the
research. These inclusions were confidentiality information (Appendix E),
rights to privacy, and the right to quit the project at any time. The
confidentiality agreement was included as an attachment to this second letter,
asking the participant to sign and return it.
5. I met with each participant at their scheduled time and conducted telephone
interviews. All of the participants elected to interview by telephone. Face-to-
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face interviews and online video conferencing were infeasible for all of the
participants due to their schedules and other commitments.
6. The list of questions in Appendix D was the framework for the interview.
These questions were not used in a question and answer session, but more as a
checklist to ensure coverage of all the intended topics. The format of the
interview was an informal conversation, and that conversation was conducted
to lead the discussion toward answering these questions.
Content validity. This concept, while important, is not normally a function of
phenomenology. The concept applies to the instrumentation used in qualitative research
and phenomenology often does not use instrumentation (Merriam & Tisdell, 2016).
Merriam and Tisdell noted that the focus of phenomenology is the experience itself and
transformation of that experience into consciousness. Phenomenology seeks to translates
the essences of these experiences into the core meanings, mutually understood through a
commonly experienced phenomenon. The task of this study was to depict the essence or
basic experience of obtaining successful outcomes in a CM initiative by querying the
lived stories of those who experienced this phenomenon.
Phenomenology does not apply to the concept of content validity easily, an aspect
that is different from most other research methods. Content validity is more applicable to
quantitative methods. Qualitative methods strive more for credibility, relying on the skill,
competence, and rigor of the researcher (Patton, 2015). As a science, phenomenology
investigates knowledge of objects and artifacts as opposed to the study of material things
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(Moustakas, 1994). Phenomenology is more an exploration of concepts to determine the
perceptions of experiencing phenomena than it is to test those experiences.
Phenomenology does not use instruments, instead, relying on the researcher to deliver
credibly by self-bracketing before engaging participants (Patton, 2015). Phenomenology
intentionally uses unstructured or conversational interviews. This data collection method
is where the researcher guides the conversation, encouraging a free-flowing openness
while striving not to influence the participant discussion. Instruments are of limited value
in this process. The most important aspect to ensure validity is the interviewer bracketing
before participating in the interviews (Merriam & Tisdell, 2016). The investigator should
obsess over not influencing the participant stories, avoiding the interjection of interviewer
experience in a way that might change the free-flowing openness of the participant.
Measuring instruments that demonstrate content validity are difficult to establish.
Each experience in phenomenology is considered unique. The process of reduction, the
rigorous analysis of the stories told by participants, reducing them to common elements
of experience, delivers a textured description of the phenomenon, the experiences that
exist in consciousness (Patton, 2015). Thus, the participants, by sharing their experiences,
are the source of validity. Validity comes from the consensus of meaning and truth found
in reducing the experiences. The study begins intentionally without precognitions or
preconditions. trustworthiness is when the participants agree that what they perceived and
believed about the phenomenon is true. If during the interview process, participants
collectively say it is valid, then it is.
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Procedures for a pilot study. A pilot study with one change leader participating
tested the process and enabled adjustments before the remainder of the research occurred.
The purpose of this pilot was to verify that the data collection and analysis approach
would work effectively and produce the sort of findings expected in an empirical
phenomenological study. Because there was little research applying phenomenology to
CM, drawing from prior studies was not feasible. The conceptual framework for the pilot
was the same as for the study. Using this approach, I tested the process for viability with
a CM leader to show any flaws in the design before beginning the actual research. This
approach to framing the pilot allowed checking the question premises in Appendix D.
This pilot study could have been expanded to more than one participant if it showed that
changes were necessary for the study process. This approach allowed for finding flaws or
shortcomings in the research design before commencing the actual research.
The themes that seemed absent from the literature and in discussions with the
dissertation committee framed the interview discussions. Although the questions listed in
Appendix D were open to change based on discussion and feedback from the pilot study
and earlier participant interviews, changes were minimal. The concepts that the questions
represented formed the framework for additional or replacement questions. These
questions were left intentionally vague as their use was to foster conversation and
discussion about the lived experiences of the participants as they led the initiative they
presented, rather than to elicit direct answers to the questions. As Giorgi (1997)
suggested, the interview discussions determined many of the questions used in the data
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collection. The initial issues were merely meant to focus those talks in a particular
direction.
Data Collection
Data for this study were primarily the transcripts of these interviews, although
participants could have elected to submit other documentation in support of their
discussion during the interview. The preferred interview setting was face-to-face at a
comfortable location where neither the participants nor I would be subject to workday
interruptions, and our respective power positions were equal. This setting was expected to
lead to candid exchanges. In this manner, I would be able to capture body language and
other unspoken cues to the meanings expressed by the participants. Data collection
ideally was to occur at a mutually agreed offsite location accessible by both the
participant and me. If that were not possible, the next best option would be utilizing
online resources such as GoToMeeting, YouTube Live, Google Hangouts, or similar
tools, and if that were not possible, to conduct the interview telephonically. Realistically,
most interviews occurred through the last approach. The initial expectation was one
interview per participant, but participants might have wanted to provide a complete story
to support the study in more than one interview. I expected each interview to last 1 hour
or less, but they might have extended beyond that at the discretion of the participant. Data
was recorded using a digital voice recorder. If the interview was online, it could have
been recorded directly to a computer. If the interview was face-to-face or over the phone,
a voice recorder, such as an Olympus VN7200, was used. Follow-up procedures were to
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include scheduling additional meetings, if needed, before ending the interview process.
Participants were asked to review the results of the analysis before considering their
participation complete and were offered a copy of the results after completing the study.
Delivery of the results was considered their exit from the study.
Data Analysis Plan
Moustakas (1994) suggested that data analysis is the reduction and bracketing of
interview data into relevant meaning units, stated as the practices or science of the
phenomenon under study, in this case, CM success. Moustakas presented an approach to
data analysis, modified from van Kaam’s (1959, 1966) method for phenomenological
data analysis. This approach included:
1. listing and preliminary grouping,
2. reduction and elimination,
3. clustering and thematically developing the invariant constituents,
4. identifying and validating the invariant constituents and themes,
5. constructing an individual textural description of the experience for each
participant,
6. constructing an individual structural description for each participant, and
7. constructing a textural-structural description of the meanings and essences of
the experience for each participant. (Moustakas, 1994, p. 120)
This last construct is the reduced and bracketed findings for all participants. The
data analysis is then completed by developing according to Moustakas (1994) “a
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composite description of the meanings and essences of the experience, representing the
group” (pp. 120–121). Tesch (1990) detailed the comparison process and described how
to reduce the raw data from interviews to common themes from all participants. Tesch’s
approach was to absorb each dataset, delineate meaning units, restate each meaning unit
in terms of a theme, and restate that theme in a professional or abstract representation
devoid of participant interpretation. As more participant interviews occurred, cluster the
respective themes together, tie the essential nonredundant themes together into general
descriptions representative of the trans-situational structure of the phenomena. The
approach suggested by Tesch was more analytical whereas the approach by Moustakas’s
was more about collecting data.
The approaches presented by Moustakas (1994) and Tesch (1990) combined with
the constant comparative method presented by Merriam and Tisdell (2016) for data
analysis. This approach called for analyzing while simultaneously conducting the
interviews. The first analysis began during the first interview by noting and documenting
observations during the interview conversation. The analysis steps suggested by
Moustakas for bracketing and distillation of meanings and essences of experience were
started immediately at the end of each interview. This approach enabled comparison of
later interviews to earlier interviews, thus developing more robust findings more quickly
while exercising the interview process.
The questions listed in Appendix D were meant to frame and foster free-flowing
conversations that exposed the participant viewpoints, feelings, and interpretations. An
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objective was to learn how they made sense of CM success while at the same time
staying focused. Those views may relate directly to the issues listed in their discussions
or may surface new and unconsidered issues. As the bracketing occurred, there were
instances of redundancies in the data. These occurrences were consolidated and coded to
eliminate redundancy and duplication. Some meaning units were outliers to the
participant consensus. These represented one or another participant’s real experiences not
encountered by most other participants. The significance of these was identified in the
overall study but reported separately. The analysis was complete when the interviews
were reduced and bracketed to meaning units that represent the collective experiences in
CM success. Upon completion of the analysis, A separate report of findings was prepared
and distributed, as a courtesy to the participants. This report showed the findings
presented in Chapters 4 and 5.
Issues of Trustworthiness
Loh (2013) described several criteria that, when met, enhance the trustworthiness
of the research. These included credibility, transferability, dependability, and
confirmability. Trochim (2006) defined credibility as the concept that the results of the
study are credible or believable from the perspective of the participants. He indicated that
transferability is represented by how easily the product of the study adapted in another
context or setting. Dependability was the concept that if the findings of this study were
exercised in another setting or context, the outcomes would be the same or similar.
Confirmability was whether the results of this study could be confirmed or corroborated
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by others. Together, these criteria enhance the trustworthiness of the research (Loh,
2013). Loh noted that given these tests; they are at best, only useful as a guide. The
nature of qualitative study is such that these four criteria may be constructive and helpful
in enhancing trustworthiness, but they can never be perfect. The nature of qualitative
research is such that every study, every context, is different, and those differences affect
the research outcomes.
Credibility
Trochim (2006) suggested that credibility is the concept that the results of the
study are only credible or believable from the perspective of the participants. Trochim
suggested that the only way to test credibility is through reviews by participants. There
was an expectation that several interviews would occur for each participant.
Triangulation began in those meetings, beginning with the first one-hour full interview.
The first interview might have extended longer than initially expected, either by
extending the initial meeting at that interview or scheduling subsequent meetings until the
participant’s story, their lived experience, was recorded completely. Comparing those
stories with the accounts of other participants was the intent of identifying meaning units.
Over time, the stories generated common experiences although each participant had
unique, outlier experiences included in their respective story. The shared experiences
became the generalized description, not identifiable to one participant or another.
Reviewing the list of generalized experiences with each participant verified accuracy and
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credibility. This review confirmed the study results. Chapter 4 contains the results of
those reviews.
For credibility, I planned for at least two additional meetings. These meetings
were elective after providing participants with a synopsis of the interview meeting. The
first reviewed each participant’s contribution individually, their story as it appeared after
bracketing. The second meeting was to review the total outcome of the research, to
ensure that the participants agreed with the results of the reduction and bracketing. This
review was a confirmation of the study results. Chapter 4 contains the results of those
studies.
Transferability
Transferability was a concept of the degree to which the results of the research
could be generalized or transferred to other contexts or settings (Trochim, 2006). Loh
(2013) noted that in Narrative Studies descriptions could add to the trustworthiness of the
research. While this study was not a narrative study per se, it used many of the techniques
of narrative studies to collect data. This study included collecting stories in sufficient
detail to support thick descriptions of their representation and impact. The guiding
process for these interviews was to obtain thick descriptions of the stories from
participants. This approach enhanced the trustworthiness, and hence the transferability of
the findings. The process used in this research sought to understand the circumstances of
each participant during data collection, and through analysis and bracketing of these
conditions, reduce those stories to their essence of practices and behaviors that affected
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the outcomes of their leadership. These were the meaning unit equivalents as defined by
Moustakas (1994). Participants reviewed these meaning units during the second review
meetings. This review included their estimates of transferability of the findings.
Typically, it is very difficult to transfer findings of a small subset into a larger population
of change initiatives. Though it may be possible for some transferability might selectively
apply aspects identified. Participant reviews, particularly their comments on
transferability, were summarized in Chapter 4.
Dependability
Trochim (2006) defined dependability as based on the assumption of
repeatability, expecting the possibility of achieving the same results, given the same
context for the phenomenon (Trochim, 2006). During the bracketing process, only those
meaning units that surfaced as general practices and behaviors, used by most or all
participants, were considered meaning units for the final report. This discipline provided
a level of triangulation by only accepting those story elements that are standard practices
and behaviors leading to change initiatives success. Verification of this occurred during
the review process. Participant responses in this review process constituted the
equivalence of a peer review.
The review process delivered an estimation of significance for each meaning unit
derived from the reduction and confirmed them in the participant reviews. If the study
subjects agreed that similar results would occur in similar circumstances to that of the
meaning unit context, that sufficed to support an estimation of dependability. The
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agreement among participants was an indication that, given the same or similar context,
the result would be the same.
Confirmability
Confirmability refers to the degree to which the results of the analysis can be
confirmed or corroborated by others (Trochim, 2006). The study participants, in this case,
were peers to the researcher and qualified to estimate the confirmability of the findings.
Participant questioning during the review process confirmed whether they believed that
the list of meaning units deduced from the stories were representative of their
understanding of what works in leading CM initiatives to success. This aspect of
trustworthiness goes together with the concept of dependability. As part of the participant
review, participants were asked to estimate the level to which they agreed that the
findings could be confirmed. Their concurrence resulted in determining a relative degree
of confirmability.
Loh (2013) noted that Lincoln and Guba (1985) recommended, in addition to
addressing the preceding four criteria for trustworthiness, the importance of maintaining a
journal. The researcher recorded daily activity regarding self and method. This record
keeping coincided with Patton’s (2015) observation that in qualitative research, the
researcher is the instrument. This journal includes, in addition to daily and personal
observations, a log of the application of methodology described here. As this study
progressed, I adhered to this discipline and retained this journal as supporting
documentation for the finished study.
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In summary, while it was important to recognize that the results of research must
be more than just the results of work, they needed to offer some sense of validity and
generalizability, concepts beyond the notion that these findings were just subjectively
valid because the researcher says they were. This level of validity can be difficult to
accomplish in qualitative research. Success in addressing these four aspects, coupled with
a comprehensive journal of conducting the research process, may improve the quality of
the resulting contribution to the CM discipline.
Ethical Procedures
Appendices A and D included several ethical concerns. These included
recognition that participation in this study was voluntary, noting several risks they might
encounter by participating in this study. These appendices addressed participant
awareness of complete confidentiality, including protection of their anonymity from any
requests outside the study. Additionally, a confidentiality agreement (see Appendix E)
ensured that disclosure of proprietary information held by me or any participant during or
after the study would not occur outside the study group.
The appendices cited in this section were meant to frame the research in a way
that maintained focus on the phenomenon of CM success and to ensure meeting the
administrative and ethical requirements while recruiting study participants. Each potential
participants agreed to the terms of agreement established to take part in or to receive
reports of study results. Additional terms for participation were considered and added
where feasible. While these arrangements were necessary for the protection of all
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participants, the objective was to recognize that they were peers in the pursuit of
successful CM.
Summary
This chapter began with a presentation of a phenomenological research design.
The intent was to gather the reflections of transformational change success patterns as
understood by change leaders. These leaders were employed by organizations for guiding
the transformational change efforts of their respective employers. Participants were
permanent employees of the organizations where they worked rather than external change
practitioners. That is, they were not scholars and consultants that management hired to
review, report, and advise the organization on CM. The chapter continued with a
definition of my role as researcher, acknowledging that I am a peer of the study
participants. I presented a detailed description of the method used to gather and analyze
data. Other details covered in this chapter included a definition of the population of study
participants and a description of a pilot study. The pilot study validated the process,
questions, and issues that were the starting framework for data collection. Procedures for
recruiting participants, for data collection, and for follow-up with participants followed.
The chapter concluded with a discussion of the measures taken to ensure the work was
credible, transferable, dependable, confirmable, and ethical. The next chapter in this work
presents the results of this research.
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Chapter 4: Results
The purpose of this study was to explore the lived experiences of organizational
change leaders to understand how they brought about change and successfully achieved
planned results. Their expertise is the day-to-day inner workings of the organization. This
perspective is different from that of consultants and scholars, the influential authors in
CM, but necessary to understand how change happens in practice. I gathered data and
information describing these lived experiences from change leaders of medium and large
organizations. Data analysis led to the discovery of the shared essences of their
experiences to determine if their strategies led to successful CM and whether it aligned
with the prevailing CM literature.
Most of the writers in CM theory lacked the experience of conducting an
organizational change effort. There is much research about what causes change initiatives
to fail and what a change manager should do to avoid failure, but little describing the
activities and behaviors of successful change leaders who, as employees are responsible
for ensuring successful change. Employee leaders invest heavily in these successes, much
more so than the typical consultant or researcher. Their survival as a member of the
organization, their critical performance, and their sense of career progression relies on the
success of their change efforts. They may, in fact, be more successful than scholars and
consultants suggest, who claim that upwards of 70% of change efforts fail; but
demonstrating that fact remains elusive.
The overarching research question was:
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How do employee change leaders, responsible for delivering results in CM
initiatives, live their experiences of CM success, specifically, to be held accountable for
achieving the results of planned change, to experience the culture of change, and
accomplish the results forecasted in planning the change process?
Subquestions derived from this research focus include:
4. What behaviors and other practices do internal change leaders seem to
exercise, what do they do differently from what external change practitioners
suggest, that results in CM success?
5. What meaning do employee change leaders attribute to the high failure rates
in CM and how do these leaders show through their lived experiences to avoid
them?
6. How, given the extraordinarily high potential for failure, do these leaders
continue to exercise CM practices successfully in their organizations?
This chapter includes the results of a phenomenological study designed to extract
the strategies, tactics, behaviors, and practices used by senior executives to achieve
successful change leadership in their organizations. The chapter begins with a description
of a pilot study, conducted to test the research questions, followed by a description of the
research regarding the setting demographics of participants. After describing the data
collection process, a presentation of a data analysis follows, followed by a discussion of
evidence of trustworthiness. The chapter finishes with a brief statement of results of the
research and a chapter summary.
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Pilot Study
A pilot study with one change leader preceded the research. The pilot study
showed that the research process and instruments worked as designed without needing
modifications. This pilot was to test the process and enable adjustments before starting
the research. The interview occurred in a face-to-face meeting with the Associate
Comptroller at a major University. This pilot was conducted to verify that the data
collection and analysis approach worked effectively, to test the mechanics of the process,
and validate that it would produce the sort of data expected in an empirical
phenomenological study. The pilot study tested the research design to find any design
flaws before beginning the actual research. This test also allowed checking the premise of
the interview questions (Appendix D) for whether they elicited the data expected from
the study. Application of the pilot would have gone on to more than one participant if it
demonstrated changes were necessary for the investigation.
The research design worked as defined in Chapter 3. The interview questions
were open-ended, meant to foster conversation and free-flowing discussion about the
participants’ lived experiences while leading change initiatives. The intent underlying the
interview questions was to keep the interview focused, more than they were to elicit
specific information on a particular point of discussion. As Giorgi (1997) noted, the
interview discussion results in the actual data collection. The initial questions were
merely meant to lead the talks to reveal the actual CM experience of the participants. I
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encouraged the participants to speak openly and freely, without restriction, in describing
how they achieved transformational change successfully.
The conceptual framework for the pilot was the same as for the actual study; to
conduct a conversational interview with one or two senior executives who had been
responsible for delivering results in transformational change. The pilot used the same
interview questions, the same Consent Form, and same approach as designed for the
actual interviews in the data collection process. The process called for an interpretation of
the interview results to a set of strategies, tactics, behaviors, and practices that led to
success. Restatement of these strategies, tactics, behaviors, and practices would occur
without subjective opinion or interpretation and presented as what a participant indicated
effected change. This analysis demonstrated in the pilot interview that reducing the
conversation to a list of strategies, tactics, behaviors, and practices was a straightforward
process. The data from the pilot interview validated the process by reflecting the fact that
many strategies, tactics, behaviors, and practices noted in the pilot matched what study
participants expressed.
Research Setting
Most study participants chose telephone interviews to participate. All participants
were director-level employees or above at their respective organizations. Modern work
requirements made it difficult for these people to leave their workplaces to attend
meetings and they were inclined not to participate if they could only do so in a face-toface interview. The participants were all executives in small to large business
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organizations or educational institutions. Telephone interviews also enabled many people
from distant locations to participate. Allowing meetings in this manner led to more senior
levels of participation from larger organizations than were locally accessible.
The entire interview process included two contacts and the exchange of
correspondence in the verification process required by the institutional review board
(Walden University IRB approval number for this study is 10-04-16-0074278 and it
expired October 3, 2017). There were provisions for follow-up interaction, but no
participant chose to take advantage of the additional time. The first contact was an initial
telephone call to invite participation and to explain the Consent Form requirement.
During this call, the participant qualified as fitting the participant profile and agreed to
participate. The Consent Form contained a detailed description of the research design,
expectations of the participants, and their rights and protections while involved in the
study. Participants indicated agreement and consent by returning a signed copy of the
Consent Form before inclusion in the study. In some cases, after reading the design and
participation requirements, potential participants declined further participation. Those
that declined did so because they felt unqualified at the executive level indicated in the
Consent form. Most who made it to the point of receiving the Consent Form agreed to
participate by signing a copy of the consent.
The second contact was the actual interview where participants told their stories.
These meetings held to the one-hour limit suggested in the research design. Recordings
and transcriptions came from those meetings, which are the basis of the analysis
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contained here. Each participant reviewed their respective transcription to evaluate,
correct, or modify as they saw fit. None made any changes. What follows here is an
analysis of the interviews and summation of what they described that led to their success.
Demographics
Participants selection occurred based on their capacities as senior executives,
director level or above who have been responsible for major change efforts and were
payroll employees in the organization where they led change initiatives. Several used
examples from places of prior employment but all met the criteria outlined in Chapter 3.
Job titles included Chief Executive Officers (CEO), Chief Operations Officers (COO),
Chief Information Officers (CIO), Program Directors, Program/Project Management
Office Directors (PMO), and Comptrollers. The change initiatives discussed included
acquisitions, divestitures, reorganizations to meet changing markets, redirection to
comply with changing legal environments, business process re-engineering (BPR)
activities, and enterprise resource planning (ERP) system implementations.
The organizations represented were for-profit businesses and education
institutions. The most extensive organization was a pharmaceutical manufacturer with
over 16,000 employees, with multiple plants around the world. The most substantial
education institution was a university school with staffing of over 7,000 and a student
body of over 46,000. Conversely, the smallest organization was a high growth services
company that had a staff of just over 30 people. That group was a subsidiary of a
petroleum industry support distributor. Most organizations ranged between 100 and 1,000
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employees. The industries represented included pharmaceutical production, petroleum
services, financial services, and both private and public education institutions. Businesses
ranged from small startup enterprises to multinational manufacturing and distribution
concerns. Table 1 shows the participants:
Table 1
Participant Identifications and Backgrounds
Participant1

Title and Responsibility

P01

CIO for three ERP transitions at $1 billion-plus pharmaceutical
companies, currently working as a consultant.

P02

P02 was CIO of a $1.6 billion pharmaceutical manufacturer, hired to
lead a transition from decentralized to centralized technology
operations.

P03

P03 was a Director of Internal Audit for an international
manufacturer and distributor of automotive parts. He led their U. S.
operations out of a failed ERP implementation, through a recovery
process. Several annual audit material failures demonstrated business
process design weaknesses resulting from ERP failure.

P04

CEO, brought into a startup company, established to be grown and
sold. P04 had just left the company as part of the sale agreement.

P05

Interim Assistant Vice Chancellor at a large West Coast University.
This position is equivalent to CFO of larger business organizations.

1

Coded numbers used to ensure confidentiality guaranteed to participants.
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Table 1
Participant Identifications and Backgrounds
Participant1

Title and Responsibility

P06

P06 was Director of Executive Education at a University business
school with an academic staff of 452 and student body of over 4,600
(the University, respectively, had an academic staff of 7,145 and
student body of close to 47,900 thousand). P06 had general
management and Profit and Loss responsibility for the Executive
Education program (EEP).

P07

CEO of a specialty candy manufacturer. P07 was brought in to turn
the company around from trending flat operations performance to
high growth, a particular management skill he possessed.

P08

P08 was Corporate Council and COO for a $100 million online
marketing company. He led a sales and marketing operations
transition from a set of questionable to unquestionably compliant
practices.

P09

P09 was CEO and President of a large manufacturing concern with
seven, regionally located, plants across the U.S. He was responsible
for standardizing products and services across these plants, changing
them from more custom job-shop producers.

P10

P10 was Director of Reporting, under the CIO of a major West Coast
University, with a faculty and staff of close to 2,700 personnel and
student body of over 31.5 thousand. She was responsible for leading
the transition from paper-based reporting to real-time online
reporting in a University Information Technology Operations Center

Note. Participant identification uses coded numbers. Each participant was guaranteed
confidentiality. Identification using coded numbers works to ensure that guarantee.
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The study required that each participant be primarily responsible for achieving the
intended results of a transformational change program or project in an organization where
they worked as a payroll employee and was the senior executive in charge, primarily
responsible for achieving change initiative results. Transformational change is effecting
change in the strategies, structures, business processes, markets, or culture of the
organization either outright simultaneously or close to it (Burke, 2014). This sort of
change is disruptive change that affects the performance, and often the very make-up of
the organization as a whole. The study focused on senior employee executives to ensure
that the mindset, the paradigm of those participants, was that of an employee rather than
of an external resource such as a consultant, educator, or researcher.
The employee perspective reflects a unique approach to goal achievement.
Employees tend to become committed to their work at that one employer. A single failure
could easily lead to permanent, irreversible damage to continuation in their chosen
careers. At a minimum, they would become identified with the failure, an identification
not experienced by external resources. The external person, a consultant or researcher,
moves on to another project with relatively little recognition in the failure, even though
they might have been primarily responsible. This difference may cause the employee to
act differently, being more aware of and sensitive to the failure possibility. Their
performance takes into account the probability of long-term career damage, and their
behavior and leadership may invoke different approaches to problem-solving than seen
from non-employee operatives. For this reason, participant selection was limited to
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include only employee change managers as participants. Employees may well exercise
strategies, tactics, behaviors, and practices that consultants or researchers may never
think of, to ensure success. The employee might use academic or consultant
recommendations differently from what the external resource intended. These differences
might come from an intimate understanding of workplace culture and their sense of selfpreservation. External sources, such as consultants, academics, and researchers may not
recognize the nuances of culture and behavior, unique to that organization, and might
offer recommendations that are relatively insensitive to the needs of the people.
Employee leaders compensate for this possibility.
Data Collection
Ten participants contributed to the data. A process of contacting and interviewing
participants continued until the data collection achieved saturation; that is until further
interviews were deemed unlikely to expand the findings beyond the already identified
factors. One meeting occurred face-to-face, all others were individual, hour-long, one-onone interviews via telephone. Contact with each participant occurred twice. First was an
initial call describing the research, inviting participation, explaining the participation
requirements, and obtaining a signed Consent Form. The second contact was the actual
hour-long interview where participants told their stories about change initiatives where
they were primarily responsible, and how they managed that effort. I recorded the hourlong interviews, and those recordings constitute the data collected. As noted by Giorgi
(1997), data collection for phenomenological studies is recording the conversations to
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enable analysis. I derived the analysis from these recordings by looking for the themes,
practices, and behaviors the participants used to effect successful change. That is, in this
case, the essence of the strategies and tactics used to achieve their results. I reviewed
these recordings several times to assure accuracy in reporting what was instrumental in
participant successes.
While the preferred context for interviews was face-to-face, finding participants
that could take the time required away from their work setting, was difficult. The
preferable conduct of the interviews was in face-to-face meetings at mutually agreed
locations, away from participant workplaces, or over the internet using video
conferencing tools. If neither of these approaches were possible, then the interviews
would occur by telephone. Participant locations were across the U. S., including in the
Mid-Atlantic, Midwest, Northeast, Southwestern U. S., and particularly in Southern
California. The distribution of these participants made travel to many of their workplaces
expensive and time-consuming.
Data Analysis
The process used to get inductively from the data collection to deduction of the
underlying strategies, and tactics used by successful change leaders, followed Giorgi’s
(1997) five-step approach to empirical phenomenology. This form of research differs in
the sense that it first focuses on reducing the collected data to themes, referred to as
meaning units by Giorgi. Findings came from the received data, the interviews, rather
than from other research. The analysis began with understanding the content then
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allowing that understanding to grow, through successive distillations into the themes that
represented the underlying approach the participants said brought about their success.
Those themes follow, organized under their respective research questions.
The study results show five major themes and five situational themes emerging
from the data. The five major themes emerged as predominant, meaning many of the
participants discussed them. The additional, situational themes, while not expressed by
most participants, were essential to those who commented on them. The importance of
these more secondary themes is that they too differ from the literature and were, to some
degree, important. These secondary topics contain the strategies and practices to which
the participants who mentioned them attributed their success. For example, two
participants established quantified performance measurements then publicly tracked and
posted them. These measures became driving indicators of success or failure for the
change initiatives. While the CM effort included planning, organization, process
redesigns, and so on, the teams focused on the measurements first and executed the
change plans precisely to achieve those quantified performance goals.
The interviews were loosely guided storytelling by each participant with no undue
influence the direction they went in with their stories. As it became apparent that the
strategies and tactics expressed were different from what the literature presented, I asked
some ad hoc questions to see if what the authors in the literature suggested were also
considerations that influenced their leadership. These included whether a sense of
urgency existed, or whether they had to do something to create a sense of urgency as
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suggested by Kotter (1996/2010). I also asked whether there was employee resistance or
an apathetic or non-supportive senior leadership mindset present that needed addressing
for success to occur, as proposed by IBM (Jorgensen et al., 2008). Every participant
indicated that these factors were not problems. If these criteria were in any way noted, the
participant was confident in having the leadership and management skill to overcome
them. They did not see these factors as troubling because team members involved in the
changes resolved them as routine executive acts during the change initiatives. Every
project was different. Each change leader acted differently dependent on the project
requirements and the organization where they worked. A discussion of these themes and
how team members dealt with factors such as a sense of urgency, employee resistance, or
senior leadership apathy, or other key interactions in causing successful change, is given
in more detail in the following Study Results section, and in the Interpretation of
Findings in Chapter 5.
Evidence of Trustworthiness
As noted by Loh (2013), several criteria enhance the trustworthiness of this
research. These include credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability. The
following sections address each of these. Together, these requirements present a
framework that helps ensure validity, reliability, and generalizability (Trochim, 2006).
While the participant group used in this study was small, consisting of 10 participants, a
sense of probable generalizability is already evident. These participants independently
expressed a list of common strategies, tactics, behaviors, and practices they used to
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achieve success. In every case, they each described strategies and tactics that are
summarily the research themes that follow in the next section. The strategies, tactics,
behaviors, and practices expressed were so consistent that it is reasonable to expect that
when study expansion to a broader sample occurs, the themes discovered here will
remain predominant. The following subsections describe the preservation of credibility,
transferability, dependability, and confirmability during this study.
Credibility
Trochim (2006) suggested that credibility is the concept that the results of the
study are only credible or believable from the perspective of the participants. Trochim
indicated that the only way to test credibility is through reviews by participants. As
expected, the first interviews were longer than planned. Most of the participants began
discussing their change initiatives during the first introductory conversation. All told their
complete stories were within the hour allotted for the second discussion. I had the
discussions in these meetings transcribed. Each participant received a copy of their
respective transcript for critique and correction, under cover of an email that included an
interpretation and summarization of the story they told. Member checking occurred when
each participant indicated that the transcripts and cover email contents were accurate and
correct. No corrections came back. The themes noted in the section titled Study Results
are the meaning units derived from these transcripts.
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Transferability
Transferability is a concept of the degree to which the results of the research can
be generalized or transferred to other contexts or settings (Trochim, 2006). Loh (2013)
noted that in narrative studies descriptions could add to the trustworthiness of the
research. While this study is not a narrative study per se, thick descriptions, a technique
of narrative study, was used to collect data. Jensen (2012) also recommended a thick
description of the research design to show transferability. That thick description follows.
This section also includes the boundaries of the study, notably recognizing limitations.
This presentation, at least regarding replication of this study, should be transferable to
any larger organization in the U.S. While this section presents the results of the study, a
decision whether transferability exists is for the reader to make. The study was designed
to question successful employee transformational change leaders in various organizations
to determine how they were able to succeed in that practice. Scholars and consultants
have conducted most of the research in CM. While these resources are not wrong in their
findings, what they present seems drawn mostly from observing failed projects and may
not be characteristics of successful CM. Their perspective, relative to changing
organizations, are external. They are less connected to the internal politics, performance,
productivity, and other requirements of the organizations they studied or supported, than
employees. Simply put, scholars go back to school and consultants go on to their next
project when change fails. The employee may suffer far greater consequences in that
failure. Employees are connected to the organization more closely, and knowing the
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consequences of failure, might manage change differently from external resource
suggestions.
The perspective that the literature focuses on failure avoidance rather than on
change initiative success is a gap in the literature. Most of the literature reviewed,
although proposing strategies and tactics to achieve success, indicated that the authors
based those recommendations on observed failures. There is little research available
reporting the outcomes of successful employee change leaders, the person accountable
for leading change from start to finish while engaged as an employee.
Study participants were senior executives, director level or above who have been
responsible for transformational change and were employees for the change initiatives
they presented, employed by the organizations where they led those initiatives. The
participants reviewed their stories and confirmed their accuracy. One participant
demonstrated transferability, describing how his industry had changed as a result of his
effort to redefine his organization’s operations. Four change initiatives were ERP
implementations, following project management practices such as published by the PMI
(PMI, 2013). One used both internal and external change managers to effect change.
Participants came from for-profit businesses and educational institutions. The participant
group did not include representation from government agencies or non-profit
organizations. However, the findings here should be transferable to other organizations
that are similar with hierarchical chains-of-command, organizational designs, business
plans, and budgetary financial controls using Generally Accepted Accounting Principles
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(GAAP) to control finances. All organizations were U.S. based. One was a subsidiary of
a Japanese company, but the study excluded organizations outside the U.S. The Japanese
subsidiary case occurred wholly within their U.S. organization under the direction of U.S.
leadership. The change initiative was not influenced by the Japanese parent organization,
although they started it.
The interview processes prompted open, free-flowing discussion from
participants. The only questions posed beyond the initial one to start the storytelling were
queries and comments to keep the conversation about change leadership as opposed to
the many other activities senior executives attend to while doing their jobs. Participants
expressed the strategies and tactics they used. While discussing these strategies and
tactics, they also described the behaviors and practices they affected to achieve their
intended outcomes. The results bracketed into the themes in the following section.
Leadership literature commonly presents these themes, for program and project
management and organization development.
Dependability
Trochim (2006) defined dependability as based on the assumption of repeatability
expecting the possibility of achieving the same results, given the same context for the
phenomenon. The study results noted here clearly demonstrate dependability, at least for
this small participant group. The themes discussed were typical for a clear majority of the
participants and were apparently also part of the behaviors and tactics of those who were
the minority. A reasonable expectation, given the outcome of this study, is that further
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expansion of participation would produce similar results. The top five themes noted were
elaborated by 50% to 90% of the participants. These participants agreed that similar
results would occur in similar circumstances and that in many cases they had used these
same or similar strategies and tactics to achieve successful change in other initiatives.
Often, the participant described the application of a tactic, behavior, or practice they used
in earlier experiences in other change initiatives as extended examples. While the
participants were not brought together as a group, their descriptions are so closely similar
that they show a uniformity where at least the top five themes are consistent.
Confirmability
The similarity of the strategies, tactics, behaviors, and practices used by the
participants itself confirms them among each other. I asked Participants if the themes
commonly expressed by others were meaningful to them and they confirmed that they
were. This theme confirmation held true for those participants that did not explicitly
indicate the top five themes were significant. In most cases, the top five themes were
inferred in the discussion rather than expressly described. At least two or three
participants independently and explicitly described one or more of the top five themes as
strategies and tactics intentionally used to achieve success. For example, P02 described
all five of the top themes. P01 described four of the top five themes. For the rest of the
participants, if this significance did not come out in the conversation, it was queried.
Those asked, confirmed recognizing the top themes as contributing factors.
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Study Results
This section presents the research question and each sub-question of the study,
with examples of how each major theme derived from the research data. The interview
results are the research data in keeping with the process expressed by Giorgi (1997), and
the discussions show examples of how acts of the participants resolved to exercise a
particular theme. In several places throughout this section, there are direct quotes from
the primary interviews with study participants. These quotes were included to clarify how
the themes came from the data. Participant numbers identify these instances.
Research Question
The overarching research question is stated, followed by Table 2 listing the
Themes associated with this question, followed by a discussion of theme applicability.
The material sought by asking this question was what were the primary strategies and
tactics used to achieve change. The overarching research question was: How do
employee change leaders, responsible for delivering results in CM initiatives, live their
experiences of CM success, specifically, to be held accountable for achieving the results
of planned change, to experience the culture of change, and accomplish the results
forecasted in planning the change process?
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Table 2
Overarching Themes
Major Theme

Respondents

Definition

1. Collaborative
Leadership

90%

Strong, proactive, qualified, self-starting,
collaborative leaders incented to do the
work of getting others to execute plans
and achieve goals.

2. Open Communication

80%

Formal and informal communications
structured to encourage open, candid,
non-punitive communication between
team members and with the total
organization, focused on success.

3. Defined Expected
Outcomes

70%

Redefined plans and operations around
new business objectives for the
organization, then executed to achieve
the new design.

4. Changed Organization
Focus

60%

Changed product and service offerings to
the extent that what they offered their
clients and customers was something new
and different from what they offered
before changing.

5. Recognized Change
Necessity

50%

Recognized continuous change as an
imperative, and the risk for failure if they
did not change.

Discussion. The themes in Tables 2 and 3 list common terminology for strategies
recognized as descriptors for leadership activity that organizations exercise to provide
leadership and obtain results. They will be described in more detail in the following
discussion while describing how their codification came from the data. These themes
came from listening to the conversations, analyzing the discussions, and realizing that
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while each participant was describing what they did differently, what they said fell within
summary categories represented by the themes. For example, the first theme,
collaborative leadership, was mentioned by nine of the 10 participants. Only one
participant used those words, but each participant described the leadership they exercised
in such a way that their commitment was clear. They expressed this theme differently but
when reviewed for what they said, the summary of what they meant consolidated under
this heading. There were differences. When P01 made the statement quoted in the
following section for Collaborative Leadership, she referred to having a team of change
leaders under her supervision that were committed, proactive, collaborative actors who
worked together to achieve their goals. When P02 talked about Collaborative Leadership,
he referred to the importance of having the senior management on board with his concept
of change and how he would manage it, the strategic direction that he would take the
change initiative. In other words, he was managing up as much as he was managing the
change. That is, he ensured that top management, including those members of top
management who were not involved in executing the change plans, agreed with the
approach he took and supported it fully, or that they would protest privately so that
unintended dissemination of their opinions did not influence the outcomes of the change.
Reviewing the data occurred in three phases. Before starting the analysis, I reread
each transcript while listening to the interview recording to ensure that the transcript read
the same as the interview. The first phase was to read the transcripts and identify specific
strategies, tactics, behaviors, and practices that were invoked or used to manage the
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change initiative. Codification began During this phase. The second phase was to read the
codified transcripts while listening to the recordings again, to determine if listening
changed the meanings or quality of the statements found in the transcripts. This second
phase brought the emphasis, the inflections, the passion of the participant, into the coding
process and resulted in clearer definitions of the critical parts of the transcripts into the
themes in Tables 2, 3, and 4. A third phase was reread through the transcripts, again to
identify a distinction between Strategies and Tactics, and Behaviors and Practices. The
discussion for the overarching research question presents the Strategies and Tactics
employed by the participants. The discussion for Research Subquestion 1 presents the
Behaviors and Practices exercised to influence commitment to the change initiatives.
While five primary themes emerged from the data, there were also five additional
themes that were situationally unique to some of the initiatives discussed by participants.
These additional themes were tactics employed by their respective practitioners to foster
success. When these were considered significant, they were noted and included in the
findings. For example, two participants established and posted business performance
metrics in their organizations. They focused on operational performance improvement as
demonstrated by improvement in operational performance measurements. The
management of their change initiatives were tailored to effect operational change in a
way that these metrics demonstrated improvements. This approach is encouraged by
consulting organizations like IBM, Deloitte, and McKinsey. These two participants did
not attribute their knowledge of focusing on performance achievement rather than on the
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changes themselves, to consultants from companies like IBM or McKinsey but they took
that approach. The themes unique in this sense, are explained after showing how the
findings for the research questions were derived.
I reviewed each interview multiple times. The results in the Tables are from
interpreting participant conversations, codifying components from the interviews under
each of these headings and summarizing them into the themes presented in the tables. For
example, P02 never used the words managing up. However, what he described was
managing his peers and superiors, a practice of managing up. P01 summarily defined
collaborative leadership. Her statement was her strongest narrative in the entire interview,
although she gave a strong discussion of each other theme as they occurred to her. In this
way, the participants summarized their descriptions into the themes presented here.
Collaborative leadership. Nine out of ten participants (90%) addressed strong
leadership as a strategy for success. Two considered it the most critical aspect of their
work. P01 describes a vision of collaborative leadership, summarizing by stating:
It all boils down to strong and present leadership. It is common goals,
incentive to perform the work, strong and present leadership,
complementary skill sets, and enough of them to get the job done. If you
do not have them all; change will not happen. (P01)
Like P01, Participant P02 noted that the first action was to ensure adequate buy-in
for his approach to change, among the executives of the organization. P02 approached his
project by not only seeking this buy-in, he actively managed the executive team, his peers
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and superiors, to ensure that no discord or disagreement among the senior executives was
visible to the rest of the organization. He also identified the informal leaders throughout
the organization and took steps to manage their interest and involvement as well. He
sought to ensure that those informal leaders would not foment resistance or other
problems by influencing the rank-and-file organization personnel He described the
managing up process as follows:
My priority was to get the executives to buy into the changes. I made it
very clear to them that once they bought into it; at no point could they
question it, except behind closed doors to me. If they were to question
whether we have made the right decision about something that is going to
give people that are going through the change an excuse to show
resistance, they would all act like they have the senior person’s support.
(P02)
Dissension among the senior executive team could damage progress and P02
needed to ensure that did not happen. He allowed for dissension among the senior
executives but asked that they not exhibit this dissension in front of the rest of the
organization. If their concerns were valid, he quietly adjusted his plans to accommodate
them.
Every participant recognized the need for strong, proactive leaders who could
foster acceptance, participation, and support for the initiative’s outcome. They sought to
manage their leaders as well as their subordinates. They sought active, participative team
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members who could drive the projects and activities by fostering acceptance,
participation, and support in turn. The practice included managing up, obtaining active,
participative acceptance from the leaders over them. In every case, participants were clear
to emphasize the importance of collaborative and participatory leadership as opposed to
an assumed command and control or directive-in-nature leadership posture. As P01
noted, there was no time for micro-managing projects and the people chosen to lead
needed to be equipped and capable of acting relatively independently while staying
within the bounds of the project objectives.
Open communication. Eight participants (80%) stressed the importance of open,
candid communication in their organizations. One CIO noted that communication among
managers and senior executives were completely open; there were no secrets. They
worked in an environment where they could discuss progress and activity openly and
candidly, and they helped each other toward achievement. They focused on the success of
their actions. One example was P04, was hired as CEO to develop a new business
organization with the intent to sell it to another company. As P04 indicated when putting
the business on the market,
There were no secrets: We tried to make everyone in the organization fully
aware of the coming changes and how they each would be affected. The
goal was to keep everyone in the loop and continuing to work toward our
objectives, given that change was coming. Everyone would know
something was afoot, so we made sure everyone knew what was
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happening, why, and that he or she was aware of the progress on the deal.
We were a small company and could not hide what we were doing so we
decided to keep everyone informed. That turned out to be a good decision.
in the process of getting bought, we made sure everyone was aware of and
matched to his or her counterpart in the new company. Those people who
were not staying with the company through the transition were told as
much as were the rest of the staff. That turned out to be a good decision.
Everyone stayed through the transition, even those not transferring to the
new organization, and all of the employees respected and appreciated
being kept informed. (P04)
P04s change activity was to prepare the company for sale to new owners. They
ensured that everyone was kept aware of upcoming changes and how he or she would
each be personally affected. Given the impending change, he needed to ensure that each
person would continue to work for the good of the company as long as they continued as
members of the organization. The entire organization knew what changes were coming
and when. P04 felt that if he did not do that, each member might surmise a negative
impact, lower their standards, and plan to leave early. By knowing what was coming to
the organization and sensing a level of appreciation, the staff remained cooperative,
committed, and stayed with the group through the transition, even those scheduled for
termination after the change. This change resulted in several key position eliminations.
The CEO believed the employees appreciated the openness and candor and respected the
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changes as they occurred. He believed that those employees, scheduled for termination
upon closure of the sale transaction, stayed to the end of the transition because they
appreciated this openness.
P02 expressed this differently. As CIO, responsible for centralization of
technology support operations in an international pharmaceutical company, he had a very
large team working at several plants and distribution centers around the world. These
teams needed to be able to act independently and proactively as they completed their
parts of the change initiative. P02 expressed this as
A problem was the fact that people instinctively avoid change. The change
piece is the challenging piece. People fear change and instinctively avoid
it. We developed a change map. We took each group through the change
map and showed everyone where they fit on the change map. We then
conducted monthly Town Halls where we would update progress and how
far we had to go, if we had any wins, we would share them with the
organization, and share what was on the horizon. We shared the strategies
and guiding principles, both behavioral and technical guiding principles,
and referred back to them all of the time. We tried to get people to believe
in them, to love them. We conducted workshops, not only for the
necessary training for work responsibility, and process changes but also
for CM. In the CM training, we had HR explain what happens in change.
This training covered the obstacles, what happens in the cycle of despair,
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then asked people to say where they thought we were in changing and to
verbalize how they felt about it. (P02)
P02 was pleasantly surprised at the positive effect this approach had. He felt
challenged by the fact that the organization had more of an engineering type of reaction
and changing roles can be frightening. They showed the people whose roles were
changing, how the new role was different and how their existing skills fit them.
Defining expected outcomes. Seven participants (70%) talked about defining or
redefining the anticipated results of the change initiatives they led. That is they started
with a planning process that identified and set objectives for their operational, marketing,
legal, or financial efforts, then continued tracking their work through the process of
defining and executing the changes. This approach allowed participation in setting
objectives by the people who would have to live and work with the changes. The
approach changed the focus from the changes themselves to the operational outcomes
expected from changing. In most cases, project plans developed a sequence of events
designed to achieve the goals. The respective participant disseminated these plans where
they applied. In some cases, the changes required careful roll-out of closely held
confidential plans as change transitioned the organization. For example, P06 was hired to
turn around the performance of an EEP at an ivy-league business school. He observed his
existing organization and studied its markets and operations. He developed a program
that reorganized the faculty and staff of the school based on noting a radical shift in EEP
requirements in business organizations. He did not immediately share the program with
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the organization as a whole because the changes were significant, they involved critical
faculty and staff realignments and some terminations, and those actions alone would have
fostered resistance. With the support of his superiors, he rolled the program out over a
two-year period. The reorganization was designed to respond to market requirements; the
fact that large corporations could not afford to send senior managers away for four to six
weeks of resident schooling. When finished, the school curriculum, the faculty, and the
educational design had significantly changed. That school transitioned to profitable
operations from consistent losses. P06 described this first, as
I analyzed operations costs then raised the price to $10,000 a day. What
happened was about a third of the custom clients agreed, a third of the
clients indicated the price change was not in the budget for that year but
they would renew in the next year. They agreed to pay the higher price.
Then one-third of the clients indicated they were not going to pay the
higher price, but in the end, they did. Without doing too much except
raising prices, I made the place profitable for the first time, probably in its
history. (P06)
P06 went on to explain how he changed the product and service offering of the
school, indicating
The faculty essentially ran the EEP division. They ran it as much for their
personal benefit, making extra money themselves, as they did for
providing senior executives with training at a level commensurate with
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executive skills. Unlike EEPs at other University business schools; at this
school, if faculty taught in the EEP, they received compensation in
addition to their basic pay. Working in the EEP was not a zero-sum game
for them. As a result of my work, the faculty-led programs changed to
market-driven programs. The School was teaching courses, for example,
time management, that a premier business school should not be teaching at
the executive level. I eliminated the old boys club and changed the
products and services offered by the school. By my third year, 70% of the
off-the-shelf open enrollment programs had changed. I re-cast the product
line and offered programs based on what market research identified as
needed. To do that, I changed the faculty to use professors that were not
the standing faculty at The School, not tenured professors. I used nontenured practitioners at least 50% of the time which upset the tenured
faculty. The dean, who also disapproved, supported the changes because
the school was growing market share and was profitable. People said we
could not do that, but we did. They said we could not raise rates from
$6,300 to $10,000 a day, but we did. I created new products and a new
EEP. (P06)
The new organization design developed by P06 is now commonly used in EEPs at
Universities across the United States.
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In another example, P08 was hired as corporate attorney at a mail order company
to resolve legal disputes over marketing practices. He eventually became the chief
operating officer (COO) of the company. He recommended operational changes designed
to counter legal issues and poor marketing practices and took responsibility to implement
them. Several state attorneys had sued the company for their approach to marketing, and
they needed to change quickly before the legal expenses shut the company down. P08
identified an approach to marketing that satisfied the States Attorneys offices and enabled
the company to continue. He described the problem like this;
I joined this company in 2013, about three and a half years ago. The
company had achieved revenues of around $110 million. About four years
earlier, maybe 2008, revenues were more like $25 million, and if you went
back to 2004, they were more like $3 million. They had a meteoric rise,
and I was the first in-house attorney the company had hired, ostensibly
because it had huge regulatory problems.
The problems came up in 2008. Late that year, the company
changed its marketing to a somewhat risky but very legal approach to
soliciting customers. By 2011 a couple of different government agencies
had observed that this marketing activity was causing, in their minds,
consumer harm. By the time I joined the company, the place was in
trouble from a regulatory perspective. Three different states had opened
investigations, and the company had retained three top law firms, notable
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experts in advertising and marketing, to handle these three investigations.
They were consuming an average of $50,000 to $75,000 a month in legal
fees.
The business was that this company, essentially a startup, was in
the process of renewing a second license with an old-line publisher from
the 1920’s and 1930’s. The two organizations had very different cultures.
The publisher had extended the license to this startup, but over the years
management relations had become incredibly strained, mostly due to
cultural differences.
The startup considered the publisher out of touch with the art of
marketing. My first duty was to resolve the regulatory and franchise
issues. Almost immediately, it became obvious that I needed to repair the
relationship with the licensor, the publisher.
What I discovered is that the entire culture at this company was
highly entrepreneurial. They employed about 200 people at the time I
started, of a very cutting-edge culture led by two young mavericks, who
believed that they could do nothing wrong. They felt that the world was
wrong and they were right. They were facing fines of more than 100
million dollars that would have put the company out of business. (P08)
In the course of his employment, P08 resolved the legal issues, redesigned the
marketing programs, which in turn redesigned the organization that existed to support

172
them. He was eventually appointed COO of the company’s continued operations. He
renegotiated the second license with the publisher that supplied their products and
continued the business without impending legal concerns hanging over them. When
renegotiation of a third license came about, the publisher chose not to renew the license.
The publisher, being one of the oldest and largest in that business, and a more
conservative organization, was not comfortable with the practices of this company and
chose to sever the relationship. P08 had foreseen this outcome during his earlier
interactions with the publisher and had developed a plan for an orderly shutdown of the
company. He assumed responsibility for the business shut-down, pending acquisition of
new products they could market.
ERP projects are a common form of a change initiative, and four of the projects
represented here were of this type. They are an example of change initiatives that require
extraordinary planning and execution to achieve the goals or outcomes expected in
change. The PMI is a professional membership organization focused on project
management. This organization has developed the project management body of
knowledge (PMBOK), a complete body of knowledge (PMI, 2013) around the concept of
planning and executing projects. Most professional project managers use this body of
knowledge to guide their work. These projects may range from construction to
reorganizations, to acquisitions and divestitures, or ERP. ERP is a typical example of
transitional change. The application of this technology is likely to drive change in
organizational design, structure, staffing, and the management of the delivery of products
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and services. P01 gave three examples of organizational change that were driven by ERP
implementations. P02’s employer, a senior executive team that had already decided on
changes needed for the organization, hired him to lead a successful ERP change. P03
talked about two ERP experiences; the first, as a member of a project team charged with
recovering from a failed ERP implementation at an international car parts manufacturer
and distributor; the second, as the corporate executive in charge of standardized ERP
implementations at newly acquired companies as the parent company merged with those
organizations. These latter implementations replaced unique business processes with
standard processes for the control and operation of their respective businesses as
subsidiaries of the new owner. VG talked about one example that was a key component
of a larger ERP initiative. These leaders referred to elements of the PMBOK (2013) when
they explained how they approached their projects. The interesting part is that the other
leaders who were not involved in technology installation or replacement initiatives did
not refer the PMBOK. However, they framed their approaches similarly, and their key
themes were essentially the same.
Changed organization focus. Six participants (60%) discussed changing the
organization focus. That is, they changed product and service offerings to the extent that
what they offered customers after changing were something different from when they
started. For example, when P06 started with the EEP, a program that had lasted four to
six weeks, operated as a residential college program. Client organizations struggled with
this because they had to absent their managers to this program that length of time. The
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program taught executive education using the same models, materials, and classes used in
their Masters of Business Administration (MBA) program. The program merely
packaged the MBA curriculum as an EEP, something most attendees had completed in
prior learning. P06 changed the program to follow a model he called Managing with
Ambiguous Authority, a curriculum designed for working mid- and senior-level
executives who were targeted to move up to the most senior positions in their
organizations. P06 described this effort as
When meeting the associate dean in the interview process, I indicated I
would only take the position if they rewrote the job description to a much
higher-level. They agreed and redefined the position as the director of the
EEP.
I began with a couple of things. First, I worked on a new strategy.
Second, I worked on the school finances and will discuss that first. They
were losing money and needed to change their pricing, cost models, and
deliverables. They could not say which products were profitable, which
were not, how much it cost to run the program. The EEP had a dedicated
building on campus, a conference center including 102 hotel rooms, an
executive chef, and dining facilities. I asked how much it cost to deliver
meals, what the mortgage payment for the facility was. No one had ever
asked these questions. I learned that the fully-loaded cost was about
$7,000 a day. Our biggest custom client was General Motors, who paid
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$6,300 a day. We were losing money. I raised prices to $10,000 a day.
Without doing much else, the program became profitable. The changed
finances surprised and delighted the dean.
The strategy changed to more market-driven programs. The old
curriculum included courses that an EEP should not teach. By year three,
at least 70% of the off-the-shelf open enrollment programs had changed,
redefined based on market needs instead of faculty prerogatives. Nontenured faculty was hired, teaching 50% or more of the time. The Dean
disapproved but tolerated this, appreciating the growth and profitability it
brought to the school.
The old curriculum came from the MBA programs. The classes
were based on case studies, using cases that had been around for 20, 30
years. An audit of the classes found that in a normal week, several faculty
members might use the same case study, taught from different
perspectives, not knowing this because they did not know the entire
program’s content. Program redesign created new classes with different
segments built on each other. The faculty appreciated this teaching
approach as the process was more challenging than it had been.
We changed the leadership processes in the school. The Center for
Creative Leadership was, at the time, known for its 360-degree feedback
evaluation system. I introduced this system into The School, the first EEP
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school to do so. We did things like action learning projects. In a joint
presentation with a large financial services firm, at UNICON (the global
consortium for University-based EEPs,) a client expressed how learning
groups changed his company. I changed the EEP because as part of
changing concepts, it was not academic EEP anymore; it was applied
executive training using academic tools.
The last change was marketing open enrollment. Traditionally,
marketing was print media. Most executive program ads were tombstone
ads, presenting innocuous information about stature and suggesting
enrollment. They included pictures of buildings, edifices, such as a
business school building. There were always building pictures in the ads.
We hired an ad agency, targeting 45 to 55-year-old men, senior managers
going through major transitions, moving to higher levels, or possibly some
other life crisis. At that time the target market was mostly men, and
advertising was mostly in print media. We created a four-color picture of a
Harley-Davidson, with the headline, "Malcolm Forbes learned to ride a
motorcycle at 51. What have you done lately?" After that ad went out, the
phone would not stop ringing. The ad was different. It popped because
everything else, the ads from other schools, were black and white, bland
text and pictures of edificial buildings. This ad strikingly stood out. The ad
essentially challenged the typical mid-life crisis of successful executives.
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That ad changed EEP marketing, changed everything in the program, and
turned the industry upside down. (P06)
The program taught the concepts of disruptive planning and execution. The new
courses were designed for working executives moving to senior level positions. P06
changed the instructor staffing to adjuncts instead of tenured faculty, recognizing that
adjuncts focus more on teaching than they do on publishing. The University was a
research school. Teaching in the EEP was a secondary priority for tenured faculty, who
were focused more on publishing than teaching. P06 raised prices for the program and
changed the marketing approach. The EEP had been operating at a loss. The price
increase was more than 58%. Marketing had followed the typical marketing tactics of
Universities; he changed that to appeal more to C level executives of large organizations
by using a Park Avenue advertising agency to develop business-oriented marketing. The
new focus was on results to expect from sending entire management teams through the
program, instead of focusing on the individual contributor’s growth in the organization.
In another case P07 found his organization so internally focused that they could
not define or accept new products, new processes, or new markets. P07 presented two
cases, and this one was his most comprehensive example. Company growth was stagnant.
He had problems from the start because of competition with the prior CEO, an autocratic
leader who led through fear and intimidation. In P07’s words
My first case was a Chocolate and Candy Company, a 50-year-old familyowned business that was run by an autocratic founder and owner who had
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recently passed away. Grandchildren were working in the business, and
the family decided none of them were prepared to take over. The
grandfather took this little candy store and made it into a $50 million
business that sold seasonal confections; hollow Easter bunnies, Easter
eggs, chocolate Santa Clauses, Valentine's Day candy, and Halloween
candies. Mostly chocolates and some other products. For example,
imported hard candies. Company products were all private label and
unbranded. Distribution channels were through mass retailers such as
Woolworth, Wal-Mart, K-mart, Family Dollar; drug chains, such as
Eckerd, Rite-Aid, Walgreens, and CVS, a lot of independent stores, and
some grocery stores. This case occurred in the 1990s when there was no ecommerce. The company was the grandfather’s source of joy and income
for the family. They went through 10 years of profit erosion under the
grandfather, who died in his late 80s. The business was still profitable, so
no one did anything that upset him. The family allowed the business to
continue as he had designed it. Expenses were increasing, and revenues
were flat. However, it was still income and pride to the grandfather; the
family did not want to upset him. So, they let the business ride.
Everybody loved Sam. During onboarding, I saw it was going to
be very difficult because I feared that the staff and family would see me as
the new Sam, which I did not think I could ever be. They loved Sam; they
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did not love me. I was not a family member. I needed a different approach.
The plant manager under Sam had been with him from the day Sam
started until he died. I committed not to fire any long-term employees
because they were not trained to do what I wanted. I would respect Sam’s
wishes to treat these employees like family members. Clarence, the plant
manager, let me know that he founded this business with Sam. Sam said it
would always be a family run business. Since I was not a family member,
the only way Clarence was leaving before me is if he sees one of the
grandchildren become CEO or if he died. Unfortunately, about two and
half years into the process, Clarence passed away. That is what I saw,
what it would be like, even before onboarding.
I decided that the best way to work because people would fear me
like they did Sam, was by trying to be nice. I did all the pump-up speeches
and tried to get the staff to know me but knew that this was like trying to
retrain a dog. The dog that had been hit with a newspaper so many times
that when the newspaper comes out, the reaction is fear. When the
President shows up, they all cowered and asked, “what do you want me to
do?” I identified, through a strategic assessment, how to grow this
business so that the top line increased. The business had not increased
revenues in 10 years. Expenses continued to rise every year. They needed
to get the top line growing at least as quickly as expenses. I created four
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task groups. One for product development. One for quality because the
quality was terrible. One for safety because we had $500,000 of
workman’s, compensation expenses, and one for, cost reduction or
productivity. We selected team members; each had a separate team of 7-10
people, representing each function; marketing, production, finance, and so
on. I hired a facilitator who is a proponent of work climate, brought all the
teams together and gave each a one-paragraph charge for their
responsibility for the next 90-days. For example, the team on productivity
would look at ways to reduce our costs so that we could become more
profitable, without affecting the customer experience.
New products in a seasonal business are their lifeblood. In the past,
they had only done product line extensions. I told the product development
team I no longer wanted to see 2 or 3% growth from new products; I
wanted them to represent 30% of our sales growth within three years of
starting. Their reaction was that new product development was a wholly
different from anything they had ever done. They had to think differently.
They may have to test equipment. Everybody was pushing back, giving all
the reasons why it would not work. I told them that is the charge, and
since I did not know enough about the business yet, I provided a
facilitator. For the next 30 days, I am not going to talk about this. You can
meet as much as you want, but I expected each team to meet weekly. I
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gave them an outside facilitator to help with these meetings. He will keep
you focused on your charge, by asking how you know what you know,
and bring you back to it. In 30 days, you will give me an interim verbal
progress report. In 60 days, you will give me a written report for feedback
about where you are heading. At the end of the 90 days, we are going offsite, to make a presentation of your findings and recommendations. What I
tried to do is involve everybody in the strategic portion of the business.
Obviously, I outlined a couple of strategies that I felt were important.
However, I tried to build consensus on the strategic thinking. All too
often, I have seen people autocratically force a strategy, and then they try
to build a consensus at the implementation level. That fails miserably. In
this case, it took us 90 days, and I got four reports. I will tell you that I
probably accepted 75% of the recommendations because this was part of
my onboarding and part of the change for doing things differently. I
needed to show that if you made reasonable recommendations, you would
get green-lighted. The result was that consensus about cost savings,
quality control, how to control Workers’ Compensation, and new product
development became the targets of the teams. I accepted most of the
recommendations and implementation became easier.
So, let's go through a couple of results. The Workers’
Compensation problem took over three years to correct. We put a safety
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program in place that reduced expenses from $500,000 to $33,000. The
program was simple, nothing more than communication. First, somebody
suggested an OSHA audit us because we were an unsafe environment.
Obviously, you would not invite government agency to inspect, but we
found a company, a private company that could inspect like OSHA. They
came in, announced themselves as if they were OSHA, acted like OSHA,
but were an audit firm. They asked for safety logs when they first came in.
Within the first two hours, all 500 employees in the plant knew that OSHA
was there and we were in trouble. We issued citations, which supposedly
represented fines left and right. The inspection happened differently in
each building; we had 500,000 square feet of buildings. By the end of two
days, we had about 180 citations. The employees did not know the
citations were not real. We told them that the audit was not real but was a
private company that audits for OSHA compliance. The Workers’
Compensation Safety Task Force recommended this approach. That team
built a consensus around the problem, noting that it was not a money
problem. Somebody could be injured; the problems could be lifethreatening.
We started the communication program and made the capital
investment needed to fix whatever was facility related. For example, on
the roof, you have to have a safety warning light, so when you get within a
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certain number of feet of the edge, you receive a warning that you close to
falling off. We started Lock-up, tag-out programs. We had people lose
fingers in machinery. We did not have safety guards and lock-up, tag-out
programs on saws and other machinery. That required capital investment.
The more important part that saved money was a yellow card system. Any
supervisor or higher could walk around and issue a yellow card. These
yellow cards were available around the plant and anybody could issue one.
If you saw somebody committing an unsafe act, you would go to that
person and write up what you saw on the card. No punishments or firings
resulted. Nobody lost time or pay. The process was that simple. You go
over to that person, and you would say, I just saw you committing an
unsafe act. The process used a carbon copy card. You would write it up
and say, Michael Moore, you were committing an unsafe act. I saw that
you did not shut this machine off and put the lock-up, tag-out protocol in
place before you reached under the filling head. I wanted to let you know
that is an unsafe act. Your arm could get caught in there, it could have
been punctured, broken, or something else dangerous could have
happened. The finding was written up on the card with one copy given to
the offender, and the other dropped in a box. The workmen’s
compensation team reviewed the cards from the box and took appropriate
action. When you collected a certain number of violations as an
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individual, you attended a training program. We punished nobody.
Nobody lost their jobs. There was no docked pay, nonpunitive personnel
actions, a practice frequently seen in other businesses. Training went out
to everybody. It was just a communication program. Ultimately, the
$500,000 Workers’ Comp expense reduced to $33,000, which meant
insurance premiums were much lower, so that was very successful.
Another accomplishment was in new products. Once they knew we
wanted a third of our business from new products, they started thinking
creatively. They thought about new equipment, which could enable
different products. I told them we did not have to manufacture the
products; They had always made everything we sold. We could
subcontract. We could outsource. We could do anything you want. They
were excited by that. We started a brand licensing program. For example,
we licensed Nickelodeon products such as Rugrats and SpongeBob
SquarePants. We licensed products from Universal Studios like Curious
George and Woody Woodpecker. We licensed Hawaiian Punch to do
flavored licorice with Hawaiian Punch flavors. We licensed Peter Pan
Peanut Butter to do Peter Pan peanut buttercups, a take on Reese’s. Some
of these things make these products that work very well. For example, for
SpongeBob SquarePants, we had bought plastic models of SpongeBob
SquarePants in China and manufactured chocolate to put inside them. We
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could not do licorice ourselves. So, we outsourced it to a company in, I
believe, Argentina. They made the licorice, and we would send them the
Hawaiian Punch flavor.
We took the company from 30 million dollars when I on-boarded,
to 75 million dollars in five years. The growth came from this brand
licensing program, a whole different product line, where we manufactured
only about half of the new products in our plant. We outsourced the rest to
other manufacturers who wanted to do business with us. Taking those
governors off was not something I thought of, these were the ideas of the
new products task group. They brainstormed ideas knowing they did not
have to manufacture here. Someone might say they had wanted to be in
marshmallow business; another might have wanted to be in the hard candy
business, and so on. The team brought that to me, and I just had to say,
yes. Since I came out of a branded background, I might have added a little
value, suggesting that we put a brand on it and try to license it under our
candy company name. The program was highly successful.
Regarding quality that was all about machinery. The organization
recognized that nobody had put any capital investment in this company.
The machines could not do what we wanted them to do. The foil wrapping
on the candy could not be good if the foil wrappers were 30 and 40 and 50
years old. Ultimately, this team recognized the places of the best leverage.
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They knew who the best machinery makers were, which were almost all
German. They knew the best Swiss candy making machines. We spent
about 6 million dollars on new machinery. I would not know one candywrapping machine from another. I will be honest with you. There were
smart people there, and they knew what was needed.
This company was successful, profitable within the first six
months. Subsequently, we took years to implement the changes. I was
there just under five years. When my contract was running out, and they
wanted to renew me for another two. I decided to move on because I was
not a family member and one of the family members, the eldest of the
grandchildren working in the business, became the CEO. They continued
these strategies to date, have been successful, and are doing well.
Onboarding was the key and framing everything as the customer
experience. Because of the command and control environment, this case
needed a certain approach. That was the approach taken there. (P07)
Others who change their organizational focus included P09 who identified the
need to standardize products across plants and defined change initiatives designed to
achieve those goals. These included changing job descriptions, engineering design
processes, and redefining the day-to-day operating objectives for the company and each
plant around the country. This project was successful in the sense that the organizational
changes needed to support standardization were made and became permanent. However,
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this project brought about tremendous cultural stress due to the old organizational
structure. The organization was an employee stock ownership plan (ESOP) company.
They did not terminate employees. Most of their midlevel and senior managers and many
of their rank and file employees had been with the company more than 30 years. The
board of directors was made up of the retired company founder, several former CEO’s,
and one outsider. The five of the six plant managers were among these 30-year-plus
veterans, and they enjoyed the autonomy they had as directors before the standardization.
Implementing these changes caused tremendous cultural stress. The company brought in
management consultants to help lead the projects, but the changes were difficult.
Nevertheless, the project was successful. Three of the plant managers retired rather than
participate in the changes. P09 was forced to take a directive-in-nature stance, which
compromised his ability to lead the organization in a broader sense, but they completed
the program to centralize and standardize operations successfully. P09 still works at the
company in a different role.
P01 led an ERP implementation in a global pharmaceutical company. She
maintained the focus on change by directing that focus on operational metrics that should
improve as a result of the project. That approach tended to divert attention from the
changes themselves because the project teams and other affected personnel paid more
attention to the outcomes of the project than they did the exercise of the project plan.
They focused on the business imperatives instead of the changes. P05 maintained a focus
on the changes while structuring the underlying projects at very low levels in the
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organization. He ran many small projects instead of one big one. That way, stress, and
conflicts were less likely to be elevated to the executive levels of the University. He had
resistance from older employees who could not understand or did not want to change and
managed that by downplaying their concerns. He listened, evaluated, and if those
concerns were about elements not critical for business continuation, ignored them. He
recognized that this approach was manipulative but stood quietly by as the resistant
employee either accepted the change or left. P08 changed the marketing programs and
organizational design of his employer. They had been marketing using a negative option
marketing approach. They were under investigation by three state attorneys’ offices in the
U.S. who were concerned that this form of marketing was damaging consumers in their
respective jurisdictions. Their product supplier also disagreed with this form of
marketing, feeling that the negative aspects of it reflected on them. At the same time, the
organization leadership did not understand the problem, nor did they understand how
their leadership and business processes contributed to their exposure to risk in these two
areas. P08 was able to convince the leadership of the need for change, developed new
marketing and organizational design, got it implemented, continued operations, after
having resolved the legal problems. The supplier problems persisted in the sense that the
supplier refused to renew their license at the next round of negotiation. The company
operated successfully for two years after resolving their legal issues, and the supplier had
no concerns after that, but they were a conservative organization and felt that the
company P08 represented was too aggressive for them. They were concerned that future
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trouble might arise and reflect negatively on them. The changes P08 implemented were
successful but were unable to overcome the concerns of their supplier.
Recognized change as a necessity. Five participants (50%) addressed the point
that change was a necessity in the organizations where they worked. All ten participants
gave positive responses when asked about the importance of recognizing change as a
necessity, but five either proactively expressed this as important or took the time to
explain their positions on this. For example, P09 developed the direction and needed
change then sold that concept to the senior leadership of the organization. He measured
success in regards to the success of the change initiative. The negative consequences he
experienced resulted from the change initiative success. In his words
We are a manufacturing company with five branches in Illinois, Ohio,
Kentucky, Dallas, and Nevada. Our leadership is very tenured. For
example, I have been 37 years with the company. I started at the bottom
and went to the top, as CEO and President. The district managers, the most
senior managers in each branch, have similar backgrounds. The company
does not terminate employees. They keep them for as long as they wish to
stay. If they stay long enough and wish to climb higher, they can, but that
is not an up-or-out advancement system. They can stay at their current
level for as long as they want, as long as they want to stay with the
company. Unfortunately, I am no longer at the top spot, but that is another
story. The challenge was aligning the branches with standardized
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products, processes, structure, accounting practices, supply systems, and
so on. Each branch operated pretty much as a separate entity, like silos or
individual profit centers. Each had their approach to developing products,
providing support, and so on. Some developed custom products that could
exist elsewhere in the system. A district manager ran each plant. They ran
their districts like a fiefdom. They disdained guidance from corporate,
which was here in the Midwest.
The change initiative we envisioned was to install more centralized
sales, product design, and support processes. Each factory would have a
central depository of designs, with everybody conducting sales and other
business processes in standardized ways. The central leadership team
would leverage the five plant teams to get all personnel working as one
group rather than as five separate groups. The goal was to leverage the
power of that knowledge by consolidating it and making it available to the
entire company. We recognized that there could be economies of scale by
centralizing and eliminating the redundancies between districts.
We hired an external consultant to help with centralization and
began with the distribution of the overhead burden. Each plant paid 20%
of the overhead. The process had been that the company equally split the
overhead between the plants. There were inequities in this. A couple of
plants operated with maybe a dozen engineers and a few office people,
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while others would have larger staffs and more complexity. The largest
plant was operating two shifts per day with 70 employees plus maybe a
dozen office personnel. A comparison to other plants set up an
inequitability where one plant with 16 employees doing primarily
maintenance support paid 20% of the burden, the same amount as another
plant paid with 82 employees supporting new product development in new
construction. The larger plants used more resources, more materials,
needed more accounting, bookkeeping, and other support. One plant might
have ten million dollars in revenue, another less than three million dollars.
Both paid the same overhead. That allocation of overhead was not
realistic. With the help of the independent consultant, we changed our
accounting structure to distribute the burden based on headcount instead of
numbers of branches. The 70-engineer branch would pay more than the
12-engineer branch. Funding became more equitable than it had been.
Plants paid costs based on resources used instead of an equal distribution
based on the number of plants in the system. Region directors rethought
whether, for 11 million dollars of revenue, they needed 70 engineers, or
because of the overhead cost, could they get by with 60, 65, or some other
number. Likewise, it affected other resource management, changing many
thought processes at the plant level. The new burden allocation brought
more equitable distribution, worked better to drive local decisions, and
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fostered savings beyond burden allocation. The new method for overhead
distribution made smaller plants look more profitable than before.
The allocation change drove out other changes. For example, plant
personnel now came to the home office, working on our centralized design
database, a data-warehouse of drawings from all of the factories. When a
designer looks for a design, they have more options from which to choose.
If they need design changes, they have a larger pool of drawings to choose
from, thus reducing the need for one-off custom designs.
Change brought benefits to the factories. The new allocation
system developed standards by evaluating factory personnel along with
plant managers and designers and talking about how we did things in the
shops. We had meetings with the designers and plant managers, who
returned to their districts with the new approaches. The most senior
managers at the plants were district managers. These individuals were
promoted from plant manager positions where they had overseen their
respective facilities. As District Managers, they worked primarily in sales
roles with customers. Plant managers were responsive to them but
additionally reported to the home office in a matrix style of organization
and were more responsible for operations. Most of the district managers
were against the changes. We dealt with this resistance while centralizing
the organization. They expected to continue operating independently, not

193
agreeing with centralization. Three retired rather than submit to change.
The district manager of the largest district stayed. The Nevada branch, a
much younger organization, having been recently established, had person
transferred from another plant to head the Nevada district. He came from
the shop environment and had been with the company close to 40 years.
He knew the expectations and agreed with the program objectives. As
CEO, I was in the Illinois facility. They did not have much choice, and
that transition went smoothly. The Illinois facility district manager was
one of those who retired. In his mid-sixties, he said: "Okay, it is my time."
With many people who had been with the company a long time, this was a
concern. People joined us and did not leave. Friendships exist among
long-term employees, some that made change difficult. Some people
recognized that friendships were secondary behind business requirements,
others did not. We resolved Some conflicts by applying pressure until
changes took hold, others were not. Eventually, I moved to a marketing
position dealing with major accounts and The Board of Directors selected
a new CEO. They recognized the changes were significant. I am still with
the company, still working on change. These include using more metrics
to monitor our work than we have in the past and standardizing business
processes. We installed CRM software and are using it to track our work
and refine our sales process.

194
Our accomplishments were in our accounting process structure.
This added efficiency resulted in winning more profitable business. We
are still centralizing business processes, getting an agreement with a "one
company, many arms" concept instead of the silos we used to operate. We
are not there but are well past the point-of-no-return. Right now, I am
working with order entry and project managers. There is extensive
communication between sales and customers. We are a job shop. We
communicate order information to our design team and order entry
personnel on a case-by-case basis. Often, we do not get the information we
need. Somebody must go back to the client to obtain it. We are installing a
step-by-step project management process. If the information is not there,
project managers must get it. Last year was one of our biggest years ever,
for chargebacks. We had over 658,000 dollars in chargebacks; charges for
wrong products, wrong work, fixing mistakes, wrong deliveries, and
customers hiring contractors to repair our work. That sum results from not
paying attention. We are correcting that through change, centralizing and
standardizing the sales and design process the way we learned to do
through the consultants we brought in before. (P09)
P09 managed change through an apathetic organization. His change initiative was
successful, although it cost him his position as CEO of the company because of the stress
and animus that grew between him and the plant leadership. If organizations like these
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did not achieve the changes needed, were at risk. In most cases, these leaders recognized
the potential for business failure if they were unsuccessful. One leader, P06, recognized
the need for change before his recruitment. He proposed changes during his interview
process and followed through with those changes over the next three years of work at that
educational institution. The case presented by P03 was for a public company, an
international manufacturer, and distributor of automotive parts, who had repeated
findings of a material weakness in their annual independent audits. These findings put the
company at risk for lost financing, which can lead to a significant reduction, possible
dissolution or divestiture of the business. P03 could get the change initiative properly
staffed and to get the business owners to pay attention to what was needed to ensure
success.
P07 presented a case where culture change was critical to continued business.
That company, a $100 million family-owned business, had been led for 50 years by its
founder. The that culture instituted by that founder had not changed in decades. This
stagnation of cultural development was responsible for lack of growth for the company.
The organization was too internally focused and was not visionary about their markets
and where they stood in them. They were slowly declining in the sense that they were not
even growing at the same rate as standard inflation. To grow, they needed to modernize
products. They needed to answer a changing market environment, and the culture had
neither the drive nor the vision to do that. They did not have this capability among their
personnel. The company risked failure due to the inability to keep up with evolving
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markets. The owners recognized this problem and brought P07 in to correct it. P06
recognized that without change, the institution where he worked would not be able to
account for or manage its business adequately. He also noted that the organization had
many resistant actors that he would have to overcome to achieve success. He did this by
keeping his plans very low key. He organized the change initiative into a list of smaller,
low key projects that would not have visibility in the political dialogue of the institution.
Each project was a relatively simple endeavor with project teams not to exceed five
members. However, they were chained together and resulted in a large change coming
together without broader visibility, especially from political players in the organization
who might be critical or feeling a need to control the effort.
Each project listed here was different, had different priorities, dealt with different
aspects of organizational design and operational imperative, but all were common in the
sense that they were designed to change the organization where they functioned in some
way. Some emphasized cultural development, others were focused on business processes,
some were about organizational structure, some about customers, markets, or other
external imperatives, but all were successful in the instance of managing change and
achieving the outcomes prescribed for those initiatives.
Subquestion 1. The themes for research Sub-question 1 are the same as for the
overarching research question. They appear from different perspectives, showing a
different view. The central issues of the overarching research question fostered lengthy,
complex, and robust expression around the strategies and tactics used to achieve
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successful change and included multifaceted looks at how they applied. The subquestions
narrow the focus to particular areas of concern. Subquestion 1 focused more on the
behaviors and practices exercised by the participants to get their organizations to apply
the strategies and tactics defined for their respective change initiatives to result in a
successful outcome. The themes associated with Subquestion 1, are again, listed in Table
3, followed by a discussion of how they apply to this subquestion. Subquestion 1 was
What behaviors and other practices do internal change leaders seem to
exercise, what do they do differently from what external change
practitioners suggest, that results in CM success?
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Table 3
Sub-question 1 Themes
Major Theme

Respondents

Definition

1. Collaborative Leadership

100%

Exercised behaviors and practices
that induced strong, proactive,
qualified, self-starting
collaborative leadership from
superiors, peers, and subordinates.

2. Open Communication

70%

Practiced open, candid, nonpunitive communication
throughout the change initiative

3. Defined Expected
Outcomes

70%

Developed plans and operational
designs that constituents used to
frame and control their
performance.

4. Changed Organization
Focus

80%

Led their organizations through a
transition that was effectively
different from what they were
when the change initiative started.

5. Recognized Change
Necessity

50%

Exercised behaviors and practices
the fomented an organizational
attitude that change was an
absolute necessity.

Collaborative leadership. All participants (100%) described behaviors and
practices they used to get their direct reports and others to strive toward and achieve their
planned goals and to get their organizations to accept and go along with the changes they
were leading. An interesting dynamic that existed in every interview conducted was that
the interviewee showed a commitment to leading their respective project to fruition.
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Every leader was goal oriented and focused on achieving their primary objectives in the
change initiative they led. This focus was evident in every case, notable to such an
extreme in one instance that the change leader’s success resulted in his removal from his
leadership position because of the social stress his drive caused in achieving the change
initiative objectives. The changes in that case, while successful, created such cultural
stress that the board of directors decided he could not effectively continue as the CEO.
The line of questioning found in the interview questions at Appendix D fostered
open and candid discussion of what was done to ensure that leadership was effective.
Participants P01 and P02 both led initiatives that were conducted across multiple business
locations worldwide. They delivered training and development for their subordinates in a
way that the respective subordinate would then be able to respond independently and
proactively to the common problems typically inherent in large, complex projects without
undue checking in with the boss. P01 recruited former colleagues and others who had
worked in large ERP implementations before. Those that had worked at other employers
were people she had worked with and knew their abilities. She described this as
I have done this work multiple times myself and made sure that I brought
in people that had also done this type of work before. Some of us had
worked together previously, but not everyone. We were like-minded and
committed to using the template that we all knew worked well in life
sciences. We had a structured approach that we had used more than once
in an analogous industry as a team of people, some of whom had worked
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together previously. I think that is huge. That is how a good sports team
wins. They practice and get better and better together. It is like they say in
basketball; every basket has ten hands.
P01 and P02 trained their subordinates, in turn, to be leaders. P03 used a different
approach that was equally effective. His charge was to effect change that, for cultural
reasons, did not support his plan. He empowered his peers and subordinates to act
proactively and independently, even when contrary to the management styles of the home
office senior leadership. Part of his job was to manage the expectations of senior leaders
to avoid violating the project management practices used and promoted throughout the
organization. This approach was risky, but since the home office was in a foreign country
and there were other more senior executives in the USA that understood and supported
his approach, he succeeded. Another example was P06, who redesigned the program
offering of the school he led, redefined its markets, procedures, and staffing for
delivering those services, and changed the definition of EEP at that institution as well as
in the rest of his industry. This change began with rewriting his job description during the
hiring process. In another case, P09 invoked change that many of his subordinate leaders
rejected. He eventually prevailed in getting the changes made by replacing or removing
people who rejected his plan. The organizational stress, the social and cultural discord,
was so apparent that his board of directors eventually removed him as CEO and
President, reassigning him to a sales marketing leadership position. However, the changes
he led were successful, including those that he had implemented as CEO and President.
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The company achieved the centralized functions proposed for operations, and he is still
there, still leading change initiatives. In his words
There were five factories. Each led by a district manager. The district
manager was the senior manager in charge of the facility. Each factory
operated independently as a separate entity. They each solicited their
respective clients, independently created their products, prepared and
maintained their architectural and design drawings, managed their
inventories separately, and conducted their accounting and reporting
locally. This independence created a lot of redundancy and duplication
throughout the company. Almost every District Manager worked
predominantly in a sales role. The District Managers expected to continue
to operate independently, not participating in the centralization plan.
When they could not there was tremendous resistance. One District
Manager, the one in charge of our Texas facility did not want to work
anymore and retired outright. The Ohio manager was a battle between him
and I. There was constant fighting over the direction we took. The
argument eventually reached a point of an ultimatum; it's my way or the
highway sort of discussion. For him, it became to either comply or receive
a formal reprimand. He did not like that and retired.
The Nevada branch was newer than the rest of the plants, opened
in 2007. We promoted and transferred an employee from Ohio, who had
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been with the company close to 40 years. He knew the expectations, what
we were trying to accomplish, and agreed with the objectives. Since I was
in the Illinois facility, they did not have much choice about change. The
district manager in Illinois was close to retirement and rather than
participate in the changes; he did that. The Kentucky facility, our largest,
was the most productive and did not change Region Managers. The big
thing with our company was, once we hire someone, few people leave.
The average length of employment is over 30 years. There are many longterm friendships in the ranks of the organization and change was difficult
because of those who did not want it.
P09 achieved change by replacing the top management at the region/plant level.
He directed change and fought with those who would resist. He lost political battles due
to personal friendships between senior employees and board members. Most of the board
members had been long-term employees and senior executives who had retired from the
company. P09 prevailed in getting the changes they planned implemented. Each of these
cases was an example of aggressive, proactive, collaborative leadership and every
participant in the study told a similar story about what he or she did as a leader to effect
change successfully. Some were through completely open, candid communication, while
others were through more structured realignment of staff. However, in every case, strong,
proactive, collaborative leadership was the key to success.

203
Open communication. Seven participants (70%) described behaviors and practices
that contributed to open, candid communication among their respective organizations as
they led their change initiatives. Many of the strategies and tactics described as regulating
the planning and execution of change, were in fact, resultant from the behaviors and
practices the leaders exercised to achieve their results. For example, P04, the CEO that
worked to maintain open, candid communication with the entire organization throughout
the sale of his company, did so out of what he saw as a necessity. His group was small,
and it was not possible to maintain confidentiality while the sale transaction was in
process. P04 was hired to grow and sell the company. His example for managing change
was preparing the company for sale and then actually selling it. He believed the team
would collectively know that something was afoot and would react negatively to it if he
were to try to maintain internal confidentiality about the sale. He needed to act so that
whatever the informal leadership, those individuals who while not in the chain of
command were known and respected by the organization rank-and-file employees,
surmised or guessed. He decided that providing the team with frequent, candid, detailed
information about the progress of the sale transaction, through weekly or bi-weekly allhands meetings and discussions, was the best way to avoid the discomfort caused by
unclear knowledge of the business owners’ immediate plans. In his words
We had an open-space office. That made it was very difficult to pretend
that we were not selling the business. There were lots of hush, hush
meetings and frankly, everybody knew what we were doing. I think there
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was a general awareness that the business was having a tough time hitting
all our objectives. I think it was clear that the people were all going to be
aware of what we were doing. For that reason, we took the unusual step of
making sure that everybody was reasonably engaged. Getting everybody
engaged during a sale process without people freaking out is hard.
Regardless, people were inclined to freak out. By getting them in the loop,
keeping them informed, they knew what was happening and where they
stood in the process. In any other scenario where they would not know
what’s happening, they would invent it themselves. The fact that people
were going to know one way or another that something was afoot was
clear, so we decided to keep everybody up to speed on a frequent basis.
Every week or two throughout the selling process, we had a stand-up
meeting and told everybody where the deal stood. We made sure that all
the employees had a chance to interact with their counterparts at the
buying company before completing the deal. There was a risk in that. If
the buyer was a group of mean people or said things that led employees to
think that they would get fired once the deal was done. Many things could
go wrong in the deal. However, keeping the entire company informed was
the right decision.
At some level, the decision was going to be made for us because
we could not have hidden it in such a small company. Keeping people
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informed was important. We had to go one way or another. That was a big
move, and it made it so that we could get through the transaction without
any attrition. In the process, it gave an additional benefit of impressing the
buyer and maintaining the purchase price on the term sheet through the
transaction. I am not sure how to characterize that, but in the process of
introducing everybody to the concept of being bought, which is always a
period of dramatic uncertainty, we took a semi-risky but bold approach to
tackle the keep employees on board problem head-on. (P04)
In a different case, P06 maintained open and candid communication with the
people within the faculty he intended to keep in the school, while less informative to
those he felt needed to leave. He was selective in who knew about the reorganization.
The professors identified to leave the school were not let go as they were already
employed elsewhere in the University. They were merely not invited to participate in the
new business model. The strengths of those professors were academic, and the new
business model was oriented more toward practitioners. The professors that were also
practitioners were more likely to stay with the EEP school. P06 managed this transition
by selectively communicating with the professors invited to stay in the curriculum while
quietly not informing the other faculty. P06 described this as
I pushed the faculty. The faculty was teaching what they taught MBAs but
in 90-minute segments for executives. The courses taught a lot of case
study, using case studies used in the business school for the prior 20 to 30
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years. I redesigned the programs to be more relevant to the typical senior
executive in larger organizations. I created programs that had logical
beginnings, middles, and ends. Different segments built on each other in a
way that the faculty started to enjoy teaching them. Instead of showing up
and teaching the same old thing, I challenged them. The good faculty liked
that.
I took one faculty member in the marketing department and one in
the management department and suggested that they co-teach a course.
They would see what they each do, discover some synergy, and build
better courses between them. Some faculty started writing books together.
They were stimulated, energized, and learning new things. I was pushing
them, not letting them get away with mediocre performance. You cannot
teach executives what you teach in MBA programs. These students are
experienced people. You must give them a case study that challenge them,
that gives them an experience to which they can respond. They have been
working in real life, exercising the problem-solving skills represented in
the cases for from 15 to 20 years. They need case studies based on
conditions commensurate with their levels of experience. The faculty
made the classes much more interactive and participatory. They enjoyed
that, and it led to consulting business for them. What they were teaching
was more relevant to the executives who attended the programs, who in
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turn, asked the instructors to come and teach the material at their
companies. It was a win-win relationship for them. They were enjoying it
more, and the instructors were getting more side consulting. Courses were
filling up. The faculty that disliked the program changes would not be
used to teach them. (P06)
P05 kept communications open only to the extent necessary in organizing his
effort as a series of small projects that did not elevate interest beyond the immediate
objective of the respective current project. There were no large-scale initiatives that
became points of discussion throughout the change effort. Another example was P01,
who maintained constant open communication using town-hall-style meetings, face-toface interaction, regular blog posts, an intranet website where current information was
available, and so on.
Defining expected outcomes. Seven participants (70%) talked about behaviors
and practices they used to encourage compliance with plans for change. In every case, the
leader developed plans for change that included specific, expected outcomes. They led
their respective organizations by emphasizing the objectives set in these plans and
working collaboratively with peers and subordinates to achieve them. For example, P08
initially studied the company over months of employment while dealing with legal
problems he was hired to resolve. From this, he redefined a strategic direction that
complied with both franchisor and States Attorney requirements. He refocused the
organization on profitability by including financial analyses, used to focus operations.
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These analyses identified objectives and set goals for employees to adopt changed
practices. He described this process as follows:
You can command change, but you cannot command respect. I believe
long-term change requires respect. Otherwise, I think it has an elastic
feature that when you stumble, leave, or something else causes doubt,
people backslide. What I found important was not only gaining the respect
of the two individuals at the top of the organization, the CEO and COO,
but also gaining the respect of our senior marketing individual who was
himself a maverick, some other key people in the organization, and the
publisher who was our supplier. First, I was the new guy in town, and
second, I identified that while our company did not necessarily think the
publisher’s core values were wrong, the organization did not respect them.
What I needed to do was convince the publisher that while we were
different, we could still work together harmoniously. They were skeptical.
I found that the two founders took about four to five months to gain their
respect. When I started, I had had a successful career in business law, but
the COO was asking me to run scripted notes by him, the conversations I
was going to have with others, such as the states attorneys or the
publisher, prepared o almost to a teleprompter-like quality. I had to do this
to convince them that my approach would add value, even though they
were looking for me to resolve their problem. Gaining sufficient respect
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that they saw that I could grow the trust and respect of the outside legal
experts took four or five months.
Once I had the respect of the top leadership within the company, I got
better cooperation from the head of marketing, who understood that he had to
consult with me in the strategic marketing. Again, the initial thought was that I
was going to solve the problem. The problem was that they still wanted to use the
same approach to marketing, but wanted me to fix the messaging, so they were
not in trouble with states attorney offices or with the Publisher. The publisher had
the same needs because some consumer complaints would go to them instead of
us because their name was on the products. These complaints tarnished their
reputation because they sold the same products outright, though they had licensed
them to us. Of course, that concerned the states’ attorney offices who questioned
the company for not heeding earlier notices.
I started meeting with the three departments that were most significant;
marketing, information technology, and graphics, which created the messaging, to
redesign the sales and marketing processes. I moved on from there to customer
service and told them to throw the book out, to ignore what they had been told
before about customer service operations. In each case rather than using the
typical approaches, I brought them something the founders were concerned about,
which was to air our dirty laundry with other people. At that point, the three states
attorneys had some subpoenas and other documents outstanding, of which the
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organization was aware. I was spending significant amounts of time feeding
information to them. The licensor had denied requests to expand marketing to
television and radio, and it was becoming obvious to the senior marketing people
that something was amiss in the publisher relationship. Everyone else just thought
it was business as usual. The customer service department was used to, maybe
100 customer complaints a day. To put that in perspective, they had about
500,000 unique customers a year. That is still a lot, and over a month, 3,000 irate
customers could be significant. We were not quite a 24 hour per day, seven days
per week operation. We had an international customer calling center, as well as
two in the U.S., so what I started was to explain to everyone that we had these
governmental issues. I expected confidentiality from the senior people in the
organization, whom we told about the legal problems. I did not tell the junior
people very much beyond recognition that there were problems and that the
culture needed to change. I did tell them what could happen if we did not change
how we approached things, how we did business.
I met with the head of Human Resources and analyzed turnover in the
customer complaint department which was significant. Out of about 120
employees in that department, we probably turned over 1/3 of the staff each year.
Handling customer complaints was very difficult work, given the kind of
complaints they handled. The products were for language learning. The key was
to help Human Resources understand how their jobs would improve. We had two
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recruiters working full-time, recruiting people. We started small meetings of
groups of individuals to explain that we needed to create a new customer-friendly
culture. Everyone would nod their head and agree that it sounded great. We call it
putting the customer first. Nothing novel about that.
There was nothing unique about the program, but people would go back to
their desks thinking it sounded great. After a few weeks of these department
meetings, I would meet again, and start developing key performance indicators
(KPI's) and metrics that demonstrated what it meant for each person in the
department. The need to change began to dawn on people. I opened their eyes to
the fact that having these complaints, at a high level, was a numbers game. We
needed to go through the type of things that were limitations. We knew we could
not immediately cut expenses but recognized that the company had spent about 2
million dollars over a year-and-a-half defending these complaints. That could
have been a lot, but in the end, most people did not connect with the fact that with
every single caller, we needed to resolve the issues before they could become
customer complaints. We developed new phone scripts. Those scripts first had to
be approved by management. The leadership agreed to use them on a pilot basis.
The average call went from about seven a half minutes to about 12 and a half
minutes. That four-and-a-half to five-minute increase was significant when
multiplied by the number of calls we received daily. We added the additional time
to let our customer department befriend the customer as well as they could, to
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diffuse any problems, and get to the heart of what was causing the issue. We
began to see better metrics about our process. Now, it is at the tail end of the
process where we would see a customer's complaint. What we needed to make a
difference was to fix the front end of the customer relationship, the marketing
message they saw or heard up front, so they had a clear understanding of what
was going to happen in their relationship with us.
P06 began proposing a direction during his interview for hire. He demonstrated to
school leadership possible alternatives for changes to organization and structure. This
proposal led to him rewriting his job description to assume responsibility for the changes
that would achieve the new vision. He developed a plan for transitioning to a new model
that better served the school’s potential markets and organized change activities so that
they would evolve into a new organization design. For example, he negotiated adjunct
professors and practitioners as faculty and eliminated tenured academic instructors, using
the new plan as justification.
P10 refocused her organization on expected outcomes directed by the new
DVAC, instead of focusing on data systems and processes. Her team was made up of
information technology people who neither knew about nor understood how the business
of education delivery worked. She brought in functional representatives, people
responsible for executing the business processes of an educational institution, to define
requirements and reduce them to a standard model that delivered operational results for
line departments. P02 invoked an objective to convert information technology operations
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and processes to comply with the Information Technology Infrastructure Library (ITIL).
This focus alleviated potential conflict by centering on an external, third-party approach
to information technology management. This method avoided the sense of ownership or
the not invented here resistance often offered by information technology employees. P01
defined business operational metrics that were the focus of program work and outcomes.
P09 created objectives for centralizing operational processes that were contrary to the
existing organizational design. These examples show that the change leader inspired
focus to some dynamic other than the change initiative they were managing. In some
cases, they identified operational metrics that should reflect outcomes because of the
work of the change initiative. In others, they invoked procedural or administrative
changes that became the focus, the expected outcomes of the changes. Every case
diverted attention from the change to some operational requirement or statistic that would
be influenced by or would reflect the effect of the change.
Changing organization focus. Eight participants (80%) saw that changing the
focus of the organization was necessary to ensure successful change. P06 changed the
curriculum, the organization structure, the processes, the markets they supported, and
their marketing and sales practices. In so doing he completely changed the business of the
school. To do that he needed to obtain a changed understanding among the senior
leadership of the College as to how the EEP division of the school should function,
should approach its markets, and should deliver its services. There was much overlap
between strategic objectives for the organization and the behaviors and practices of
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individuals charged with achieving those goals. In P06 case he identified the need for
change then led a restructuring that came from that definition. He did this out of a sense
of self-direction, leading the organization to a different design. P06 was a driven
personality, and his selection for this work was a form of self-fulfillment. Defining the
organizational change was a practice from earlier in his career that he repeated at new
assignments.
P05 worked in a University with a large number of long-term faculty and staff.
Many of the staff had never worked any other place in their career. In fact, many had not
only never worked anywhere else, but many had also obtained their education at that
University. They had gone there as an undergraduate student then obtained employment
with the University, staying on in a permanent capacity. There was a firm inclination to
resist change, regardless of whether it made sense or not. These employees not only
resisted, in some cases, they refused to change. They saw no reason for it, considering
past practices adequate for future use, saw no reason for change.
P02’s executive board charged him with achieving the changes identified by
others before his hire. They recruited him for that purpose. He developed the strategic
approaches and led the team so that they accomplished the changes. Decisive, proactive
leadership was his style, and he could not listen to or hear about potential failure. P01
also had her objectives set by senior leadership. She developed a team of proactive,
collaborative leaders to help roll out the plan throughout the organization. Her practice is
to develop these leaders as she pursues the objectives in her charge. P09 changed the
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company despite cultural problems that existed. The resolutions resulted in some
retirements and reassignments for people who disagreed with the objectives. P07 changed
the team to focus on the customer experience instead of on making and delivering
products. This focus was invoked as a mantra and used to overcome apathetic behavior
throughout the organization. P08 did this out of a sense of legal responsibility on behalf
of the organization. He conducted analyses, developed new organizational designs, and
convinced the owners to change to those designs to survive. P05 did this by standing his
ground in the face of resistance. He kept a low profile, avoiding visibility in senior
management circles, and could accomplish change without undue executive involvement
that might have questioned the changes.
Recognized change necessity. Five participants (50%) recognized change as a
necessity, a constant in business, and discussed behaviors and practices they exercised to
get their organizations to recognize change as a necessity in their organizations. For
example, P02 felt that change is a constant regardless of the context within which it was
occurring. In his words;
For me, I almost feel as if change is constant. Change is not like at some
point you would look back, and say wow we did it, even if it is a project.
When we look at information technology, for me, it is very much driving
the mix of change at any company. The reason you put in a new project or
make a system change is to change a business process. As soon as you
change the system, you are changing how people operate and respond to
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things, and then you change outcomes. So, we are always involved in
change, but change continues. Change is not like we implement the
solution, make the necessary changes, people adapt to the changes, they
assimilate the new processes into their existing workflow, and then it is
over. In my mind, it is never over. You keep measuring. You keep
changing as needed. (P02)
Thus, P02 recognized that change is constant. He knew that change results in
more change. Once you make a change, that causes another change somewhere else in the
organization, which in turn causes another change, and so on. This trickle effect of one
change driving another is circular and tends to continue to trigger more changes until it
ultimately causes change in the original change that started the process. Change is neverending and circular.
P03, recognizing that change was a necessity, took advantage of repeated audit
findings of material weaknesses reported by external auditors in annual audits. A
Japanese parent company owned his organization, and they addressed problems,
managing people and finances differently from how U.S. organizations manage these
things. The company had implemented SAP, a brand of software, as a tool to administer
their business execution processes. People from the Japanese home office led That
implementation, it was done poorly, and did not invoke the security and compliance
aspects included in the software to comply with operational and legal requirements
imposed by such organizations as the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants,
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the Security Exchange Commission, and the U.S. Congress. The remoteness of the
company headquarters, where the concepts for running a business was very different
from the U.S. approach, exacerbated the problem. As P03 invoked change, he weighed
any resistance against the possibility of further negative audit findings. In his words:
As an internal auditor, responsible for Sarbanes–Oxley compliance (SOX),
I recommended that the company replace the information technology
Director with a person who understood manufacturing and distribution
business administration in the U.S. This person should know how to apply
SAP products in operations properly, who could conduct appropriate
training and could change an organization to one that effectively complied
with both legal and practical requirements for business operations using
the SAP tools. (P03)
P03 accomplished this by writing reports that went to the U.S. CEO, a person who
also understood the differences between U.S. and Japanese structure and culture. The
U.S. CEO validated the needs to the company ownership in Japan and enabled a project
to redesign business systems that complied with U.S. regulatory and operational
conventions for performance. The goal of this effort was to eliminate the annual audit
material weakness findings they had received every year. The company replaced the
information technology director with one who had been a consultant, leading companies
through SAP implementations and had experience in socializing those tools into
manufacturing and distribution organizations. Within 2 years, the organization invoked
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the financial and operations controls found in SAP and eliminated the threats of material
weakness findings in their annual audits.
P07 recognized that culture change was needed to change the business. His
program to change the organizational focus from making and delivering product to
creating a customer experience was used as a framework to achieve this culture change.
P06 also recognized that culture change was needed. A fundamental component of his
reorganization was changing the culture to more business and less academic focus. P04,
like P02, recognized that change is a constant. He had difficulty understanding the
research premise at first because he felt that any manager should understand the
continuous nature of change and CM is just one of the tools that managers bring with
them. There is nothing special about CM. However, in the discussion about
transformational change, he recognized the need for a structured, formal approach and
dedicated resources for managing change, particularly in larger organizations. P08 knew
that everything needed to change. He developed and executed the change plan. When the
company lost their franchise, he downsized the organization to keep it viable while they
found new products. P05 had senior leadership that recognized the need to change as a
necessity and a rank-and-file employee staff that did not. He stood his ground in
moments of conflict with the rank-and-file, knowing he had senior leadership support.
P04 considered change as a constant and change leadership as a necessary skill that any
manager must have. CM is just a routine responsibility of leadership, although
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transformational change exists and requires a more comprehensive approach, using
program and project management tools and tactics.
Subquestion 2. The information sought in Subquestion 2 was a more generalized
interest in what successful change managers thought about the reported failure rates
found in the literature. The finding turned out to be that all of these managers had in one
way or another, the same thought; the failure rates for failed projects were of lesser
concern than successes. They would do what they had to do to be successful. Failure was
not considered an option for them. What follows is a restatement of Subquestion 2 and a
discussion reporting how these managers saw those statistics. Subquestion 2 was
What meaning do employee change leaders attribute to the high failure
rates in CM and how do these leaders show through their lived
experiences to avoid them?
Every participant in this study indicated one way or another that they were either
unaware, only vaguely aware, or knew of the published failure rates for change
initiatives. If they were aware of these statistics, they did not place much value on them.
Some neither believed nor agreed that the high failure rates were valid. As P04 noted:
I was not aware of the failure rates for change and was not trying to be
interested in knowing what everybody else’s failure rates were. I am not
sure there is any value in knowing that. There are many reasons that
companies do not get sold, but I guess all that matters, in the end, is
whether you are sold or not. That is the ultimate measure of success or
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failure when it comes to selling your business. Either you sold it for a
multiple people are satisfied with, or you missed, and you can blame it on
whatever you want, but in my case, selling a company required good
execution on lots of levels. So, no, I am not aware of the failure
percentages. I think that is the kind of thing that knowing would not help.
All it does is make you more nervous about the outcome than you are
already. (P04)
P01 related the failure rates in change to the failure rates in ERP implementations,
considering ERP implementation merely one form of transformational CM. She
recognized the potentiality for failure but considered it less important than a dedicated
focus on results. She saw a dedicated team of positive, collaborative managers to work
with as an important contribution to successful project outcomes. Her description was
To me, an ERP implementation is just one of many different forms of CM
initiative. If you are not investing in something, then it is operations. It
does not CM. People will say you do not need to do such and such; the
existing process works just fine. Then what you are telling me is that your
normal operations are sufficient to continue to achieve your growth
objectives, your revenue objectives, to satisfy your customers, and so on.
That position, to me, means you are running the business. To me, the
biggest failure occurs when the change initiative is a write-off. How you
avoid that circumstance is most important. You let it get to that level, you
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deal with issues when they are small. By the time they become a big
problem, it is almost impossible to “right the ship” so to speak. I have
worked places where there were write-offs. None for which I was
personally responsible, thankfully, but I respect companies that do not
punish people for failing because nobody in those companies wants to take
risks. However, with that said, you cannot keep making the same mistakes
over and over again. There are penalties for failure. (P01)
Every response to questions about the published failure rates was similar to those
of P04 and P01. Those who were aware of the published rates downplayed them as
though they were of less importance than completing the change initiative for which they
were responsible. P02 did not know what the published failure rates were and did not
want to know. He considered that knowledge counterproductive. Change was going to
happen regardless of the published failure rates, and that change required leadership. P09
did not pay attention to failure rates; he just continued to push his organization until
completing the changes. P03 never mentioned a potential for failure; he had a
methodology he followed to induce change, and he followed it. Most of the participants
had seen or heard about the failure rates but did not look for literature documenting
change failures. All of the participants knew what they had to do and did it.
Sub-question 3. The third sub-question in this study was
How, given the extraordinarily high potential for failure, do these leaders
continue to exercise CM practices successfully in their organizations?
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As previously noted, most participants were either unaware or only vaguely aware
of the high failure rates reported for CM. They continued to lead their initiatives without
considering the published failure rates. However, when asked, they were mostly aware of
Kotter’s (1996/2010) reported causes for CM failure. These participants provided
leadership, addressed problems and challenges, maintained open communication, and
drove toward success. They went beyond recognizing that change should be a focus. CM
was considered a distinct factor in business and organizational operations requiring
leadership and management in the course of continuing operations. Change was
considered unavoidable, and the participants dealt with it as it occurred. The focus of
participant efforts was on the results expected from starting a change initiative in the first
place, not on the processes or practices of change leadership, especially as reported in the
literature. They were more inclined to identify problems and develop solutions as
proactive leaders than they were to study failure rates and their causes. As P04 said,
knowing the failure rates served no purpose other than to frighten. He would rather not
know these rates and continue working toward success rather than study the literature for
insight into what causes failure.
Additional situational themes. Several secondary themes emerged from a few
participants. These were more situational than the primary themes noted above and
unique to certain aspects of CM. Circumstances drove some of the projects that included
them; others were strategies, tactics, behaviors, or practices that the participant found
useful as part of their leadership practices. For example; two participants addressed the
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need for culture CM; two used organizational performance measurements to drive
change; two who understood transformational change as compared to routine or regular
change once explained saw all change as continuous and never-ending. These themes are
shown in Table 4 and elaborated in the following text.
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Table 4
Additional Situational Themes
Major Theme

Respondents

Definition

1. Changed Individual
Programs, such as
Marketing, Information
Management systems,
Performance Tracking
systems, and so on.

100%

Diverted attention to operational
dynamics or some other imperative
that drove the need for change.

2. Broke the Change up into
separate programs

40%

Defined the change initiative as a
program of many smaller projects,
each sufficiently low-level to avoid
a need for higher level scrutiny or
senior leadership involvement.

3. Managed up and managed
the informal leadership

60%

Actively sought to influence
organization leadership outside of
their chain-of-command to foster a
positive reaction and acceptance.
This included informal leaders,
those employees who by their
personalities or roles influenced
how the organization accepted
changes.

4. Established and Posted
Metrics for Progress
Reporting

20%

Defined and publicly displayed
operational performance metrics
that demonstrated strategic or
tactical improvements in
operations, attributable to the
changes.

5. Recognized Change as a
Constant

30%

Recognized the circular nature of
change, where one change causes
another change, which in turn
causes another until eventually the
original change must be changed
again. These leaders recognized
the continuous, never-ending
cyclical nature of change.
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Changed individual programs, such as marketing, information systems, and so on.
All of the transformational change initiatives discussed focused on a particular part of the
organization. A practice used by several leaders was to focus their planning and
execution for change on a neutral or entirely new structure or process, thereby avoiding
the angst change participants might feel over the not invented here syndrome. For
example, P01 focused the change leadership team on operational goals. Their change
initiative was to install ERP software across an international organization of more than
7,000 people. The software would improve operational dynamics such as reduce
inventories and increase inventory turns. Thus reducing inventory carrying costs;
improved efficiencies in production operations so that products were in production a
shorter period; improved efficiency in taking orders from customers and managing them
through the systems, thereby reducing the potential for mistakes and rejects upon
delivery; and so on. P01 focused the change initiative team on those types of metrics.
Without this sort of focus on characteristics such as these, organization staff members
often feel an investment in the existing systems and processes to such a degree that they
find new systems and processes threatening.
Participants addressed the potential for resistance by employing external
philosophies, designs, or other tools that replaced the invented here systems and
processes. For example, P06 redefined the markets, an act that drove change throughout
the organization. Every functional aspect of the organization changed. Another example
was P02, who focused his organization on the requirements of the ITIL. This changed
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focus changed the paradigm for information technology management in the organization.
The organization membership became so engrossed in learning to operate under ITIL
requirements that they had less time to worry about or defend the old systems and
processes they were replacing. Some other examples: four participants changed their
organization’s marketing programs. Four individuals changed their information systems,
two changed their products and services, two focused on culture change, and one focused
on preparing an organization for sale. Only one focused on changing everything.
All participants recognized the difference between CM and transformational CM.
The examples used in every interview were transformational change initiatives. The
participants recognized that change which is less than transformational is more routine
and incidental, needing less formal leadership or management effort. This change is more
evolutionary and localized. Routine change that is not transformational occurs in the
normal flow of operations and is dealt with locally and circumstantially by the people
affected by that change. As P04 stated, “A change in the ordinary process of business
operations is just that, an ordinary change. The people managing the changing process or
dynamic should be able to handle it as a matter of routine” (P04). He recognized that
there are changes that are more comprehensive that require planning and roll-out or
execution management, such as a shift in the market, an ERP installation, buying (and
merging) or selling (and divesting) a business unit, but most change is minor or simple.
Changes such as redefining a product component, adjusting the workflow of one
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particular process, changing a report layout, and so on, are routine and the responsible
manager should be able to resolve them in their day-to-day work.
Broke the change up into separate programs. Four participants (40%) conducted
their change initiatives by splitting the requirements into multiple separate programs and
projects that ultimately delivered the expected results. Different reasons existed for this,
but the tactic was common. The approach was particularly evident in information systems
initiatives. For example, P02 ran each plant conversion as a separate project. They were
all defined similarly but replaced disparate systems and procedures and needed to address
each case differently. P05 broke his initiative into multiple projects because that made the
whole initiative less visible to detractors, less apparent as it happened, and delivered
transformational change without the social stress often seen in these sorts of projects.
Each small project was a routine change, but together, they were transformational. P05’s
initiative quietly replaced a 35-year-old information system of a major university. The
organization completed the change without realizing the scope until done.
Managed up and managed the informal leadership. Six participants (60%)
expressed a need to manage up, that is to structure their leadership to influence senior
leaders outside their chain-of-command. This need again was most apparent in the
information technology projects, where senior leadership tended to be less involved in
leading the change. Program managers developed tactics to bring them into the process
and thereby exhibit their support for the changes as they occurred. Two participants noted
the importance of managing the informal leadership, those individuals who while not
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members of management, held sway over the organization based on their informal
leadership capacity within the rank-and-file of the organization. They were the respected
leaders of the social structure, the grapevine, that could derail a project by criticizing or
campaigning against it, even though they had no managerial responsibility in the
organization.
Established and posted metrics for progress reporting. Two participants (20%)
established and posted metrics for progress reporting. That is, they made operational
performance metrics the goals and the organizations focused more on achieving those
metrics than they did on the changes themselves. For example, P01 focused the
organization on inventory control. A reduction in inventory carried can result from
improved efficiency in purchasing, receiving, storage, issue control, control while in
production, and control in shipping to customers. It is represents increased inventory
turnover, reduced inventories on-hand, and reduced carrying costs. A well-written ERP
system can significantly impact these measures by offering visibility to them. Similarly,
P08 worked with his marketing people to develop key performance indicators (KPIs).
These were simply running compilations of numbers of orders taken, by whom, number
of complaints, and so on, that could collectively demonstrate the success of order entry
personnel in taking orders without cancellations. These examples enabled change
acceptance because those changes enabled operational personnel to achieve their goals
better. This approach was again, a tactic that avoided the possibility of resistance among
the rank-and-file staff of the organization.
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Recognized change as a constant. Three participants recognized change as a
constant that is a routine part of management responsibility. Two recognized
transformational change as a unique requirement that occurs from time to time. P02
recognized change as continuous, noting that one change drives out another, which in
turn drives another, and so on until the latest change drives a change in the first change
that started the cycle. He saw change, even transformational change, as continuous,
cyclical, and an organization needed to prepare itself to forever change. P04 had
difficulty with understanding transformational change at the start, for this same reason.
He saw change as a constant that is always happening, and CM is just another skill that
any good manager has as part of his or her managerial skill set. He recognized that there
could be major changes needing a higher level of leadership, planning, and execution but
that most change is simple, localized to the process in which it is occurring, and the
responsibility of the manager in charge of that process. P07 was the only participant that
recognized the distinction between change and transformational change, without needing
an explanation. The program he presented was transformational change, the process of
changing a culture from a flat performing organization to a driven organization that
sought ever higher levels of business and performance through change.
Summary
This chapter included a description of the research study conduct, and the results
noted. This presentation included a description of the pilot study, the approach to data
collection, the process used to reduce the findings to their general themes, including
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descriptions for how participants supported those themes, and how the themes relate to
the research question and sub-questions posed in Chapter 1. Most notable was the fact
that the descriptions demonstrate how successful transformational change leaders plan
and execute their change initiatives.
The stories that participants provided represented the leadership of
transformational change very differently from what was expected, after having read the
literature presented in Chapter 2. The strategies, tactics, behaviors, and practices
exercised by the participants in this study, all successful transformational change leaders,
were different or applied differently from the strategies, tactics, behaviors, and practices
recommended by the authors and practitioners studied and presented in Chapter 2. Some
of these leaders were aware of the findings suggested by the Chapter 2 sources, but none
showed any signs that they had studied those recommendations and applied them to their
work. These participants did things differently. These successful transformational change
leaders suggested that what the authorities in CM present, is not the most critically
important aspects of planning, organizing, and executing transformational change.
In short, a summary of how the research questions were answered by study
participants follows in Table 5;
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Table 5
Research Question Summary
Research Questions

Summary Answers

Overarching How did employee change leaders,
Question
responsible for delivering results in
CM initiatives, live through their
experiences of CM success,
specifically, to be held accountable
for achieving the results of planned
change, to experience the culture of
change, and accomplish the results
forecasted in their planning the
change process?

Employee change managers were
proactive, collaborative leaders, that
developed qualified teams of leaders
around them who were equally
qualified, proactive and collaborative.
They did not respond to the literature
and were mostly unaware of what
was in the literature.

Research Sub-Questions
1.

What behaviors and other practices
did internal change leaders seem to
exercise, what did they do
differently from what external
change practitioners suggest, that
results in CM success?

Some approaches were similar to
external recommendations but not
because participants were aware of
them. Some used novel approaches,
specific to their project contexts.

2.

What meaning did employee
change leaders attribute to the high
failure rates in CM and how did
these leaders show through their
lived experiences that they avoided
them?

Employee change leaders were
mostly unaware of high failure rates.
They did not avoid them, did not
entertain them. Failure was not an
option so they did not fail.

3.

How, given the extraordinarily
high potential for failure, do these
leaders continue to exercise CM
practices successfully in their
organizations?

All were successful change leaders.
They never had and did not expect to
fail. They were confident in their
ability to succeed.

Every author and practitioner cited in Chapter 2 suggested different organizational
dynamics in CM that contributed, in their opinions, to CM success. Their solutions were
different from what a majority of the study participants said made them successful, or at
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least the study participants applied concepts found in Chapter 2 differently. A comparison
of the differences noted between the practices of successful change leaders and what
expert authors and practitioners in the industry of CM recommended follows in an
interpretation of the findings in Chapter 5. This comparison includes the limitations of the
study; recommendations beyond this research; a discussion of the implications of these
findings; and their implications for social change, future research, and practice.
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Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations
This study explored the experiences of successful employee change leaders to
understand how they make change happen and achieve their planned results. I compared
these results to the literature to see if these change leaders exercised strategies, tactics,
behaviors, and practices that matched what seminal authors in CM suggested. Modern
CM philosophy has existed more than 60 years. Authors, such as Burke (2014), Conner
(2012), Kotter (2014), Schein (2010), and many others, suggest that 70% of change
initiatives fail. This statistic seems extraordinary, given that the field of CM has such a
long history and widespread interest.
That high failure rates persist, despite the significant investment in it over those
60 years seems implausible. Most Universities teach CM in their curriculums. Many
management consulting firms, including practices in the largest firms in the management
consulting business, specialize in CM. Two professional career disciplines exist for CM:
the business systems Change Manager and the OD specialist. Thousands of people make
businesses of CM. There are Hundreds of books and thousands of articles published
about the amelioration of change failure, yet the 70% statistic does not seem to change.
Given that, organizational leaders still lead successful change initiatives. Starting
transformational change does not seem prudent to a manager whose career success might
hinge on one failure where the failure probability is that high.
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The findings of this study are reported and summarized in Chapter 4 of this
dissertation. The basic answers to the research questions are the summary of the research
findings and are represented here in Table 6.
Table 6
Research Question Summary
Research Questions

Summary Answers

Overarching How did employee change leaders,
Question
responsible for delivering results in
CM initiatives, live through their
experiences of CM success,
specifically, to be held accountable
for achieving the results of planned
change, to experience the culture of
change, and accomplish the results
forecasted in their planning the
change process?

Employee change managers were
proactive, collaborative leaders, that
developed qualified teams of leaders
around them who were equally
qualified, proactive and collaborative.
They did not respond to the literature
and were mostly unaware of what
was in the literature.

Research Sub-Questions
1.

What behaviors and other practices
did internal change leaders seem to
exercise, what did they do
differently from what external
change practitioners suggest, that
results in CM success?

Some approaches were similar to
external recommendations but not
because participants were aware of
them. Some used novel approaches,
specific to their project contexts.

2.

What meaning did employee
change leaders attribute to the high
failure rates in CM and how did
these leaders show through their
lived experiences that they avoided
them?

Employee change leaders were
mostly unaware of high failure rates.
They did not avoid them, did not
entertain them. Failure was not an
option so they did not fail.

3.

How, given the extraordinarily
high potential for failure, do these
leaders continue to exercise CM
practices successfully in their
organizations?

All were successful change leaders.
They never had and did not expect to
fail. They were confident in their
ability to succeed.
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This study interviewed several employee change leaders to learn what they did to
achieve success, to learn how they viewed change, and how they saw the purported
failure rates. These interviews provided the data for this dissertation. The study used an
empirical phenomenological approach. The research design followed an exhaustive
literature review that showed what scholars, consultants, and other external resources
believed were the strategies and tactics that organizations should use to achieve
successful change. The data collection process allowed study participants to tell their
stories about how they succeeded, then distilled the essence of those stories into
explanatory insights. The literature review did not answer the basic questions noted
above, or the research questions posed in Chapter 1. The analysis showed that successful
working change leaders viewed change differently from what the literature suggested.
The strategies, tactics, behaviors, and practices exercised by the leaders in this
study were different from those recommended by scholars and other seminal thinkers in
change management. The differences are significant. This chapter presents an
interpretation of these findings, the limitations of the study, and recommendations for
further research. It then closes with a discussion of the implications of this study,
particularly their impact on positive social change. The chapter closes with conclusions
drawn from the discoveries noted in this research.
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Interpretation of Findings
The strategies, tactics, behaviors, and practices exercised by the leaders in this
study were different from those recommended by scholars, authors, and other seminal
thinkers in CM.
The literature, the published body of knowledge about CM, exists in both
scholarly publications and popular business books and articles. This literature addresses a
mature discipline of business and social science dating back to the work of Kurt Lewin
(1997/2010) in the mid 20th century. All of the literature found came from scholars and
consultants, qualified but external to the organizations that execute transformational
change. While these individuals were technically competent and thorough in their
findings, they had limited involvement in the culture of the organizations they wrote
about, particularly regarding their responsibility to successful outcomes. They tend to
write about what they perceive as contributors to successful change, but do not recognize
the social and political aspects of survival in the organization beyond the position of
responsibility for achieving change results. There appeared to be a lack of published
opinion by working organization leaders. Unlike the literature, executive-level employees
of working organizations expressed the findings here. These are the people who exercise
the practices and behaviors that influence the culture of the organizations that employ
them. They are committed and subject to experience the consequences of failure. They
were not just there; they were culturally connected. They had a responsibility beyond
leading change initiatives and were sensitive to their continued participation in the
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organization, beyond their responsibility to achieve results in transformational change
initiatives. They were more vulnerable to criticism and censure by the formal and
informal social organizations where they worked. Their status might jeopardize or change
their performance, they would be sensitive to that fact and might adjust their approaches
to obtaining results.
This study began with a CM literature review of transformational change theory;
that is, change that affects organizational vision; the strategic plans, design, structure,
culture, products, and services simultaneously. It is a major change that when finished,
redefines how the organization exists and operates to serve its markets, clients, or
customers. The literature review in Chapter 2 noted a lack of representation in the
literature by working leaders within changing organizations. For example, Kotter
(1996/2010) indicated that he based his discovery on the approximately 100 companies
he had worked with over the 15-year period before his publication but did not identify
those organizations. The scope of the study in Chapter 4 was to review successful
transformational change initiatives of small to large business organizations and see if they
followed the theories in the literature or did something different. They used strategies and
tactics expressed in the literature but saw them differently. The study design was
phenomenological research. I interviewed ten leaders of change initiatives, senior
executive employees in their respective organizations of various sizes, industries, and
locations across the Continental U.S. These interviews were free-flowing discussions of
how they achieved transformational change in their respective organizations. While ten
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participants are a small quantity for establishing generalizability, they represent a good
cross-section of senior organization leadership. Generalizability might be concerning
from this participant group, but only because the findings are so different from what was
said by the authors in the literature review, caution suggests that further study to
corroborate these findings is warranted. The study stopped at 10 participants because of
perceived saturation, as defined by Giorgi (1997). The study quickly sorted into a set of
themes that were common to most or all participants. There were also situationally
unique themes that while not as common, responded to a higher-level idea for focusing
organizations on outcomes rather than on change. Participants exercised what seemed a
common practice, which was to plan for expected results or outcomes and to focus the
change initiatives on those results rather than on the execution of the change. With 10
participants there were ten different approaches, which distilled to the five situational
themes.
The findings in this study neither confirmed nor disconfirmed what the literature
indicated were the strategies and tactics that allow change management success. Many of
the strategies used by study participants were similar to those found in the literature
review, but the study participants apparently acquired their knowledge through other
means than studying change management literature. For those themes in the research that
were similar to the strategies recommended by change management authors, their
interpretations of those themes were different from how the literature review authors
presented them. The findings of this study indicated that what the literature professes is
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required to bring about success while similar, is not how successful change leaders effect
change. The study findings were different from the literature for how the study
participants applied the strategies, tactics, behaviors, and practices used to ensure CM
success. Overall, the participants in this study appeared aggressively focused on success
without regard to what causes failure. The scholars and industry writers seemed more
focused on identifying the causes of failure and defining strategies for their avoidance.
This section offers an interpretation of the major themes found in this study. These
themes are shown again in Table 5 in the following results section. Situational themes
noted by the study participants are identified later in Table 6 of this section with a
discussion of their importance to the study. Those situational themes were the more
common strategies used to maintain a focus on results, rather than on change per se. The
results section that follows discusses the findings, the themes found in Chapter 4.
Results
Research Question
This section presents an interpretation of the findings shown in Chapter 4. It
shows the themes identified in the Chapter 4 analysis by representing the themes in Table
5 and 6, followed by an interpretation for each. For clarification, the overarching research
question that was the basis of this study was:
How do employee change leaders, responsible for delivering results in CM
initiatives, live their experiences of CM success, specifically, to be held
accountable for achieving the results of planned change, to experience the
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culture of change, and accomplish the results forecasted in planning the
change process?
Table 7
Overarching Themes
Major Theme

Respondents

Definition

6. Collaborative Leadership

90%

Strong, proactive, qualified, selfstarting, collaborative leaders
incented to do the work of getting
others to execute plans and achieve
goals.

7. Open Communication

80%

Formal and informal
communications structured to
encourage open, candid, nonpunitive communication between
team members and with the total
organization, focused on success.

8. Defined Expected
Outcomes

70%

Redefined plans and operations
around new business objectives for
the organization, then executed to
achieve the new design.

9. Changed Organization
Focus

60%

Changed product and service
offerings to the extent that what they
offered their clients and customers
was something new and different
from what they offered before
changing.

10. Recognized Change
Necessity

50%

Recognized continuous change as an
imperative, and the risk for failure if
they did not change.
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Discussion. A majority of participants expressed the themes listed in Table 5 as
the primary contributors to the success of their change initiatives. These themes seemed
exercised differently from what the authors cited in the literature review in Chapter 2
suggested. In general, the theorists focused more on strategies derived to counter
transformational change failure. For example, Kotter (1996/2010) recognized that
leadership is instrumental in exercising the strategies he recommended. His
recommendation for leadership was to build a strong guiding coalition with sufficient
position power to block those left out from disrupting the changes. The team makeup
should include enough expertise to enable intelligent decisions, with enough credibility to
be taken seriously by the rest of the organization, and enough leadership to drive the
change process. Most importantly, Kotter recommended that the guiding coalition
membership be able to work in tandem, using teamwork. He recommended not including
high ego individuals and troublemakers, those individuals prone to creating an
atmosphere of distrust and conflict. The study participants also indicated strong,
committed, collaborative leadership as instrumental in their success. However, they did
not go into the detail that Kotter did to describe requirements for good team member
qualifications. They described the importance of the leader's continuous influence to
follow through to see end goals achieved. They did not cite Kotter or other theorists to
explain the importance of committed, proactive, collaborative leadership. The study

242
participants were senior, experienced, qualified leaders. The earned their leadership
through years of experience at top levels in organizations.
Kotter (1996/2010) based his eight strategies on responses to eight errors that he
said characterized failed projects. These failures were drawn from his experiences. This
study showed the perspectives of participants who have led successful projects, embodied
in the themes shown in Table 5. They did not see the eight errors Kotter professed that
failing change initiative leaders exercised, or these leaders did not commit those errors, or
they corrected and eliminated them as potential problems during the courses of planning
and executing their projects. It seemed the study participants intuitively avoided the
problems noted by Kotter in the preceding paragraph. They exercised what Kotter
recommended, but not because they had read or given credibility to Kotter’s findings. Of
course, there are many ways that Kotter’s suggestions for selecting change initiative
leadership might have made their way into the participant’s project plans. Only one
participant indicated he was aware of Kotter’s materials, and then only when asked. It is
possible that the literature review recommendations came into the projects through some
round-about way. Someone else in the organization or program leadership might have
read change management materials or exercised them in other places where Kotter’s,
Burke’s (2014), or Schein’s (2010), or other’s suggestions were applied. The example
noted for Kotter’s leadership step seemed similarly true for every theme expressed by the
participants and will be discussed in more detail in the following sections. They were
exercising practices found in the literature review, but they had come to the knowledge of
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those practices independently, without necessarily, knowledge of or experience with the
writings cited in the literature review.
Both Burke (2014) and Schein (2010) emphasized the perspective of culture
change and described approaches to avoid failure due to a failure to effect a change in
culture. Ackerman Anderson and Anderson (2010) suggested strategies that would avoid
failure while following the 7-S model. Their discussion of culture change was limited to
changing the mindset of the leadership. The 7-S model was developed by Peters and
Waterman (1982/2012) while employed at McKinsey, a management consulting firm
with a CM practice. Many of the theorists cited in Chapter 2 either recognized leadership
as a precursor to their methodology or did not acknowledge it as a requirement for
success. Many of the methodologies presented seemed more tactical than behavioral,
rooted in observations of failed projects. Their methodologies presented strategies,
tactics, and behaviors that they felt could create success and avoid failure. For example,
Kotter suggested that if change leaders exercised his eight steps in their projects, he
believed they would be more likely to succeed in their change initiatives. If change
leaders exercised change within the McKinsey 7-S framework, as instructed by
McKinsey (Peters & Waterman, 1982/2012) or by Anderson and Ackerman Anderson
(2010) their change initiative would likely succeed. If change leaders exercised culture
change as prescribed by Burke (2014) or Schein (2010), both of whom expanded Lewin’s
(1997/2010) three-phase approach to three-phase, seven-step approaches, successful
culture change was more probable, which would, in turn, lead to change initiative
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success. While the change recommendations noted in the literature review and the
practices of the study participants were similar, there was no clear linkage between them.
The remainder of this section presents a description of these themes and how they are
different from what the literature showed could lead to successful change.
Collaborative leadership. Nine participants (90%) considered this aspect of
leading change critically important. As participant P01 said,
it all boils down to strong and present leadership. It is common goals, incentive to
perform the work, strong and present leadership, complementary skill sets, and
enough of them to get the job done. If you do not have them all; change will not
happen.
P01 was adamant that collaborative leadership is more than strong leadership; it is
committed, collaborative leadership working together with team peers and others to
achieve the goals of the change initiative. The emphasis on collaboration was important.
None of these participants felt that a strong, top-down, directive-in-nature, leadership
style, a hierarchical organization control structure, would lead to success. Several
participants stated this in their efforts to express the importance of collaboration and
teamwork. Several participants actively trained their leadership teams to be proactive,
take-charge leaders who would collaborate with affected personnel to achieve planned
outcomes. Other participants selected their program and project team members, what
Kotter (1996/2010) called the guiding coalition, because they exhibited proactive,
collaborative behavior. They were not only take-charge leaders in the first place; they
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involved people in decision and execution processes as participants. Most of the
resources in the literature review recognized the importance of leadership to achieving
success but more as a prerequisite for participation than as the collaborative requirement
expressed by the study participants.
Open communication. Eight of the 10 participants (80%) indicated the importance
of ongoing, continuous communication and status reporting as their projects progressed.
Study participants were adamant about continuous, ongoing, open, candid
communication with everyone in the organization who was involved with, connected in
some way to, an observer or of stakeholder in the change initiative. They included
programs such as regularly scheduled town hall meetings over the life of their projects.
They scheduled both mandatory and voluntary training sessions to keep the transition
front-of-mind for all personnel. They established performance criteria, which they
frequently measured and reported publicly. These tactics were part of ongoing,
continuous communication programs to keep change activity at the forefront of day-today interaction throughout their organizations. None of the literature authors expressed
communication needs to this extent. The closest anyone came was Conner (2012), who
discussed how the organization membership might perceive change based on their culture
and might interpret a message differently from what was intended when communicated to
them. Kotter’s (1996/2010) titled his fourth step as communicating the change vision
which is one part of a communication plan such as suggested here. Kotter’s approach
suggested that his guiding coalition define a vision then communicate that vision to the
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affected organization. He focused entirely on communicating the vision with little
attention to how to keep the vision alive throughout the change process. I used Kotter’s
example as typical of external resources, the scholars and consultants who offered
theories for how to effect change successfully. They tended to limit communication to the
initial message of a vision or a need for change. The study participants viewed ongoing,
continuous, open communication throughout the life of their initiatives, and even beyond,
as critical to success. They seemed to view ongoing communication more important than
disseminating the initial vision.
Defining expected outcomes. Seven of the 10 participants (70%) defined expected
outcomes as part of their planning processes. These outcomes served several purposes.
The first was to give those people who needed to change a clear, personal vision as to
where they were expected to fit in the organization after the changes. Changing personnel
may have had a better grasp of what they needed to do, what was expected, to change
satisfactorily after having set these sorts of goals. Change plans were more manageable
because expected outcomes were defined at fairly detailed lower levels, in some cases at
the individual performance level. Several participants pointed out that they could move
quickly through their change plans because outcomes were predefined. There is a point in
the execution of change where it becomes more evolutionary than revolutionary, and
quickly executing plans is important to avoiding the evolutionary trap. That is the sense
of apathy that comes with the lack of excitement while project work is underway and the
project seems to have evolved into a slow evolution instead of revolutionary progress. It

247
was important to sustain excitement and interest within the organization, such that
seemingly slow, non-productive activity momentum did not become prevalent. It was
obsessing over the get it done now mindset, before the organization lost interest and
dismissed the change as another brainstorm of management, with the rank-and-file
employee deciding that their continued involvement was not important. None of the
theorists mentioned in Chapter 2 addressed ongoing management of execution at this
level.
Changed organization focus. Six participants (60%) changed the focus of their
organizations. The changes they initiated were so significant that their organizations were
something new and different from when they started their change. The organizations had
different visions, structures, staffing, business processes, offered different products and
services, and served different markets or the same markets differently. In some cases, the
changed vision was predefined, and the organization saw it as a matter of execution. In
other cases, the organization defined the changed vision. In one case, the organization
defined the changed vision then gave that vision to the guiding coalition in a way that the
guiding coalition believed the vision as if they discovered it themselves. Among the
remaining four participants, while they did not change the primary focus of their
organizations, they made significant changes to the underlying operations that supported
their missions and how they achieved their operational goals. These changes were
transformational in the sense that they changed major business processes. For example,
participant P01 changed how transaction processing occurred through the organization,
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thereby improving operations and customer service. Participant P02 changed how IT
supported the various operational functions of the organization, improving and
standardizing internal operational support across the entire company. This improvement,
in turn, expanded the company’s ability to support its markets and other stakeholders.
Recognized change as a necessity. Five participants (50%) expressed the
importance of recognizing the need for change as a prerequisite to their projects. Most
participants needed changes defined for them before starting, but these five began their
initiatives by defining the necessary changes before starting. These five participants
recognized operational requirements beyond the changes themselves, as driving forces
that demanded change. They began their efforts by recognizing that fact. For example,
participant P09 was able to effect change in spite of heavy resistance among the senior
management. His change program was to centralize administrative and engineering
design activities across all seven plants in his organization. This recognition was critical
to company survival to remain competitive in their markets. Participant P09 recognized
this need and convinced his board of directors of the change required to ensure this
survival. In another example, participant P10 was hired to correct a problem where an
EEP at a major university had lost its position of leadership. The program was losing
money as it continued operations. The need for profitability and a reorganization that
offered a curriculum that appealed to large business organizations such as General
Motors and AT&T drove the need for change. Every change initiative had external
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drivers like these, and the five participants used those drivers to plan and execute the
change initiatives they led.
Sub-question 1
The research question drove three sub-questions. The first sub-question addresses
the same themes as the overarching question, but from a different perspective. Employee
leaders were members of and connected to the social culture of their organizations. They
exercised behaviors and practices to effect performance from their peers and subordinates
without offending them in such a way as to lose their trust and respect. Their
relationships with their organizations were long-term relationships. Whatever way they
directed their business, they did so while maintaining positive social and personal
relationships for the longer term. This section discusses these behaviors and practices.
Research sub-question 1 was:
What behaviors and other practices do internal change leaders seem to
exercise, what do they do differently from what external change
practitioners suggest, that results in CM success?
Discussion. A problem noted in the literature review was a lack of reporting about
the behaviors and practices successful change leaders exercised to control progress
toward their desired outcomes. These leaders connected to the cultures of their
organizations in ways that external resources would not. Not only did they proactively
lead and direct the activity for which they were responsible, but they also did so in ways
that retain the respect and trust of their superiors, peers, and subordinates. They led their
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part of the organization, achieved the results planned as objectives of their work while
maintaining the trust and respect of the organizational membership. There are
circumstances where a leader might need to exhibit strong command-and-control
behaviors, to push people with a very directive-in-nature style. At other times the leader
might need to use more democratic or socially interactive methods, building consensus
around a direction or decision, using softer social interaction to obtain agreement with a
direction or decision from peers and subordinates. The literature talked about the need to
be sensitive to the needs of the organization, to agree with the changes and expected
outcomes, but did not discuss how leaders did this. For example, Kotter (1996/2010)
indicated the need to develop and communicate a changed vision. He provided a list of
tactics for each of his eight steps but discusses these at a relatively high and impersonal
level. Kotter recognized that his guiding coalition would develop a vision, that this
process worked best with teamwork, that creative thinking was needed, that creating a
vision was a process that happened over time and ended with a product that represented a
desirable future. He did not address how to involve people in doing this wholeheartedly,
willingly, to become connected to and part of the vision as it was rolled out. He did not
address how to sustain this involvement until the vision is realized and did not indicate
how the change leader retained the trust and respect of the organization culture as they
went through the exercises he described. The following discussion tells how the
participants did this. The study suggested that there is more to exercising leadership than
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simply directing action and expecting results. Some relationships need preservation
beyond the completion of a change initiative.
Collaborative leadership. All participants (100%) described behaviors and
practices they exercised as they associated with superiors, peers, and subordinates to get
done the things that needed getting done. Some behaviors were forthright and obvious;
some were subtler applications of leadership. Some of the subtlety was obscured to the
point of seeming manipulative, focused on successful outcomes for the change initiative
while avoiding conflict, resistance, or negative impact. For example, participant P01
recruited people she had worked with before in similar projects. A significant part of the
core team had worked with P01 at past employers and knew how to approach changing
the organization as a team. Both participants P01 and P03 empowered their subordinates
to make decisions to, in turn, assume a role of leadership. That required these participants
to assume ownership of the changes and to defend the activities of their teams as they
implemented change. The staff was leadership trained and participated in program
development at levels where they knew and agreed with the visions for their respective
organizations.
Participant P03 empowered his project team to effect change and lead the
organization through an ERP implementation. The home office leadership, culturally
removed from the organization where P03 worked, disagreed with the proposed
approaches, the processes and provisions needed to effect the change. P03 ran blocking
maneuvers designed to distance the home-office leadership of his company from the
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change activity. He protected the project team from home office interference by
maintaining communications in a way to satisfy status reporting at the home office, while
directing his project team to do what was necessary to complete the project successfully,
regardless of instructions from the home office.
Participant P09, CEO of a manufacturing organization, encountered significant
resistance from senior management, district and plant managers, under his supervision.
The company had a policy that avoided employee terminations and layoffs. This policy
was so ingrained that the average longevity of employment was over 30 years with the
company. P09 encouraged the resistant managers to retire and replaced them by
promoting more cooperative leaders into those top positions. In every case, the
participants provided proactive leadership while empowering subordinates to act
decisively, in turn, to achieve the goals of the change initiatives
Open communication. Eight participants (80%) described behaviors and practices
that enhanced open communication among peers and subordinates as they led their
change initiatives. These participants provided frequent, open, continuous, candid
communication throughout their entire organizations, and especially to those within the
organization who were affected by changes. For example, participant P04 scheduled allhands meetings at least bi-weekly. These meetings were to ensure the entire organization
was up to date on the progress of the change initiative (the sale of the company to a new
owner). Additionally, he scheduled frequent one-on-one meetings with individuals in the
organization, and as the organization grew closer to its transition to new owners, he
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arranged for the staff to meet their counterparts at the new company. This openness
resulted in the entire staff, including those who would not move to the new company,
remaining on board through the sale and working for the betterment of the company.
Participant P05, an assistant vice chancellor at a West Coast University, had a
unique challenge. If senior leadership became involved in the decision making and
execution process, those decisions and their execution would become entangled in a
highly political and heavily bureaucratic process that would slow down, and could
completely derail, the initiative, putting it at risk for non-completion. That was the nature
of the culture at that school. If progress reports, decision making, and the normal activity
of project administration elevated to senior leadership levels, they became objects of
never-ending discussion without resolution among that leadership until they lost to
obscurity, the reasons for knowing about the project. P05 circumvented this by breaking
his program into many small, low-level projects. He and the Chancellor were aware of
the overall program plan from start to finish. Each department head, senior executive, or
dean only knew what was happening in his or her area of responsibility while it was
happening. Reporting that could elevate to senior staff levels was avoided and thus, the
potential for excessive bureaucratic interference reduced.
Participant P06, a school director at a University, had a different problem. His
change program radically redesigned and reorganized an EEP. P06 was selective about to
who was invited to teach the new program and how he communicated the changes that
were occurring. Some tenured faculty members worked in the old program but were
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considered ineligible for the new program. A concern existed, thinking that the tenured
faculty might resist that change. P06 worked quietly, only apprising those faculty
members who would be invited to teach in the new program, thus keeping this knowledge
from those faculty members not invited back. He maintained this posture over the twoyear period it took to transition from the old to the new program. The only people outside
of the new faculty told about this transition were the dean and associate dean of the
university’s business school. Of course, faculty members not selected for the new
program learned about it through informal communication in the social network of the
school, but there was little they could do about it. The dean and administration supported
the changes, and the lack of communication precluded their ability to influence their
inclusion. Between the nature of their reward system, the publish-or-perish paradigm, and
the social sense of political correctness, they were unlikely to object to their exclusion
openly. Open, ongoing communication was used to sustain the interest of those
participants who were part of the change, who were invited to teach the new program,
and thereby included in the new program design process. As in the other cases, P06
controlled communication in a way that kept interest alive while avoiding potential
conflicts.
Defined expected outcomes. Seven participants (70%) described how and why
they defined expected outcomes as part of the planning processes for the change
initiatives they led. This thinking reflected the logic that something not broken did not
need repair. Change for the sake of change was seen as a waste of time and other
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resources. Most employees would know when a change was being made merely for the
sake of change and that the changes add no real value to the organization. People are
smart. When invoking change, the rank-and-file personnel of an organization will know
it’s worth and will dismiss it if they cannot see how it adds value. Change managers
know this and will structure change initiatives around outcomes that offer real added
value. For example, participant P06 completed a market analysis before determining the
need for new programs in the EEP. He determined that enrollments were declining
because the programs they offered were no longer serving their existing markets.
Participant P02, a CIO for an international pharmaceutical company, was
concerned that during his project he would run into resistance in the form of a not
invented here syndrome. The company had multiple plants around the world, each with
its own IT operations that ran independently from the others as well as from centralized
control of the senior leadership of the company. The mission was to centralize IT and
standardize support operations. P02 planned his transition to implement ITIL companywide. ITIL gave the organization an impartial but complete and comprehensive IT
management methodology. Most importantly, all personnel focused on ITIL instead of
aligning to defend various legacy systems and processes, each plant considering their
respective processes as best for the company. The organization focused on outcomes
instead of territorial concerns. This tact is similar to the tactics of the situational themes,
presented later in this chapter.

256
Participant P08, a corporate attorney and new hire, who eventually became Chief
Operating Officer of the organization where he exercised transformational change, took
several months to build relationships of trust and respect before initiating changes. When
he started, the company had been using questionable marketing practices of negative
option marketing. These practices, while not illegal, were aggressive enough to pique the
interest of several states attorneys. Those states attorneys were considering lawsuits over
these practices. When he started, P08 was not seen by other leaders as credible in
defining marketing or operational practices, although he was an attorney specialized in
business law and had several years of experience as a corporate officer in other
businesses. Over time, he earned respect and trust of the senior executives and marketing
leadership of the company. He worked carefully to ensure that the advice he gave was
correct. He did not compete with or critique past work, he just recommended new
procedures that would allay the concerns of the various state’s attorneys who questioned
their marketing practices. This care earned him the trust and respect he needed to change
marketing practices so that the company was not effectively closed down by state's
attorney lawsuits. These examples and others showed that employee leaders needed to
exercise leadership with sensitivity, earning trust and respect from others in their
respective organizations. Sometimes they could invoke more forceful command-andcontrol type leadership, but often they needed to act subtly, earning trust, respect, and
cooperation from their respective organization. They needed sensitivity to their respective
cultures, the social structures of their organizations, to be a friend, and to get results.
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Changed organization focus. Six participants (60%) changed their organization’s
focus. They changed the products and services offered by their organization to the extent
that the organization itself was something different from when they started. For example,
participant P06 completed a market survey that showed a need to revamp the programs
offered by an EEP where he worked. His first task was to convince the senior leadership
that the programs they offered did not meet their market’s needs. The programs he
proposed would fulfill this need better. Part of his implementation was to replace tenured
faculty with adjunct professors, the latter being more interested in teaching than
publishing. He needed to manage this transition in a way that he could successfully
replace staff without offending the senior faculty or the administration. Part of this was,
as previously indicated, to only involve staff and faculty considered for the new programs
and to quietly exclude the rest of the faculty from discussions about the change.
Participant P07 needed to change the culture of the organization where he was
employed. The previous CEO had been a strong command-and-control personality who
had been in charge for about 50 years. Leaders were not proactive, having been subjected
to heavy subordination by the previous CEO. They expected instructions from P07 telling
them what to do, how to do it, and what outcomes P07 expected from their effort. There
were no independent thinkers in the management, which showed how the previous CEO
had run the company. P07 established four teams to deal with specific problems and
charged those teams to develop solutions for operational problems. These teams were a
new products team, a safety team, a quality team, and a cost reduction or productivity
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team. He would not tell the teams what they needed to do but instead, charged them with
defining solutions for problems in each of those areas. The expectation was that they
would tell him what they needed to achieve their goals. This approach was intended to
foment independent thinking among management personnel. The charge of each team
was to develop recommendations for solutions and improvements in their respective
areas. The goal was to inspire creative thinking among the management and self-starting
activity where they would own their recommendations and the correspondent results they
proposed. P07 needed to inspire independent thinking and leadership among a staff that
had not been allowed that behavior in the past. At the end of a 90-day period, they
reported to P07 with their recommendations and plans for implementation. P07 accepted
all recommendations as presented. During that 90-day period, P07 remained intentionally
distant. His goal was to encourage independent thinking and more of a take-charge
attitude or mindset among the management team. The teams presented progress reports
verbally, every 30-days and a final report including recommendations for improvements
at the end of the 90-day period. P07 accepted their recommendations and charged them
with implementing the programs. As a result, the management team accepted
responsibility for these four areas and took ownership of the results generated in each.
The results were good. Workmen’s compensation claims dropped from $500,000 to
$33,000 per year. The top-line growth of the business went from $30 million to $75
million over the ensuing five years, mostly from identifying and offering new products.
The plant installed several millions of dollars worth of new machinery that significantly
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improved productivity and product quality. Most importantly, the management team at
the company, all highly qualified in their fields, took ownership of the business
processes, the growth, and the customer service. They learned to act proactively and to
lead the organization.
Another example is that of participant P01. Participant P01’s project was
implementing an ERP system at a multi-national pharmaceutical company. ERP is
essentially the underlying transaction processing system throughout an organization
design to keep throughput flowing efficiently, allowing workers to do their work without
problems or excess resources. The system not only takes in posted transactions such as
sales orders, purchase orders, inventory withdrawals, and so on; it also maintains the
connections between those types of transactions, so that coordinated processing occurs
and throughput optimized at its most efficient operational levels. ERP is a computerized,
integrated transaction system, developed in a way to balance resource loading and
achieve efficient order processing, procurement, production, shipment, and delivery of
goods and services. The system undergirds business processes established to facilitate
sales order processing, raw material acquisition, inventory management, work-in-process
manipulation, and shipping of finished goods in fulfillment of sales activity. It is a toolset
for managing the business. Measurements such as on-hand inventories, turnover, time to
order completion, work-in-process, products in shipment, and so on, signify the health
and wellbeing of executing the administrative processes underlying the business.
Participant P01 established improvements in these business performance metric reporting
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as the goals of the ERP project, thus focusing the interest in productivity and business
process improvement rather than in the implementation of ERP. The project teams
worked to improve those metrics rather than working to get ERP systems installed and
working. That focus changed the scope of the ERP implementation. It changed the design
of the project. This approach, to focus on something beyond the outcome of the change
initiative itself, assuming that operational improvements signify change, seemed common
in planning and executing change initiatives. In this case, it made project management
easier. It focused on operational outcomes instead of change initiative mechanics, Like
participant P02, who focused on converting management processes to ITIL to avoid the
not-invented-here syndrome, or like participant P06 who focused on profitability and
market share rather than on change programs. Or like participant P07 who focused on
business improvements instead of the need to disrupt the management staff behaviors.
Focusing on higher level outcomes appears to be common.
Recognized change as a necessity. Five participants (50%) recognized change as a
necessity, a constant, and talked about behaviors and practices they exercised to control
this reality in their respective organizations. For example, participant P02 recognized that
change was a constant, a cyclical process where one change leads to another, which leads
to another, ad infinitum until the latest change leads back to the original change, which
must change again. CM is a continuous, never-ending process in organizations.
Participant P04 talked about the fact that change is constant, is just part of the day-to-day
activity of business that any qualified manager should be able to deal with, and if they are
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not capable of managing change, then they are not qualified. P04 recognized that
occasionally there is a major change that requires planning, control, and execution, that
might need an assigned manager due to its complexity, but that is rare. Most change is
relatively routine; a process change at one point or another, packaging changes, market
changes, and so on, that cause an adjustment in an already existing process. When taken
together collectively, the sum of the changes might be major, but most change happens
incrementally and is manageable within the normal routine of business operations.
Participant P09 recognized a need for major change, centralization of
administrative operations as well as new product design and development. He brought in
consultants to help plan and execute these changes. His business was essentially a
collection of job-shops, and every new order was a custom product. However,
centralization reduced design costs and improved customer service responsiveness. While
pushing senior managers into retirement was not an original goal, P09 did this to replace
resistant senior leaders. This participant’s story demonstrated a reality in large projects
and programs that drive much activity due to spontaneous occurrences that arise during
the execution of the project. Transformational change projects typically run longer,
sometimes running years from start to finish, and while in execution, other changes or
influences may occur that affect the original plans. In this case, resistance from senior
management caused leadership to force those who were resistant to retire. That, in turn,
drove out a series of personnel decisions, replacing those individuals who left. The nature
of these types of projects is such that planning is best at a relatively high level, leaving
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much of the detailed execution to contingency planning during the work of following the
plans to achieve the goals of the change.
Sub-question 2
The second of the three sub-questions was to understand how aware participants
were of the published failure rates for change initiatives and their impression of this
statistic. It was surprising is that only a few knew of the 70% claim in the literature. Most
of the participants did not give credence to this statistic. Those participants that had heard
it did not consider it highly in planning and executing their projects. The second subquestion of this study was:
What meaning do employee change leaders attribute to the high failure
rates in CM and how do these leaders show through their lived
experiences to avoid them?
Those participants who were aware of the high failure rates published in the
literature dismissed them. They focused on ensuring success in their projects. As
participant P04 said, he was not interested in knowing about other people’s failures. That
knowledge might scare him enough to hesitate, and because of that hesitation, he might
commit or omit an act that could lead to failure. He was confident in his ability to effect
change and did not want to know about other people’s failures.
Sub-question 3
The third of three sub-questions was meant to identify why change leaders, in
spite of the published failure rates, would continue to pursue transformational change
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initiatives. It would seem that a 70% chance of failure would caution a prudent manager
to avoid change, or at least to avoid being tapped for the leadership of a change initiative.
This avoidance might be particularly true for the employee, who is much more at risk for
negative consequences of change failure than others, external consultants and scholars,
who might be involved in a change initiative. Being held accountable for leading change
might also foster a great degree of careful planning, more than necessary, to ensure that if
the responsible leader were required to lead a change initiative, they would do so in a
way that ensures success. The third sub-question asked;
How, given the extraordinarily high potential for failure, do these leaders
continue to exercise CM practices successfully in their organizations?
Those participants who had thought about this question maintained that change
happens. It is an inevitability, things change, and managers must keep up with those
changes regardless of the inherent risk. That being the case, the participants were
sensitive to ensuring that everyone involved in change was equipped to exercise the
themes noted in Table 5. The participants provided training, mentoring, and personal
coaching to ensure that everyone involved had what they needed to work proactively
towards the change initiative goals. The participants knew that change would happen
regardless of whether they tried to manage it or not, so they proactively tried to control
and manipulate the changes in the best interests of their respective organizations so that
they achieved desired outcomes.
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Some participants questioned the published failure rates in the first place. For
example, participant P02 said he had heard about the failure rates but had never
experienced a project that came anywhere near failure. He had not seen a failed project,
and none of his peers had experienced one either. He was cognizant of the published
failure rate but questioned whether it was real or not. Most participants, however, were
not cognizant or were only vaguely aware of the failure rates commonly found in the
literature.
Additional Situational Themes
The following themes, listed in Table 6, were also noted. Each of these themes
was situational in the sense that they represented unique applications or techniques to
sharpen the focus, the direction of the group charged with carrying out the work of
change. These approaches that participants used as examples of their experiences were
more tactical. Some have been discussed elsewhere as examples of approaches to leading
change initiatives. Each of these themes was situational. The nature of the respective
programs and projects allowed for these themes to exist and for the participants to use
them to help control the change.
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Table 8
Additional Situational Themes
Major Theme

Respondents

Definition

6. Changed Individual
Programs, such as
Marketing, Information
Management systems,
Performance Tracking
systems, and so on.

100%

Diverted attention to operational
dynamics or some other imperative
that drove the need for change.

7. Broke the Change up
into separate programs

40%

Defined the change initiative as a
program of many smaller projects,
each sufficiently low-level to avoid
a need for higher level scrutiny or
senior leadership involvement.

8. Managed up and
managed the informal
leadership

60%

Actively sought to influence
organization leadership outside of
their chain-of-command to foster a
positive reaction and acceptance.
This included informal leaders,
those employees who by their
personalities or roles influenced
how the organization accepted
changes.

9. Established and Posted
Metrics for Progress
Reporting

20%

Defined and publicly displayed
operational performance metrics
that demonstrated strategic or
tactical improvements in operations,
attributable to the changes.

10. Recognized Change as a
Constant

30%

Recognized the circular nature of
change, where one change causes
another change, which in turn
causes another until eventually the
original change must be changed
again. These leaders recognized the
continuous, never-ending cyclical
nature of change.
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Discussion. Each participant exercised behaviors and practices that helped
achieve change. As part of their planning and execution processes, there were several
tactics used to maintain focus on the outcomes of the projects, lessening or softening the
impact of the changes themselves. In many cases, these themes represent ways of
establishing goals that were tantamount to setting up irreversible or no-return situations.
Once the organization had embarked on implementing change, there was no way to go
back.
Changed Individual Programs, such as Marketing, Information Systems, and so
on. Every participant (100%) focused their programs on some operational theme or
characteristic that gave a purpose for the changes. For example, participant P02 was
charged with centralizing information technology operations for a $1 billion
pharmaceutical manufacturer, with several plants around the world, each with their own
independent IT operations. P02 feared that each plant’s IT operation might choose to
defend their respective operational designs, considering their version of operations better
than the others and that they would campaign for their operations model to be adopted by
the other plants. P02 saw this as a potential for conflict and resistance that he wanted to
avoid. He adopted the ITIL standards for administration and operation of IT departments
to overcome this potentiality. By doing this, P02 avoided argument and resistance over
which approach to centralized IT management was best. The ITIL standards provided a
complete system for IT management that the entire organization membership was aware
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of but had not used. P02 avoided the not-invented-here syndrome and facilitated a smooth
transition to a new management model.
Participant P01, as previously noted, directed her project team’s attention to
operational metric improvements. The change initiative became a problem of
implementing ERP in such a way that it effectively improved operational performance,
rather than to just implemented a new ERP system. Participant P06 focused on
improvements that would serve their markets more effectively and profitably. His
redevelopment of EEPs was in response to a market study that showed this as needed,
rather than just recognizing that existing programs were not serving the market
adequately. Participant P08 focused on redefined marketing programs that avoided the
potential for being sued by state’s attorneys, and the concurrent risk, bad publicity, and
expense that sort of activity would add to the organization. Every participant, like these,
found operational requirements beyond the change, goals that needed to be affected by
the change, for the change initiative to be considered a success.
Broke the Change up into separate programs. Four participants (40%) led change
initiatives that were large programs that could be broken up into smaller projects. For
example, participant P05 led an ERP implementation at a large university that had a
highly political and bureaucratic environment, especially at their senior leadership levels.
Any approval process elevated to the chancellor, a school dean, or department director
level, or higher, would get delayed in a painfully slow and circular process of discussion,
negotiation, and renegotiation, without resolution. At this level, the possibility of failure
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existed because of the bureaucratic processes at those senior levels. They could not make
quick or efficient decisions. In fact, they often would not make decisions at all, getting
into an iterative and reiterative cycle of rehash and re-discuss without acting. P05 broke
the implementation into small projects that worked at a very low level. He worked with
one office or department at a time until that part of the implementation was completed. At
any point in time, only the University Chancellor, the Deputy Chancellor, P06, and the
department head or office chairperson actively under implementation knew what was
happening. Even then, department heads and office chairpersons did not know the full
scope of the project. This approach avoided the need to elevate coordinative decisions to
senior levels, where the bureaucracy tended to work against quick decision making. The
entire transition took about three years to complete. In another example, participant P02
centralized operations for six plants located in various markets around the world. The
centralization project at each plant was an independent project. The structure of the
organization allowed for a level of independence at each plant and breaking the work into
separate projects that allowed for each to proceed at their own pace. The same approach
worked for participant P01. She planned the project for each plant in her organization
separately, in a way that enabled them to implement ERP sequentially across the
organization. These participants found that by breaking their initiatives into multiple
smaller projects, they were able to manage the changes more efficiently and had better
chances for goal achievement.
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Managed up and managed the informal leadership. Six participants (60%) not
only managed their respective change initiatives, but they also exercised leadership to
influence their peers and superiors, as well as the informal leadership of their respective
organizations. This need was most apparent in the ERP projects, where the transition to a
new organization with new systems was the objective. These leaders needed to ensure
that they had no naysayers at their senior leadership levels. As participant P02 put it, a Clevel peer, who disagreed with the change or the approach, could cause a project to fail. If
the senior leader openly and publicly expressed disagreement, that expression could be
picked up by others, including people with responsibilities to make the changes called for
in the plan. Those others could use the criticism by the C-level peer as a justification to
resist or otherwise not cooperate with the change process. P02 asked his C-level peers not
to express disagreement publicly. He requested that if they had a question about or a
problem with, what was happening, they should express it to him personally and privately
so that they did not unduly influence the organization to resist the change. P02 would
take their critique under advisement and either make changes to the projects or negotiate
with them for ways to satisfy their concerns without undue influence over the rest of the
organization. P02 also talked about the informal leadership. Every organization has
informal leaders, people who are not in the chain-of-command or charged with leadership
responsibility, but who are liked, respected, and trusted by the organization membership.
They can and often do influence what organizations believe and accept. P02 sought these
people out and made them part of the larger team, the guiding coalition that would
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support the changes. These informal leaders did not have responsibility for change or for
leading the organization, but they could easily create discord that could lead to project
failure. P02 avoided this by including these people in the planning and execution
processes of the change initiative. They were pulled in as part of the solution, with their
power to instigate resistance or somehow undermine the initiative significantly
diminished. They were, in effect, made part of the change initiative delivery and given a
vested interest in its success.
Established and posted metrics for progress reporting. Two participants (20%)
identified operational performance metrics and posted them for the organization. As
previously noted, participant P01 focused on inventory and production control
measurements routinely found in manufacturing operations. The mission became one of
improving those metrics rather than one of successfully installing ERP. A well-written
ERP system can significantly impact efficiency regarding order processing, accounting,
purchasing, inventory management, work-in-process management, and shipping,
distribution, and fulfillment control. These systems can affect improved performance in
the form of inventory on hand reduction, shortened manufacturing cycle times,
minimized shipping and transportation costs, and on-time fulfillment of orders for
finished goods. P01 managed her ERP implementations to identify these measurements
and to show how much they improved as a result of the ERP. The approach changed the
project team’s focus from ERP implementation to business process improvement. The
improved performance measurements demonstrated successful implementation.

271
Participant P08 did something similar when redefining the marketing programs for his
company. That change was to redefine marketing strategies and practices. He facilitated
meetings with the marketing personnel where they identified key performance indicators
for marketing programs and started tracking those measures while they worked to
transition their marketing practices from negative option marketing to a different
approach.
Recognized Change as a Constant. Three participants (30%) recognized change
as a constant, a routine part of management responsibility. Two participants recognized
transformational change as a unique requirement, apart from the more routine day-to-day
change that is an ongoing part of organizational operations. Participant P02 and his
position regarding the cyclical nature of change discussed previously, gave a
comprehensive overview of the continuous nature of change. Participant P04 had the
thought that change is a routine skill that a manager brings to the job with him. He had
difficulty, at first, understanding transformational change. He talked through this during
the interview and concluded that occasionally, major changes occur. When that happens,
the organization might need to stop, redesign, plan for change, then implement. He
conceded that there are occasions where transformational change is the responsibility of
the entire management team. P04’s understanding was the most common among
participants. Participant P07 was the only participant that recognized a difference
between routine or incremental change and transformational change without prompting.
P07 presented a transformational change program, one that changed the culture, the
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vision, the mission, the structure, and the business processes of the organization. The rest
of the participants either led transformational change programs without realizing that was
what they were doing, or they knew they were leading major change programs but were
unaware of the published literature about this activity. Most participants did not
understand the emphasis on transformational change, apart from leading other change,
until, in the course of the interview conversation, they thought through and realized the
distinction.
Limitations of the Study
This study started as an exploration to discover what successful change leaders,
employees of the organizations where they worked, experienced in leading that change to
success. The most significant limitation of this study was that the participant group was
small, with only 10 participants. That limitation came about because the findings
achieved saturation as defined by Giorgi (1997) quickly. The study was not expected to
achieve saturation that quickly, but it made no sense to pursue further contacts, given the
fact of this occurrence. The size of this participant group was small, and generalizability
is a concern, but the value of the study is clear. The insights show that practitioners’
experience, while similar to that prescribed by theoreticians and consultants, was
exercised independently without general knowledge of what was in the literature. Further
study is needed to substantiate the findings. Though this study was exploratory, it did
suggest that what successful change leaders do is different from what the literature
prescribes, at least insofar as to how these leaders approached their work. These leaders
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were successful. The literature, although expansive and mature, has not contributed to
reducing the failure rates noted by some scholars and others who study CM. Moreover,
the so-called failure rate seems to be a consultant’s convenience and not based on
practice.
The study participant group included only senior leaders, director level and above,
responsible for leading transformational change in small to large organizations. The
group included CEOs, CFOs, CIOs, General Managers, and Directors. The participant
group included people from multiple industries including education, manufacturing,
pharmaceuticals, and services. The projects presented represented various forms of
transformation including ERP implementations, reorganization, centralization, mergers
and acquisitions, and turn-around management. The findings are from a cross-section of
leadership and management activities and positions. The 13 projects given as examples
showed a variety of scenarios where transformational change occurs.
The results of this study are valuable to CM leaders and all others who take an
interest in transformational change in organizations. The study results were significant
beyond the senior executives who lead change. The results should also be significant to
all who are interested in CM, in particular, the scholars and consultants who have
supported the methodologies found in the literature. The external resources who
recognized the failure rate for transformational change initiatives remaining around 70%,
should reconsider, or at least question, that figure in light of these findings. What was
unique about the findings is that they represent results achieved by employees of
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changing organizations, held accountable for results, and these employees were
successful in achieving the desired outcomes in their change initiatives. These cases of
CM success offered a unique perspective that could enhance the usefulness of the
literature.
Recommendations
Further research is needed to augment the credibility and transferability of the
findings of this research. Qualitative studies designed to broaden participation, based on
the findings of this research, should be developed and executed. That research should be
structured to ensure that this research was not an aberration of the broader subject of
change management as it is exercised by successful organizational change leaders.
Further study should qualitatively show that the findings in this dissertation are not
outliers. The themes noted as strategies, tactics, behaviors, and practices used by the
study participants differ from what the literature reports in their application. That said,
much of what was represented by the study participants were similar to the
recommendations in the literature. Where they differed was in how they applied
leadership principles throughout the life of their projects. In leadership, they focused on
how they worked with people, participating in the social and cultural processes in ways
that retained the trust and respect of their respective organizations.
The comparison between external resources and executive employee leaders
needs further study by students and practitioners of change management. The theorists
reviewed in Chapter 2 did not show how they derived their theories, nor did they
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substantiate their credibility. They offered no replicable examples or fundamental
research that demonstrated their findings as transferable. Their findings, as presented, are
not generalizable from a research perspective. Most of the authors reviewed mentioned
one or more of the themes found in this research, but not as primary causes of success. If
they mentioned a theme, it was usually defined or applied differently. For example,
Kotter (1996/2010) recognized a need for leadership to execute his eight steps, but that
represented only one of his eight steps. He did not indicate how important that particular
step was to success. He talked about selecting leaders who were team players and were
not ego drive or troublemakers. One of his steps was about communication, but it was
more of a top-down type of communication, to disseminate a vision throughout the
organization. Kotter’s concept of communication did not seem to suggest the two-way
communication needed to foster collaborative decision making and execution throughout
the life of the change initiative. That said, Chapter 2 presented the works of experienced
scholars and consultants, noted CM researchers and leaders. Their theories may well be
credible, but they did not include sufficient data to validate this fact. Further research is
needed to establish the validity of their theories.
Further research is needed to establish whether the literature review
recommendations are, in fact, successful in fostering transformational change. As it
stands, transformational change failure appears to have hovered around 70% of all
initiatives undertaken by organizations for at least the past 60+ years. Most of the
literature reviewed in Chapter 2 was developed during that period, yet that statistic for
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transformational change remains unchanged. The concepts of transformational change
management appeared highly situational. The research showed that transformational
change is something that happens over time in highly dynamic environments that are
simultaneously evolving in other ways. This type of change does not seem to lend itself
to the execution of structured or standard practices or theories, as presented in the
literature. Some cases might need more focus on project planning or leadership,
management, or execution practices, while others might need to focus more on training
and development or other culture change needs. Most change leaders probably require
some mixture of these characteristics. The change initiatives themselves may be very
complex, requiring a combination of strategies and tactics drawn from various
disciplines. These initiatives may be so complex that each change requires custom
planning and execution, may require being broken up into multiple initiatives, each with
its own definition of success. There might be a need for highly flexible execution in a
highly dynamic environment that is evolving over the time spent executing the changes.
That seemed to be the case among several of the participants in this study. Further
research is needed to establish this fact.
I do not question the competence of the scholars and consultants reported in the
literature review as change leaders; the criticism is limited to the facts that they did not
present sufficient evidence to validate their claims or enable replication of their findings,
and their research was focused on failed change initiatives. They should have focused on
successful initiatives to determine why they were successful rather than trying to
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understand why unsuccessful initiatives failed. In the meantime, the published failure
rates continue at extraordinarily high levels and have done so for over 60 years. If the
strategies recommended by the scholars and consultants reviewed in Chapter 2 are valid,
they should be at least replicable in the sense that similar studies could be mounted that
produce similar results. Those strategies should show a history of adoption and should
have affected the published failure rates. They should be verifiable with fundamental
research. None of the authors reviewed in Chapter 2 gave enough background to enable
this testing. Thus, the theories of the authors in Chapter 2 remain unproven and
unsupported, and the recommendation here is that additional research is needed to
validate the findings suggested in the literature for CM.
The research was empirical phenomenology. This study was a phenomenological
exploration to understand what employee change leaders, those executives employed by
the organizations where they worked, responsible for delivering results in
transformational change, did to ensure success. The recommendations in the literature
were thought valid as organization executives were contacted and interviewed for this
study. The study asked these leaders to describe a recent successful transformational
change initiative where they succeeded and to explain in detail what they did to achieve
that success. This questioning was open-ended, expecting they would tell stories about
successes that would either validate or refute the literature. The executives involved in
this study did not follow the recommendations in the literature, although they did exercise
many of the steps and activities that the literature authors suggested. When they did this,
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they were not acting in response to knowledge gained from the literature. As such, they
neither validated or refuted the literature. They acted in ways that the literature suggested
but not in response to what was in the literature. They were acting as managers and
leaders, as trained over the years in their personal and professional development. Some of
the participants were aware of the literature but still did not necessarily apply those
strategies. Instead, they focused more on collaborative leadership, allowing for
continuous open communication, defining expected outcomes, changing their
organization’s focus, and fostering organization-wide recognition of the need for change.
They focused on goals and directed their organizations to those ends.
This research needs broader coverage due to the disparity of these findings and
the impreciseness of the literature. This study was an exploratory exercise to ask
successful change leaders what they did to achieve success. The study needs expansion to
ensure that these findings are valid, reliable, and generalizable. At the start, the strategies
noted in the literature review were accepted as valid techniques for facilitating change.
While the research did not confirm these strategies, neither did it refute them. They were
there but exercised differently. Further work leading to fundamental research is needed to
show how the strategies noted in the literature, as well as the strategies used by the study
participants, bring about successful transformational change in organizations.
Further research is needed. The recommendations in the literature are
unsupported. Change research needs more comprehensive qualitative and quantitative
research to demonstrate the validity of the literature. Most of the authors in the literature
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review did not provide this validation, although they did refer to examples from their
experience that demonstrated points they were making. Through these examples, they
showed a depth of experience that suggests their recommendations could be valid, but
they did not provide adequate validation of their findings. Likewise, this study was an
exploratory qualitative study to learn how successful change leaders foster
transformational change success. This research needs expansion, to clarify the disparity
between what change leaders do for success and what the literature recommends they
should do. Thus, further qualitative research is needed. This research necessitates
multiple levels or layers, growing into the conduct of fundamental research that
establishes internally and externally valid practices that are reliable and objective
recommendations for change strategies.
CM and OD disciplines. CM is an engineering discipline associated with systems
design and business administration. This discipline is a technical science used to design
and maintain organizational structure for exercising efficient communication,
organizational transaction processing, and activity resolution. OD is more of a cultural
discipline, focused on creating work environments supportive of organizational
participants. Indeed, Schein’s (2010) work was exclusively about culture change. He saw
change management as a function of changing the culture.
In transformational change, both disciplines were critical to success.
Transformational change involved the redefinition of the organization (Burke, 2014). It
redefined the mission, the underlying business processes, and the work environment for
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the organization. Burke noted that when change occurred, it was people that were
changing. Without people change, transactional and structural change cannot happen.
Both disciplines, OD and CM, needed to address change or the potential for failure of the
change initiative increased. The two disciplines are interdependent. One cannot achieve
planned results without the other. While some scholars in Chapter 2 recognized this, it
was not a consensus of understanding. Most of those scholars did not mention this
distinction. Instead, they were more focused on one or the other discipline. Their
presentations seemed to hold these two disciplines separately, with CM relegated to the
project management element of a business analyst in the information systems and
technology management activity. OD was presented as more of a human resource
activity, relegated to human resource or training departments. Change is possible with
one or the other of these disciplines, but the potential for failure increases. As Burke said,
change occurs because people change. Process change is, by comparison, easy.
Implications
Change happens. As the study participants in Chapter 4 suggested, change is a
continuous happening that occasionally rises to a level of transformational change. As
participant P02 noted, Change is a never-ending cyclical process. Once you invoke a
change, that change drives out one or more other changes, which in turn drives out more
changes, until they ultimately cause a need to change the original change that started the
process. Duck (2001) made this point but did so differently. The results of a major
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change eventually resulted in changing whatever started that process in the first place.
This cycle of change will go on for as long as an organization exists.
Chapter 1 of this study indicated that the most likely beneficiaries of this research
would be anyone responsible for leading change. If this study led to a reduction in the
published failure rates for transformational change, it could conceivably lead to a
reduction in the negative social impacts of failed change initiatives. Sensitivity to the
possibility of job losses due to change failure drove this research. Possible job losses due
to change failure and the social impact to communities surrounding changing
organizations remained at the forefront. If the findings here were generalizable, they
might also be transferable. An impact statement of such an outcome follows, in the form
of a statement of relevant contribution to positive social change.
If the CM and OD industries had presented integrated, validated theories,
strategies, and practices that were generalizable and transferable, those theories might be
more heavily adopted and organizational leaders more likely to use them with
confidence. Most importantly, organizational leaders would not fail 20%, 70%, or 92% of
the time when executing transformational change. The CM literature was predominantly
the product of scholars, scholar-practitioners, and external consultants, all external
resources contracted by working organizations to assist in exercising CM in continued
operations. These theorists have not established the criteria needed to demonstrate how to
achieve successful transformational change. Actual working change leaders, those
employees of organizations responsible for effecting transformational change, have
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contributed very little to the literature. There is little showing what successful change
leaders do to execute transformational change in organizations where they work.
Employee change leaders have a different perspective from external resources, driven by
the fact that if their change initiative fails, not only are they at risk of losing their jobs,
thus damaging their careers but also at risk of causing other job losses in turn, in a
domino effect. At their worst extremes, these leaders might also cause organization
failure. If this collapse were large enough, it could significantly impact the community
surrounding the organization.
One or a few people losing their jobs in a healthy economy is not very impactful
to the society where those people live. If a corner convenience store closes, that might
represent job losses for, at the most, 5 to 20 people. That includes the ripple effect, jobs at
other organizations, lost because these people no longer work at the convenience store. If
a larger organization were to fail, the impact is much different. One example that
demonstrated this probability occurred during the U.S. economic recession started in
2007 and continued through 2012. The Big 3 automakers; Ford, General Motors, and
Chrysler were on the verge of bankruptcy at the beginning of the recession. Had they
failed, that would have represented a loss of approximately one million jobs, plus the
ripple effect for those losses (Amadeo, 2017). Estimating that ripple effect is difficult.
The U. S. Department of Labor does not estimate the residual impact of job losses
throughout a community because of the complexity of that impact. As people lose jobs,
many find new work relatively quickly. If the Big 3 auto manufacturers had failed in
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bankruptcy, other manufacturers might move in and fill the void in the auto market left
by those closures. Many workers, let go because of the failure, would have found new
jobs elsewhere. The same is true for the ripple effect. As the industry recovered, those
jobs lost in the community might become available again as other businesses vied for the
lost market share. To examine the impact of lost manufacturing jobs, one economist
estimated that each manufacturing job in an economy leads to 1.9 jobs in the community
that rely directly or indirectly on that manufacturing job. These are mostly supply-chain
positions related to the goods, services, and raw materials needed in support of
manufacturing (Moran, 2004). There are other jobs beyond the direct and indirect
employees of the supply chain supporting the manufacturer, in the form of local services,
such as restaurant workers, retailers, household services, transportation services, and so
on. These workers also rely on the manufacturing job for their existence. These losses are
even harder to estimate. Calabresi (2009/2016) noted that in unhealthy economy job
losses grow, leading to more job losses in the organization and in the community. These
community job losses lead to further job losses in the goods and services industries
surrounding the community, to further losses in the governmental and public services
agencies that support the community and leading to what he called a perfect vicious circle
of less available work for job seekers (para. 5).
The ability for an organization to effect transformational change is a significant
advantage, not only at individual and organizational levels but within the community as
well. Each job not lost enables continued economic support to the organization and the

284
community. The estimates noted above suggest that the job losses had the Big 3 auto
manufacturers failed, would have been approximately 2.9 million jobs. There would have
been an uncountable impact on the local retail and services economies, which would have
been heavily impacted, requiring government services would have also needed to cut
back. A perfect vicious circle (Calabresi, 2009/2016), where just as those services were
needed for the millions of jobs lost, the local and regional governments would not have
been able to provide them. Economic depression in Some sections of the U. S. economy
would have occurred with that large of an impact. U. S. Government investments in the
Big 3 auto manufacturers avoided those job losses. However, the onset of the recession
was known a year before it happened. Had the Big 3 automakers forecast that event and
started planning for change, the U. S. Government might have avoided providing them
with a bailout.
CM and OD are part of the management consulting industry. The companies that
help large organizations change are the primary authors of the most widely read
leadership and change literature. Those authors routinely cite the scholars who study CM
and OD. Often, they are the scholars who conducted the research, as in the cases of
Kotter (1996/2010) or Jorgensen et al. (2014). Many organizations consult academia
directly, rather than use professional consultants. Organizations rely on companies and
universities to provide consulting services; delivering the training, development, and
other leadership support needed to facilitate change.
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The CM industry has not changed the potential for CM failure, as evidenced by
the fact that the reported failure rates have not declined. The reported failure rates in
recent years (Isern & Pung, 2007; Jorgensen et al., 2008; Jorgensen et al., 2014; Kotter,
2014; Conner, 2012) are essentially the same as were reported in the 1940s and early
1950s (Lewin, 1997/2010; Schein, 2010). The theories noted in Chapter 2 seemed not to
have reduced the potential for transformational change failure, were not validated, and
are not generalizable as they stand. Whether the failure was due to a fragmented
understanding of the CM or OD industries, or some other reason, successful employee
change leaders seem not to do what the authors of those theories recommend. If followed,
the theory recommendations should have reduced the probability of failure in
transformational change. The theories should have reduced the possibility of employee
terminations due to failure, reduced the chances for the organization itself to fail, and
quite possibly avoided an economic impact in the community where the organizations
existed and worked. That wasn’t the case.
Conclusions
There are several obvious conclusions from this study. CM, as a discipline,
although having a long history of extensive study, is inadequately supported in the
literature. It appears to be more complex, more complicated, and idiosyncratic than the
research suggests. Until the quality of the published theories includes fundamental
research, the literature will continue, at best, to represent only conjecture about possible
strategies and tactics for leading change initiatives. I intend to pursue this research until
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there is an adequate underlying study that supports generalizations and transferability of
what works in CM.
There are two primary kinds of change, evolutionary and transformational (Burke,
2017; Jick & Sturtevant, 2017). There are also two disciplines that influence our
understanding of change; CM and OD. Evolutionary change is minor change that occurs
during normal organizational operations. This type of change is typically handled by the
affected operative within the organization as it occurs. It does not include changing the
mission, the organization design, or the culture. It is typically changing a process step or
a structure. It is not likely to involve culture change at all. Transformational change is
revolutionary. It involves a redefinition of an organization. It can include a changed
vision, mission, organizational design, a change in products or services, or a change in
staffing. The organization that emerges from transformational change is something
different from when it started that process. This type of change includes cultural
considerations, offering training and personnel development or redeployment, that
encourages personal and group social change to work with the new vision.
Change appears more complex and situationally oriented than general theories
seems to allow. What works in one case may not work in another. Every change initiative
seems unique in the sense that what works in one context may not work in another. Often,
contingencies apply to a change that might alter the approach and methods used to effect
change. The same change in a similar organization might require a completely different
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approach to ensure success. The similarities from one change initiative to the next may
vary, dependent upon the underlying culture and context.
CM seems to be, first and foremost, a leadership discipline (as opposed to a
management discipline). Change appears to be an outcome of applied leadership practices
as much as it is the result of following some methodology or process designed to
facilitate change. Much of the leadership literature is actually about change. For example,
Peters and Waterman (1982/2012) wrote about organizational excellence and identified
several leading companies, recommending their emulation. One participant in this study
noted that any organization wishing to emulate those companies would need to initiate a
transformational change project or program. Goldratt and Cox (2004) wrote about
process improvement. Any organization considering process improvements such as
Goldratt and Cox suggested would need to plan for transformational change to apply the
approach that Goldratt and Cox advocated. Senge (2006) wrote about systems thinking,
suggesting that organizations are a system and should not only manage their business but
also manage the system connectivity across their organization. Any organization wanting
to adopt Senge’s perspective would need to plan for transformational change to achieve
it. Argyris 2010, Beer and Nohria (2010) Blanchard (2010) Bradford and Burke (2005a,
2005b) and the many others cited earlier offered many approaches to OD and business
execution. As organization leaders plan their change initiatives they must consider the
design and structuring that accentuates learning at a systems level which should be built
into the infrastructure and system of the organization.
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This study has reviewed the literature for CM theory and methodology and found
that the primary activities of actual employee change leaders, the strategies, tactics,
behaviors, and practices, were, at best, coincidentally included in the theories suggested
by CM scholars. The CM literature reviewed in Chapter 2 does not show what successful
change leaders in organizations do, day-to-day, to successfully invoke change. Instead,
those scholars and authors focused more on failure and what they recommended that
change leaders do to avoid that outcome. What successful change leaders did to succeed
was not clear in the Chapter 2 presentations, although there were point examples given to
demonstrate one step or tactic, or another. That led to the study presented here, to explore
the strategies, tactics, behaviors, and practices of successful employee change leaders,
that led to successful transformational change. While the Chapter 4 study has broadened
knowledge of CM, there is more work to be done. Research is needed to expand
knowledge in this area beyond the conjecture of qualified scholars and consultants. While
the authors cited in the literature review were obviously qualified and experienced change
researchers and leaders, and their contributions are well said, the literature needs to
expand to where it includes fundamental research that demonstrates their theories are
substantiated, generalizable, nor transferable. This study is not complete. It expanded
knowledge in change leadership by focusing on the experiences of successful employee
change leaders in working organizations, to learn what they did to achieve
transformational change success. However, this work was just another qualitative study,
much like those cited in the literature review. The findings only lead to more research to
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expand the knowledge of change leadership until it includes internal and external validity
and is a reliable and objective qualification of the strategies and tactics recommended for
achieving change management success.
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Appendix A: Welcome Letter
{Letter Date}
{Participant Address}
Dear {Participant}
You are invited to participate over the coming weeks, in a research project designed to
explore experiences like yours in change leadership. To participate, you may need to
commit up to three hours of your time over the next 10 to 12 weeks, spread over two or
three meetings.
The research entails you telling me about the single biggest challenge you struggle with
in your change initiatives. If you could take a few minutes to outline this challenge, it
would mean the world to me and most importantly, help generate the information needed
to frame my research in change leadership. You can respond to this through survey web
page at http://www.leadership-and-change.com/
You can also schedule a brief meeting to discuss your experiences. This could be done
telephonically, and would serve as a mutual introduction and to plan going forward. The
meeting should not last more than five to ten minutes, but I would stay on as long as
needed to plan for understanding your experience.
We can then set another time for a longer conversation, to describe your experiences in
depth. After that, we can meet again to ensure that the research matches your
understanding. Your input will be merged with others and summarized in a report. I
expect to speak with between 10 and 20 people during this project. We can meet a third
time to review the summary if you wish. Regardless, you will receive a copy of this
report, detailing the broader understanding of the success factors found during the study.
I should reiterate that no participants will be identified in this study. Findings will be
structured to protect confidentiality. For questions or comments, you can reach me by
email. I welcome and look forward to hearing from you. If, after completing the survey,
there are no questions and I do not hear from you, I will call to schedule our introduction.
Sincerely,
Michael E. Moore
Ph. D. Candidate
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Appendix B: Introductory Phone Script
First Contact:
Hello, {participant}? My name is Michael Moore. Thanks for your interest in
learning more about my study of change management. I’d like to introduce myself and
the study and answer any questions you might have. Then, if you are interested in going
forward we can set up a time to talk at length. Do you have a few minutes to talk now?
(Yes): Excellent. This conversation should not take more than about 10 minutes
and includes planning for a later meeting of up to an hour of your time, to talk in detail
about your experiences. Does that sound okay?
(No): That is fine, when would be a more convenient time to call back?
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Appendix C: Online Survey
Research Participation Data
The following survey collects basic administrative information needed before
entering into an interview about change management. Interview time will be limited, and
completing this survey enables sharing this basic information without consuming
interview time to gather it.
1.

Your name

2.

Organization

3.

Phone Number

4.

Email

5.

Business Address
Street
City, State, Zip
Mail-drop

6.

Best time to contact you
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7.

Describe the change management project that brought you to participate in
this research:

8. Top three goals for the project
1st goal
2nd Goal
3rd Goal
9.

Top three problems that occurred during the project
First problem
Second problem
Third problem

10.

On Scale, how successful would you rate the project outcome?
Unsuccessful
Successful
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Appendix D: Interview Questions
1. Tell me about the change initiative you were responsible for; that prompted
you to participate in this study. What was it like; how did you approach it?
RQ1 What behaviors and other practices do internal change leaders seem to exercise,
what do they do differently from what external change practitioners suggest, that results
in change management success?
2. Talk about the things you did well, what you could have done better, and
why?
3. How do you define successful change management, how do you know when
you have achieved it?
4. Have you read any professional or academic literature on managing change?
Was it useful in your own efforts? Was your experience what you expected
after reading their articles/books? What was different?
RQ2 To what do employee change leaders attribute to the high failure rates in change
management and how do these leaders show through their lived experiences to avoid
them?
5. What words describe change management?
6. Have you ever heard that 70% of change efforts fail? Did that influence your
own strategy in managing change?
7. What would it mean to you to fail in a change project; what happens and how
is it explained?
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RQ3 How, given the extraordinarily high potential for failure, do these leaders continue
to exercise change management practices successfully in their organizations?
8. How do you feel about change management in your organization?
9. What practices or behaviors do you see other change leaders exercising to
achieve success?
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Appendix E: Confidentiality Agreement
{Name of Signer}:
During my data collection activity for the research: “An Exploration of the Causes
of Success and Failure of Managed Change” I will have access to information, which
may be confidential and should not be disclosed. I acknowledge that the information must
remain confidential recognizing that improper disclosure of confidential information
could damage the participant.
By signing this Confidentiality Agreement, I acknowledge and agree that:
1. I will not disclose or discuss any confidential information with others,
including friends or family.
2. I will not in any way divulge, copy, release, sell, loan, alter or destroy any
confidential information except as properly authorized.
3. I will not discuss confidential information where others can overhear the
conversation. I understand that it is not acceptable to discuss confidential
information even if the participant’s name is not used.
4. I will not make any unauthorized transmissions, inquiries, modification or
purging of confidential information.
5. I agree that my obligations under this agreement will continue after
termination of the job that I will perform.
6. I understand that violation of this agreement will have legal implications.
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7. I will only access or use systems or devices I am officially authorized to
access, and I will not demonstrate the operation or function of systems or
devices to unauthorized individuals.
Signing this document, I acknowledge that I have read the agreement, and I agree to
comply with all the terms and conditions stated above.

Signature:

Date:

Participant

Researcher

By:

by:

_____________________

Title:

____________________

Dated: _______________________

____________________

Title:

___________________

Dated: ______________________

